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ABSTRACT

Dwight Eisenhower has long been thought of as a president who did not think about
politics in a coherent way. This project finds, however, that Eisenhower was a coherent and
systematic thinker about politics. The first chapter explores the sources of Eisenhower’s political
thought. In this chapter I establish that he had both the resources and inclination to reflect
seriously on politics from early adulthood forward. Next, in Chapter 2, I outline his view of
freedom in conjunction with how he thought about the state and society. Here, I find that he held
that the state must be powerful enough to accomplish big tasks, such as the interstate highway
system, but not so powerful that citizens could not hold it accountable. After establishing his
thought on big political concepts, I turn to Eisenhower’s thought on communism in Chapter 3.
He imagined communism as a multifaceted threat that combined a spiritual challenge to America
along with political and military challenges. Shifting back to America, Chapter 4 focuses on
Eisenhower’s perception of America as a unique political system. He was convinced that
gradual progress was always likely to occur within America’s existing institutions and he had
confidence in the innate goodness of the national character, fueled by his belief in America’s
divine mandate to be an example of freedom to the world. I then turn, in Chapter 5, to exploring
Eisenhower’s unique brand of conservatism, which blends elements of traditional small
government with progressivism. Although he did not fit neatly into either group, he exhibited
both progressive and traditional conservative traits. Finally, I explore Eisenhower’s view of the
proper relationship between religion and American society in Chapter 6. He insisted that a broad
religious commitment among America’s citizens was the most important weapon for the
country’s Cold War arsenal. He also argued that the basis of citizenship in America was an
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individual belief in a divine power. Overall, I find that understanding Eisenhower as a thinker
allows the student of American politics to understand both his actions and the politics of his time
in a new way.

xiv

INTRODUCTION
To explore Eisenhower’s significance as a political thinker it is important to first
establish a definition of political thought. My conception of political thought comes from
distinguishing it from two concepts that are more frequently addressed in political theory and
political science, respectively. The first thing that political thought differs from is political
philosophy. I do not here use the term political philosophy in the way that political theorists
most commonly use it today. That is to say that I am not arguing that a specific portion of
political theory rises to the level philosophic inquiry, while most of the subfield fails to achieve
this aim. Put more bluntly, I am not entering the debate between those theorists who study
Strauss and those who do not about what truly matters in the study of political theory. Instead, I
conceive of political philosophy as systematic reflection on human nature that is then applied to
conceptual thinking about government. Political philosophy, in other words, is concerned about
best regime types, in the broadest possible sense. Political philosophy, then, tends toward the
abstract and the general, while viewing its task as a timeless one. According to this definition,
Eisenhower was not a political philosopher. He was not, in fact, a philosopher of any kind.
Secondly, this dissertation is not merely an evaluation of Eisenhower’s political opinion.
I define political opinion as a personal judgment one makes about a given issue at a given time.
Opinions, in this way, are non-systematic, as they do not require thought about more than one
issue at a time. Opinions may be thoughtful or rash, reasonable or unfounded, but what unifies
them in my conception is that they are related to a present issue only. One may have an opinion
about whether a senator ought to be reelected or whether the United Nations should pass a
specific resolution. The way that I will approach Eisenhower’s thought will be different. I will
analyze some of his opinions in order to better establish the content of his thought, but the aim of
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the project is not to survey how he felt about particular political issues at specific times.
Quantitative political science is frequently concerned with political opinion in a variety of
settings. Public opinion, elite opinions, the opinions of members of congress, and the opinions
of judges are all topics where extensive and helpful work has been done by political scientists in
recent decades. Following this model, the field could stand to benefit from a rigorous study of
the political opinions of presidents, grouped, for example, into governing ideologies or partisan
affiliation. As intriguing as that project sounds, this project is something different.
My argument throughout the dissertation will be that Eisenhower was an important
political thinker, whose thought influenced the course of national politics, his party’s governing
stance for years to come, and the American public consciousness on what to look for in a
president. By political thinking I mean that Eisenhower thought consistently, intentionally, and
coherently about American politics. He thought intensely both about the challenges he felt
Americans needed to address domestically, and he thought carefully about America’s place in
the world. He thought frequently about the fundamental character of the American people, and
he thought about the strengths and limits of the American systems of commerce and government.
He did this thinking from before he entered politics through the end of his life, which was nearly
a decade after he left the White House.

The Case of Presidents and Political Thought
The combination of presidents and political thought is something that has not been deeply
studied in any academic discipline. Most of the major works on the presidency in political
science, for example, attempt to understand the character of the institution by examining the
actions of particular presidents. Books of this kind include Stephen Skowronek’s The Politics
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Presidents Make and Presidential Leadership in Political Time, Richard Neustadt’s Presidential
Power and the Modern Presidents and Jeffrey Tulis’ The Rhetorical Presidency. The other usual
way presidents are approached is via the academic biography. These appear in history, such
Stephen Ambrose’s Eisenhower: Soldier and President and in political science, as is the case
with Fred Greenstein’s The Hidden-Hand Presidency.
Only within the last decade has a book that takes the political thought of presidents
seriously and systematically appeared. This is the aptly titled Presidents and Political Thought,
written by political scientist David Siemers. In the opening chapter Siemers does an admirable
job describing how he chose the six specific presidents he profiles. He is persuasive in arguing
that, since he hoped to show a wide array of presidents some important figures had to be left out.
John Quincy Adams is left out, though he had a deep education in political theory, because his
primary teacher was his father, who is included for analysis. Lincoln is left out, Siemers argues,
because, in spite of being what he calls “the office’s most fascinating occupant,” Lincoln never
had an appetite for using the classical tools of political theory.1
The important thing for this dissertation is that Siemers does not feel the need to justify
why Eisenhower is left out of his analysis. Eisenhower is mentioned only once in the book and it
is an instance where he is grouped together with a few other postwar presidents in order to make
a comparison in service to a larger point about Woodrow Wilson. At the risk of sounding trite,
there is an opening for the study of Eisenhower’s political thought because the person who wrote
the seemingly lone book on presidents and political thought did not even find it important to
explain why Eisenhower did not merit close study. The implicit argument for why Eisenhower is
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not included can be found in the definition Siemers gives for presidents who displayed serious
political thought. He puts it this way:
Most presidents have found most of their ideas outside of political theory. However, a
sizable percentage of presidents have used tools housed in the political-theory toolbox.
In these cases it was not political theory itself that caused anything. Each president was
fully for his own actions.2
Siemers is arguing that the president who has been concerned with political thought has
not been a traditional philosopher. Rather, the presidents he profiles have been men of political
action who found it important to think about politics in a particular way in order to maximize the
chance for political success. The combination, not the separation, of thought and action are
hallmarks of political thought oriented presidents, in Siemers’ telling. While I agree with this
analysis, I find that Siemers makes a small misstep, which leads to him ignore Eisenhower as an
important example of a political thinker in the White House.
Just before this definition Siemers provides a different definition. In arguing for the
coherence of the choices he made about which presidents to include he noted that those who
received significant attention in the work “define[d] their own theoretical inspiration from among
those who have written systematic arguments about politics that attempt to be broadly applicable
across time and place.”3 The difference in establishing the threshold of presidential political
thought as one who relied on the systematic writings of others from one who “relied on the
tools” of political thought is an important one. Eisenhower was not someone quick to quote the
seminal figures of political theory, but he did engage with the ideas that theorists such as Locke,
Marx, Weber, and others put forth. He did not rely on systematic writings to form the basis of
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his thought, but he did “use the tools” these writers provide. He was intentional, specific, and
motivated in his thinking about politics. He was a president whose actions, during his time in
office cannot easily be separated from the underlying thought from which they flowed.
Though he does not include Eisenhower in his book, Siemers provides an important
paradigm for thinking of presidents as serious political thinkers. For that reason, this dissertation
will, in part, be extending Siemers’ work to a new case study.

Eisenhower’s Political Thought in Political Time
Stephen Skowronek is one of the most influential contributors to the study of the
American presidency among political scientists in the past half century. One of his most
noteworthy ideas is the concept of how the presidency relates to a concept he calls political time.
In his work, The Politics Presidents Make, Skowronek argues that presidents are not entirely free
actors, but are constrained by the institutional limits the presidency itself faces due to a given set
of political realities, at a specific historical moment. He develops a four-part sequential structure
that he believes describes the usual transition of presidencies in the United States.
The strongest situation a president can inherit is that of a reconstruction leader. These
presidents are the most important figures in new political coalitions and usually enjoy a high
level of support among voters, as well as in congress. They take advantage of their popularity to
achieve important pieces of their agenda, because they are seen as correctives to the previous and
now unpopular paradigm. These presidents are often remembered for being “great” presidents.
Presidents Skowronek puts in this category include Washington, Franklin Roosevelt, and
Reagan. Coming just after a reconstruction president is an articulation leader. This is someone
who is elected on the basis of the ruling coalition’s popularity, but this president does not have
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the personal popularity that the reconstruction president possessed. The two main reasons for
this are that the articulation president faces challenges from within the party about leadership
over its future and that there is no reverence attached to the articulation president, as there had
been for the reconstruction president. These presidents usually end up being seen as moderately
successful, though they have a difficult time winning reelection. Some notables in this group
include Truman, Nixon, and George H.W. Bush.
Second to reconstruction, the best a president can hope for in political time is to be a
preemption executive. These presidents do not fully unseat the governing coalition, but they are
able to access a measure of growing public discontent with the ruling party’s priorities. Thus,
preemption presidents often enjoy a good deal of legislative success by brokering compromise
deals and are generally charismatic personally, which contributes to their ability to attain
success. Representative examples of preemption presidents include Clinton and Eisenhower. I
will take up Skowronek’s classification of Eisenhower and its importance for this dissertation
below. The final of Skowronek’s types is the disjunction president. This is someone who is
elected largely because the opposition party has not yet become powerful enough to
fundamentally unseat the ruling coalition, but at a time when the ruling coalition is quickly
faltering. These presidents, in Skowronek’s view, have no chance of success and are often
remembered as the worst presidents in history. Figures in this group include Pierce and Carter.
This four-part scheme is the key to understanding how to place expectations for a current
president and for correctly analyzing the link between presidents across time. The most
important insight contained in this structure is that presidencies are not merely tests of the
political acumen of the current office holder, but rather each president inherits a set of challenges
and opportunities that flows directly from the relationship between the presidency and the

6

politics of the time. The downside of Skowronek’s analysis is that he sometimes downplays the
importance of personal decisions, styles, and thought. This is where he makes a misstep in
understanding Eisenhower.
Though he includes Eisenhower as being a preemption president, he does not devote
much attention to analyzing Eisenhower’s time in office. He seems to believe, as do the majority
of other scholars on the presidency, that Eisenhower was unremarkable as a chief executive and
that, because of his lack of discernable thought or memorable personality studying him is likely
to be a fruitless endeavor. If Skowronek had given Eisenhower a closer look, though, he would
have found a way in which his theory could have been improved with some nuance.
Specifically, Eisenhower is something of both a preemption and a reconstruction president.
While it is true that he was elected by running against New Deal economic policies, it is also the
case that his victory was thanks partly to his status as a nationally renowned and respected
figure. Once in office he was able to use his popularity with voters and his calm public
demeanor to influence attitudes about the scope and purposes of government. Another
conservative figure would likely have had difficulty arguing publicly against Roosevelt’s
political legacy.
That Eisenhower played a more important role in the history of the presidency than has
often been thought is important, but that revelation does not itself make the case that Eisenhower
merits study as a political thinker. The two arguments-that he played an important role in the
development of American politics and that his political thought was notable-do complement each
other nicely, though. One of the ways that they are linked can be demonstrated by studying
Eisenhower’s role in postwar conservatism.
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Eisenhower as Part of the Conservative Story
The most important scholar of American conservatism is historian George Nash. His
book, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, is several decades old, yet is still
thought to be the seminal chronicle of the development of conservative political thinking in the
United States. Eisenhower is mentioned a few times throughout the work, but he is not a
prominent character in Nash’s story. The first mention of Eisenhower comes in a chapter titled
“The Recovery of Tradition and Values.” In this chapter, Nash argues that the 1950s saw a
return to American traditionalism and public religiosity. Nash notes that Eisenhower began his
first inaugural address with a prayer, something that was not common at the time, and that the
president’s decision to attend a church during his years in office was seen by Eisenhower and his
advisors as an important public act.4 Later in the chapter, in a section analyzing the writings of
Russell Kirk, Nash cites Kirk’s description of the early 50s as “the early days of the apparently
conservative administration of President Eisenhower.”5 Similar to the way Skowronek treats
Eisenhower, Nash seems to be implicitly arguing that Eisenhower’s place in American
conservatism was not important because of his own contributions to conservative thought, but
rather because he found himself serving as president at an important time during the history of
conservative development in America.
In his chapter on the Red Scare of the 1950s, Nash portrays Eisenhower’s role in
McCarthy’s downfall as being passive. Specifically, he argues that McCarthy’s popularity
dropped only after he publicly attacked Eisenhower’s commitment to fighting communism.
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DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2006), 87.
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Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 112.
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Since Eisenhower was seen as a national, rather than a partisan, hero this discredited McCarthy
in the eyes of many Americans who believed his accusations to be plausible before his attack on
the president.6 Nash argues that as Eisenhower’s presidency progressed movement conservatives
went from suspicion to contempt for his credentials. In 1956, for example, William F. Buckley
argued that Eisenhower was only a marginally better choice than Stevenson, but that he still
represented nothing more than “measured socialism.”7 During his second term, Buckley’s
critiques would go from stringent to hysterical. Eisenhower had committed a “sin against
reality” by refusing to identify and respond to the Soviet aim of world domination.8
Nash lists a string of conservative of critiques against Eisenhower in order to make a
compelling point: That “the intellectual conservative movement” faced “estrangement from the
immensely popular President Eisenhower,”9 which meant there was no point of significant
access for movement conservatives to control high political offices throughout the 1950s. Nash
notes this because he is establishing the conditions under which conservatism developed
intellectually in the years after World War II. For the purposes of this dissertation, however,
Nash’s analysis leaves out the important fact that Eisenhower was a part of the intellectual
development of both conservatism and American politics during his decade in office. He was
not, it is true, an ideological conservative, but he was an influential conservative, regardless of
whether figures like Buckley approved of him.
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Eisenhower as a Political Thinker
In 1964, Eisenhower was invited to address the Republican National Convention. This
was a contentious convention, as Barry Goldwater’s supporters were fighting off efforts to
replace him with a more centrist nominee. Eisenhower’s speech gave a nod to this strife, but he
did not spend time discussing it, nor did he take a side. Instead, he gave a broad speech that
highlighted the culmination of his political thinking. It was an address he hoped would unify the
party around what he believed were shared ideals of Republican orthodoxy. After beginning
with some platitudes about the connection between Lincoln and the contemporary Republicans
Eisenhower moved to providing a broad vision of what he felt fundamentally animated
Republican philosophy. Republicans, he argued, “[had] ever sought to create an atmosphere of
liberty and to sustain”10 individual liberty.
He went on to describe Republican politics, over the decades, like this: “We have
maintained that in all those things that the citizen can do better for himself than can his
government, the government ought not to interfere.”11 Conservatives may have debated whether
Eisenhower’s standard of when the government was needed to help a citizen was good enough,
but his philosophical disposition was clear. He thought of himself as someone who had
combatted the notion that the government can, as a routine matter, be counted on to solve
complex societal problems. Later, he moved to a defense of his administration that rested on the
notion that he had been a proud standard bearer of Republican values. For example, he argued
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that his presidency had meant both that America had a military force capable of meeting the
Soviet threat, yet also a leader ready to caution the people that a standing military would “spell
always waste and inefficiency and extravagance.”12 Rejecting the charge that Republicans were
too aggressive in international affairs he noted that the past three wars had all come under the
leadership of Democratic presidents. The conservative position on armed conflict, in
Eisenhower’s telling, was to never seek it and to avoid having a military large enough to drain
important economic resources anymore than present threats required.
Closing out his speech, which would be the last one on such a prominent national stage,
Eisenhower used intimate language to describe his attachment to conservative thinking and the
Republican Party. It is worth quoting this passage in full.
This, then, in sketchy outline, is my treasured picture of the Republican Party. It is the
kind of party in which I, for one, and I would hope the vast majority of Americans, could
serve with lasting pride. I count on it with confidence. My friends, for me the shadows
lengthen, but my loyalty to the historic mission of my party, to its great record and its
promise for the future is as strong and bright as ever, My confidence will never dim so
long as all of us stand together for human dignity and for the sound and steady progress
of this wonderful land; for so long as we stand as the strong, wise and sturdy leaders of
freedom in the entire world.13
These are the words of a man who had spent most of life thinking intently about politics
generally, about the politics of America, and about his own place in his country’s public life. It
is true that the above quoted paragraph lacks the soul to move most readers. Eisenhower was not
a Reagan or an Obama in his ability to command a room with his charisma. He was not a
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wordsmith with any poetic flair. However, if one matches these words from 1964 with other
pieces of his thought throughout his life, a coherent picture of a unique political thinker emerges.
This body of this dissertation seeks to demonstrate that point.
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CHAPTER 1
SOURCES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

In the six decades since he has left office Eisenhower scholarship has gone through
several analytical paradigms. The prevalent view of Eisenhower during his time in the White
House and in the first couple of decades after he left was one of an aloof figure, who did not
have the political acumen to run the government. Later, though, with the publication of Fred
Greenstein’s The Hidden Hand Presidency (1982), historians and political scientists began to
view Eisenhower as a calculating politician, who used his bi-partisan appeal and personal
popularity to his political advantage. Eisenhower, this account holds, knew that as long as he
appeared to be above the political fray in public he could use his popularity and his cunning
instincts to win political battles out of the public’s view. In order to understand the scholarly
corpus on Eisenhower it is best to note the four major categories in which works most often
appear. These are biographies, studies of his leadership style and abilities, examinations of his
military service, and investigations of his presidency related to a specific topic issue, such as
civil rights. There is one important area of scholarship missing, though. No political scientist or
historian has yet produced a thorough study of Eisenhower’s political thought. This dissertation
seeks to do just that.
This dissertation is timely for three important reasons. The first is that the literature has
successfully established that Eisenhower was an intentional political actor, but has not yet gone
much deeper than that to try and discover if there was any philosophical or practical coherence to
his actions. Secondly, by this point the trove of de-classified documents pertaining to his
presidency, as well as the digitization of many primary sources related to his life makes such a
study possible. Finally, the 1950s was a cultural and political bridge in the American experience.
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The size of our permanent military, the status of civil rights, the state of transportation,
America’s role abroad, urbanization and suburbanization, and the stature and contours of religion
and public life were all set to change dramatically either in or shortly after the decade in which
Eisenhower served as president. To understand more about Eisenhower’s political thought, then,
is to understand more about America’s political journey through the middle part of the twentieth
century.

Introduction: What was Important in Shaping Eisenhower’s Thought?
The most straightforward way to begin studying Eisenhower’s political thought is to note
that he was influenced by his own experiences, rather than by formal philosophical or political
training. In order to conduct a comprehensive study of his political thought, then, it is important
to first discuss some of the most important influences that shaped his views of life and politics
when he stepped into the presidency. I present these things to give the reader important
biographical information and to provide a baseline from which the deeper investigations of his
political thought will naturally spring. These eight things are items that should be kept in mind
by anyone hoping to understand Eisenhower as a political thinker. These are his childhood
experiences, his military career, his perspective on military cooperation and alliances, the
German enemy and the need for total victory, the liberation of Nazi death camps, his beginning
thoughts on America, a concrete sense of good and evil, and his experience of and reflections on
friendship.
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Childhood Experiences
Eisenhower often portrayed himself publicly and privately14 as a Kansas farm boy who
happened to find himself on the world stage. While his rural upbringing surely had some impact
on him the religious background of his parents is more important to understanding Eisenhower as
an adult. His paternal grandfather was a Mennonite pastor, his parents became members of the
Jehovah’s Witness and named him after Dwight L. Moody (a renowned evangelist and founder
of the fundamentalist Moody Bible Institute in Chicago) and his family was committed to
pacifism, especially his mother.15 The Eisenhower family lived, for most of Dwight’s life, in
rural Abilene, Kansas, and Dwight would recall that time and place fondly, though he scarcely
returned to Abilene.16
It is not necessarily strange that he would not have found time to go back home, given the
time, travel, and fame that were associated with his adult careers, but there was more than simple
busyness that kept him away. Reading his grandson, David’s, account of Eisenhower’s post
White House years in Gettysburg gives an insight into a restless soul who never quite felt at
home anywhere. Not only did Eisenhower and his wife travel between Gettysburg, a home in
Augusta, Georgia, and a community in Southern California after 1958, but Eisenhower had
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complaints about each place. He was not misanthropic; he enjoyed the company of some whom
he considered friends and relished being part of a social scene wherever he was currently located.
And yet, he seemed to always hope for something more satisfying and elusive than what he had
in each place. Abilene, then, functioned as a idealized homeland that served Eisenhower better as
a memory than it did as a living place that was a part of his adult life. It is even fair to say that
what Eisenhower hoped for when he envisioned America at its best was something like Abilene.
A place where, as he remembered it, families were tight-knit, friends were loyal, there was the
potential to live in communal harmony, and economic success was attainable.

Military Career
My project is an examination of Eisenhower’s political thought, but it would be
impossible to understand the man without reckoning with his military service. For someone who
moved often, spent long stretches away from his family for much of his adult life, never settled
in one place even in retirement, and often conducted his closest friendships through
correspondence rather than face to face interactions, the army was the most stable force in his
life. He grew up intellectually and morally in the army, he would always look back on his
military career as the most satisfying portion of his life, and he approached presidential
leadership in a manner that revealed he hoped to run the White House like a general’s staff office
as much as he could. Most fundamentally, though, his experiences in World War II would color
his moral sensibilities and help shape his priorities once he was in office.
One way in which his military experience shaped his political thought is by influencing
his conception of leadership. Once taking office he was consistently angered by what he saw as
inefficiency and disloyalty in the executive branch. He could no longer issue simple orders and
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expect that things would be done according to his wishes.17 This gave rise to anger and fear, not
only because he was not used to this type of executive environment, but because he believed the
inefficiency to be a threat to the operation of government. And that, he felt, was a threat to the
prosperity of the American economy and a challenge to protecting American interests abroad.
While he understood that the military is not free of bureaucratic delays, self-serving
subordinates, or inefficiencies of time and money, once Eisenhower took office he began to
nostalgically compare his current situation to what he remembered having in the Army.
Increasingly, the military became a standard of organizational efficiency for him, and since the
White House could not match his memory of the army he would never be fully satisfied with the
working conditions of a president.
Early in his officer’s career Eisenhower volunteered to be part of the army’s first official
tank training program.18 He would quickly become an enthusiast for the new weapon and would
forge his lifelong friendship with George Patton (the most famous early tank supporter in the
American military) on this basis. Both men published articles outlining their revolutionary
vision of the tank in military journals and both were reprimanded by higher commanders for
publicly challenging the accepted wisdom of the army’s establishment on the matter.19 Within
the first few paragraphs of the article Eisenhower criticized those who did not believe the tank to
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be a promising weapon of the future as ignorant. Even in 1920 his style was direct and his
thought pragmatic. He expressed his fundamental point this way:
The tank, as a self-propelling, centerpillar type of weapon, was a development of the late
war. Many officers who served with fighting divisions never had an opportunity to take
part in an action supported by these machines, and their knowledge of the power and
deficiencies of the tank is based on hearsay. Others took part in such combats when the
tanks were improperly used, poorly manned, or under such adverse conditions that they
were practically helpless in trying to lend efficient aid to the Infantry. As the number of
American-manned tanks that actually got to take part in the fighting with American
divisions was very small, the number of officers of the Army who are openly advocates
of this machine as a supporting weapon is correspondingly few.20
At a time when tanks were mostly thought of as a powerful, but slow means of breaking
through entrenched defenses that would go ahead of an infantry advance, Eisenhower imagined a
more dynamic role for them that would include the combination of speed and firepower that
would come to characterize the tank battles of World War II. Though he did not see combat as a
part of the 301st Heavy Tank Battalion he was marked by his training experience with that unit.
Alluding to commonly held notions about the tank Eisenhower later remarked about his unit:
“We were different. The men dreamed of overwhelming assault on enemy lines, rolling
effortlessly over wire entanglements and trenches, demolishing gun nests with their fire, and
terrorizing the foe into quick and abject surrender.”21
It is important that this reflection came in Eisenhower’s final memoir, published just two
years before his death. His experience with the tank unit had shaped not only his commanding
decisions later, but his own sense of how to handle challenging situations. Specifically, his
willingness to trust his own judgments and those of associates whom he respected, along with a
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craving for efficiency and a desire to find creative solutions to problems are all characteristics
that would mark his later political thought and actions. The independence of his thought that
was seen in his vision for tanks would appear later in his political thinking, for example during
his decision to use federal troops during the Little Rock Crisis of 1957.
The tank, for Eisenhower, was the first major project of his career that required him to
resolutely stand behind his vision in opposition to higher ranking and skeptical officers, as well
as to inspire those whom he was charged with leading. A more mature Eisenhower would go on
to cordially, but firmly disagree with Churchill and George Marshall on matters of strategy and
eventually would go on to despise the domestic policies of Roosevelt and Truman. This
confidence in his own political judgment stems not from a classical liberal education, or from a
lifelong desire for high office, but rather from an assumed confidence that was first developed in
the early days of his military career. It is important to connect his later thought with his early
experiences, because doing so allows one to see the development of his conscience,
consciousness, and practical judgment.
Later in Eisenhower’s military career his innovative thinking would become even more
apparent. In early 1942 George Marshall, army chief of staff, asked Eisenhower to propose a
plan for winning the war in Europe. In May of the same year once he reviewed this plan and a
separate Eisenhower recommendation that suggested a unified command of all American combat
forces in the theater, Marshall appointed Eisenhower to the position that Eisenhower had
proposed.22 The new unified command role that Eisenhower suggested was not obvious at the
time and would require not only unprecedented levels of coordination between the services, but
would entail the newly appointed commander to manage high ranking colleagues who had gone
22
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from peers to subordinates with a delicate balance of delegation of some things and a firm
insistence on others. Eisenhower’s suggestion, then, was not only a military novelty, but was
something that would present difficult leadership challenges in the midst of the stresses of total
war.
The single command of American troops was important, not only because it
preconfigures the later unification of all Allied forces in Europe, but because Eisenhower himself
felt that this idea was more important than his tactical contributions to the war’s planning. “I
remarked to General Marshall,” Eisenhower would later remember, “that this was one paper he
should read in detail before it went out, because it was likely to be an important document in the
further waging of the war.”23 Additionally, he recommended that future commander of the U.S.
occupation forces in Germany24 and that Army Air General Joseph McNarney be appointed as
Marshall’s top aid because “[Eisenhower] knew that General McNarney firmly believed in the
Air Force’s ability to make the ground invasion of France possible.25 Eisenhower would go on
to consistently argue for the primary importance of air, ground, and sea coordination in the
planning of D-Day, and in the press toward Berlin that followed. The unflinching nature of this
conviction would become important later, as Churchill became convinced that a cross-channel
invasion would not be tenable, and that a land invasion beginning in southern Italy and
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advancing north to and through Germany was the most prudent strategy.26 Later, Eisenhower
would push back the planned launch date for D-Day from early May to early June, so that Allied
air power could have more time to weaken German defenses.27
Eisenhower was not the only advocate of a fully integrated force, but he was one of the
first and became the new concept’s most important supporter during the war. Eisenhower’s
boldness in planning the assault flowed from a deeply held belief about the nature of the present
conflict and what was required to win it. The fact that this boldness was rewarded on a grand
scale in Europe could only have strengthened Eisenhower’s confidence regarding the wisdom of
(often bold and independently formed) political judgments during his White House years. In
short, the roots of Eisenhower’s later political action can be seen in his actions as commander,
and these actions flowed from deeply held, bold, and independent thought. So, while it is
impossible to consider Eisenhower as a political thinker without reckoning with Eisenhower the
officer, it is likewise true that a careful study of his time in the army will provide clues to his
later political thought.
Though Eisenhower is mostly remembered as an officer for his role in WWII, he held a
career long interest in America’s transportation infrastructure This interest was matched with
active experience in 1919, when Eisenhower was assigned to be an officer on the
Transcontinental Motor Convoy. This was an army commissioned journey that was designed to
test the state of America’s road network. The D.C. to California journey took over two months
to complete and achieved its purpose of drawing public attention to the poor state of American
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highways.28 It would also serve as one of two most important influences on Eisenhower’s later
insistence upon a nationally integrated interstate highway system. “The old convoy had started
me thinking about good two-lane highways,” he would later quip, “but Germany had made me
see the wisdom of broader ribbons across our land,” he would remark about his experience with
the German Autobahn.29 Here again, the root of future thought that is deeper and more
systematic is present in Eisenhower’s early military career.

Cooperation and Alliances
The wartime experience of working in and eventually leading an alliance shaped not only
how Eisenhower thought about international relations at the highest levels, but also came to drive
what he expected from subordinate officers. Studying Eisenhower the president through now
declassified memos, memoirs of administration members, Eisenhower’s own diary and personal
letters, and the reflections of family members show that politics was an intensely personal matter
to him. Governing, even at the highest level, was a matter of mutual personal loyalties and of
trust for specific individuals in specific roles. This conception of leadership was developed and
honed during Eisenhower’s years in Europe. He always felt personally responsible to Marshall,
for example, and felt that he had granted others whom he trusted a personal gift. He trusted
Marshall as a mentor, even when Eisenhower had been chosen over Marshall to command the DDay operation. The letters exchanged between the two (though they were primarily a matter of
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professional communication) demonstrate a warmth that could be taken as real friendship.
Without this sort of personal bond, Eisenhower believed that the army would not only be less of
a livable organization for its members, but that its fighting strength would tangibly suffer.
One of the most famous promotion in American military history happened on June 25,
1942, when Eisenhower was given the title of Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in the
European theater. While it is true that this promotion, and his performance in this role, endowed
Eisenhower with the profile and popularity he would use to be elected a decade later, it is also
important to note how his experience in the role itself shaped his political disposition.
From the outset of the war Eisenhower was engaged in a role that was combat centered,
but that required a diplomatic30 sense and a willingness to navigate multiple national political
structures. Immediately upon entering the theater, Eisenhower became concerned that the
ultimate success of the Allied war effort was threatened by the lack of a coherent strategic
command.31 Once taking command himself, Eisenhower was pleased with how his British staff
cooperated and assisted his efforts, but did not appreciate the style or the strategic sense that the
French delegation, led by an escapee from the Vichy government, General Giraud, displayed. 32
This distinction provides the insight that Eisenhower was not merely happy to look back on the
war effort as a success because of an ideal of cooperation, but rather that he developed and held
concrete notions of what made for a good alliance partner and what was unhelpful to the joint
goal. He would carry his own ideal of strategic cooperation into the presidency and would not
only judge the actions of fellow heads of state, but would seek to pattern American commitments
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and actions according to what he felt best accomplished his goal of being a dutiful and intelligent
alliance partner. Eisenhower always believed that America’s interests coincided and did not
compete with America’s duties as an alliance partner.
Eisenhower’s appreciation of the British as a near ideal ally followed largely from his
personal fondness for Winston Churchill. This relationship developed as the two participated in
the planning of D-Day, which, for a time, entailed twice weekly33meetings between the two that
were held either at Churchill’s country retreat or at his official office in London. As the Allied
forces gained territory Eisenhower’s headquarters moved closer to the theater of operations and
the meetings with Churchill grew less frequent. Even so, the trust between the two allowed for
compromises when strategic differences arose between the American and British delegations. A
prominent example of this came just before the famed Cairo conference of 1943. Before
travelling to Egypt to meet with his fellow heads of state Churchill stopped by Malta, site of
Eisenhower’s current headquarters to informally discuss long-term strategy for the European
invasion. Churchill made it plain that he hoped to invade the continent by landing in southern
Italy and then marching north by land, while Eisenhower prioritized a cross-strait invasion of
France. In spite of this important divergence Churchill would not interfere with planning that
relegated his hope for an attack on the “soft under belly” of the Axis to a secondary concern.34
Eisenhower’s vision of cooperation was one reserved not only for the strategic level, but
for the individual as well. Without cohesion among units and between national militaries
Eisenhower believed that the war effort would be doomed to failure. Put succinctly: “Morale is
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the greatest single factor in a successful war.”35 Throughout his time as European commander he
worked in small ways to promote the family environment he hoped would permeate the
experience for those serving under his command . He visited battle troops just before or after
combat and saw himself as a father figure to those under his command.36 He also proposed
attaching permanent family names, in the British style, to American units in order to give troops
a sense of belonging, stability, and boost morale.37
Alliance building and maintenance would be something that Eisenhower would never
leave behind in his public life. After the war ended he served as president of Columbia
University, where he viewed his job as uniting disparate factions, in order to bring the university
financial safety and intra-institutional harmony. During this same time he advised Pentagon
officials about how to best handle the new budget regarding hungry bureaucracies associated
with each branch of the armed forces and, most notably, he served as head of NATO from
December 1950, until the launch of his presidential campaign in 1952. His experience in the
White House, then, both as America’s chief soldier and diplomat in the early Cold War, and as
the first Republican president in the New Deal era can only be understood if one accounts for the
formative experience of alliance participation and leadership during and shortly after the war.
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The German Enemy and the Necessity for Total Victory
Eisenhower is often remembered as the first great anti-Communist president. Many, in
fact, have remembered this one issue as the full-extent of his political thought. He added the
words “under God” to the pledge of allegiance, he refused to publicly rebuke Sen. McCarthy’s
infamous behavior, and he approved large amounts of a conventional and nuclear military
buildup throughout his time in office. While Eisenhower’s record on each of the above issues
merits its own investigation, it is fair to characterize his foreign policy as one primarily devoted
to the defeat of Communism. In order to understand the depth and contours of his antiCommunism, though, we must first understand how he viewed his German foes during World
War II. One incident best displays his feelings. During the Tunisian campaign of 1943, some of
Eisenhower’s staff officers suggested that he follow the traditional protocol of cordially visiting
with the commander of a recently captured enemy force. Recalling this incident with disgust
Eisenhower writes:
The custom had its origin in the fact that mercenary soldiers of old had no real enmity
toward their opponents…A captured commander of the eighteenth century was likely to
be, for weeks or months, the honored guest of his captor. The tradition that all
professional soldiers are really comrades in arms has, in tattered form, persisted to this
day. For me World War II was far too personal a thing to entertain such feelings. Daily
as it progressed there grew within me the conviction that as never before in a war
between many nations the forces that stood for human good and men’s rights were this
time confronted by a completely evil conspiracy with which no compromise could be
tolerated. Because only by the utter destruction of the Axis was a decent world possible,
the war became for me a crusade in the traditional sense of that often misused word.38
Though he writes in guarded and even cold language about the experience of the war in
most places, here we see that it was a deeply emotional matter for him. More importantly for
this project, he reveals thinking about the nature of good and evil manifested in the world that
goes beyond a desire to defeat an enemy out of duty or love of one’s country. He does not
38
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repudiate the traditional western practice of providing hospitality to a conquered general, instead
he tacitly signals his approval of a practice that provides some sense of civility and humanity in
the midst of the most inhumane of human activities. In the particular case of World War II,
though, Eisenhower felt as if even formally greeting a particular German commander (one, it is
important to note, who was a career military officer and had no direct role in the political regime
of Germany, aside from continued military service) would signal a “compromise” with “evil.”39
Much of Eisenhower’s later musing on Communism would mirror this type of statement, so it is
important to note that it is clear that Eisenhower had already accepted the notion that some
enemies were fundamentally dangerous, not just to his country’s interests, but to humanity itself.

The Liberation of Nazi Death Camps
Nothing in the war stirred his feeling as much as the discovery of Nazi concentration
camps. In April of 1945 he personally inspected one such camp and interviewed survivors
shortly after Allied forces had liberated it. Writing to Marshall on the day of his visit
Eisenhower described the experience this way:
The visual evidence and verbal testimony of starvation, cruelty, and bestiality were so
overpowering as to leave me a bit sick…I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in
position to give first-hand evidence of these things, if ever, in the future, there develops a
tendency to charge these allegations merely to propaganda.40
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Eisenhower would go on to note in the same letter that George Patton refused to inspect
the camp, after hearing initial reports about what he would find, for fear that it would make him
“sick.”41 Eisenhower had an immediate sense that he had come upon one the most important
stories of the war and he quickly decided that the horrors of the camps needed to be exposed to
as much publicity as possible. Writing four days after his initial letter on the subject he
telegraphed Marshall to request permission for a visit from a contingent of American newspaper
editors and congressmen so “as to leave no doubt in their minds about the normal practices of the
Germans in these camps.”42 He also hoped this large-scale publicity would “leave no room for
cynical doubt” in the minds of even the most skeptical American and British citizens.43 This
immediate forethought regarding not only how what would come to be known as the Holocaust
would be perceived in the short term, but how historians would remember it is striking coming
from a general whose singular concern had been the achievement of Allied war aims. Though
Eisenhower has not been treated as a serious political thinker, in this case he instantly shifts his
attention away from war supervision and planning to the likely political ramifications of the
narrative that will emerge regarding the conditions in the camps and the German culpability for
these conditions.
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Linking Eisenhower’s experience of the discovery of the concentration camps with his
view that the Allies were fighting a war on behalf of moral goodness against a fully evil foe is
not a simple task. One could argue, for instance, that Eisenhower’s discussion of the German
regime in his war memoir was likely influenced by the horror of having personally witnessed a
Nazi death camp. This seems to be not only a plausible, but an almost certain truth. Importantly,
however, when Eisenhower decided to cast off the long-held tradition of meeting with a recently
captured opposing commander it was two years before Eisenhower had arrived at his first
concentration camp. At this point he knew about the existence of the camps “only generally or
through secondary sources” and had not imagined the scale of intentional brutality that the
Germans carried out in the camps.44
Upon personally confronting his first camp at Ohrdruf, in central Germany,45 Eisenhower
not only insisted upon immediate publication of the facts of the camps, but also began focusing
on how to best take care of the newly liberated refugees who had survived Nazi control of the
camps. His leadership in administering the feeding, housing, and resettling of camp survivors
was, in time, harshly criticized by members of the American media as well as by the Harrison
report, a presidentially ordered independent inquiry led by the dean of the University of
Pennsylvania law school, Earl G. Harrison.46 Upon receiving this report in August of 194547
Truman ordered Eisenhower to investigate the conditions of displaced persons under American
control.
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This incident is especially instructive for this project, because Eisenhower shifted the
tone and content of his descriptions of this event over time, but he always maintained an
awareness of the problem that demonstrated his own thinking. In his report to Truman in
September of 1945 Eisenhower conceded that there were significant and systematic problems
with the way refugees were being handled and promised to personally ensure an improvement in
conditions.48 Several days after his first letter to the president he wrote again for the purpose of
documenting some of the reasons for poor conditions among the refugee population under the
American army’s purview. He noted a difficulty in locating paying jobs for many camp
survivors, a general trepidation about the future, and the insistence by Baltic and Romanian Jews
that being sent home would mean facing continued persecution. He noted that Army personnel
were working to improve living conditions in refugee settlements, but disputed the Harrison
report’s claim that some refugees were being housed in former concentration camps.49
In Crusade in Europe, written several years after the conclusion of the war Eisenhower
was more defensive of the job the army did in providing a new life for the Holocaust survivors.
Criticizing both the Harrison report and media coverage of conditions in the new refugee
settlements Eisenhower wrote:
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Individuals with no responsibility in the matter, their humanitarian impulses outraged by
conditions that were frequently beyond help, began carrying to America tales of
indifference, negligence, and callousness on the part of the troops. Generally these
stories were lies.50
Eisenhower went on to claim that improving the material lives of the displaced persons
remained a primary objective for him as long as he was in Europe. His claim that practical
limitations worked to prevent a quicker progression of improvement was not an argument that
the realities of war made it impossible for American troops to provide the freed prisoners with
livable conditions, but merely that the units assigned to the task had not had sufficient time to
complete it. Neither the humanitarian importance of creating suitable conditions for the
displaced in the short-term or the political importance of resettling the refugees for European
peace in the longer-term were ever in doubt for Eisenhower. He never retreated fully into a
position which valued only combat objectives after the status of refugees became part of his
command duty. He would conclude his reflections on this portion of the war by penning the
following: “Of all the distressing memories that will forever live with American veterans…none
will be sharper or more enduring than those of the [displaced persons] and of the horror camps
established by the Nazis.”51 The discovery and liberation of the camps, along with the task of
aiding the survivors became Eisenhower’s lasting and most vivid image of the war’s larger
significance. Combatively answering a question posed by a reporter at a June 1945 Pentagon
press conference about whether it was appropriate or helpful to have publicized the full extent of
the camps’ atrocities Eisenhower quipped: “I think it did good. I think the people at home ought
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to know what they are fighting for and the kind of person they are fighting. Yes, it did good.”52
The memory of the Holocaust’s aftermath would guide Eisenhower’s sense of concrete good and
evil and the political responsibility to defend the former and combat the latter throughout his
presidency. Understanding him as a political thinker requires understanding this formative
experience.

America as a Unique Community
Perhaps the primary reason that Eisenhower has not been considered a serious political
thinker up until now is because he is not a philosopher in training or style. He wrote no books
and gave few speeches that demonstrated a particular philosophy of government or democracy
that was deeply theoretical and systematic. He was not likely to ruminate on human nature,
though there are notable exceptions to this.53 He did, though, have a particular sense of America.
He viewed America as a unique, dynamic, and fundamentally good political community whose
flourishing was good for the world. Eisenhower’s anti-Communism, his economic positions, and
his expression of religion were all bound together with his view of and love for America.
One place where Eisenhower’s sense of America’s fundamental goodness is present is in
his wartime diaries, memos, and letters. In both public and private, and in both personal and
professional contexts Eisenhower consistently extols the virtue not only of the American cause in
the war, but of America’s enduring character. He does not believe the German people to be evil,
though he feels that they have fallen into a particular kind of political evil from which they must
52
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be cured. America, by its nature, would never fall into similar evil in Eisenhower’s view. Since
we know (and since Eisenhower knew) that Hitler was democratically elected it is easy to reason
that Eisenhower felt that America’s goodness and promise went beyond having a democratic
system of government and sprung from something unique in America’s history, composition, and
present reality.

A Concrete Sense of Good and Evil
Eisenhower’s thought is marked by a robust conception of good and evil. Not only did
he believe that these things objectively existed, but he felt it to be his responsibility as an officer
and as president to promote good while fighting evil. He reflected and influenced the spirit of
the 1950s in this way. He did not think that struggles against evil in the world would be easy, or
that the strategy to defeat political evil would always be evident, yet he did consistently find it
easy to identify the forces of good and of evil themselves. World War II is a primary example of
this. This way of viewing politics, though, carried on into his presidency and is evident after he
retired from the White House. The American cause, fundamentally and at all times was an
endeavor in the promotion of goodness across the world. The Soviets, their allies in Vietnam,
and American youth who protested the Vietnam war were all parties to causing (in the first two
cases) or tacitly encouraging (in the case of American protestors) objective evil in the world.

Friendship
Perhaps the most important part of Eisenhower’s life that has never been considered
politically relevant by scholars is friendship. Not only did he forge famous relationships with
Winston Churchill and George Marshall, but he kept up friendships with childhood friends,
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business associates, fellow soldiers, family members, and even political allies. Eisenhower
showed warmth and tenderness in personal correspondence and diaries not only to his family, but
toward such thorny figures as Richard Nixon and George Patton. For Eisenhower, one’s career,
capacity as a leader, and personal happiness all depended on maintaining a network of trusted
allies. Eisenhower thought of these relationships as true friendships, but they were much more
akin to strategic relationships. He sought to and succeeded in maintaining friendships with
individuals that ranged in age, profession, intelligence, social status, and formality. He looked to
his childhood friend Swede Hazlett, for example, to give him an unbiased view of world events
and of Eisenhower’s political actions, he mentored Nixon in leadership and campaigning, and he
trusted Patton to do a professional job in the field, even when his own analysis of Patton’s
missteps caused him to consider sacking the general in favor of a calmer leader.
Friendship matters for understanding Eisenhower’s political thought, not merely his life,
because seeing how Eisenhower saw friendship (and particular friends) is an important window
into seeing how Eisenhower viewed the world and his place in it. Eisenhower valued personal
loyalty, established trust, and advice from associates as both general and president. These things
could not be established except by long-term and real connections between Eisenhower and
others around him. In order to better illustrate the role of friendship is Eisenhower’s thought I
will explore a few of his most important relationships.

George Marshall, Mentor
The most important mentor relationship Eisenhower had was also the one he cherished
the most. Marshall and Eisenhower would become permanently connected during the war, but
Eisenhower’s admiration for the general existed before the two had formally met. According to
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Eisenhower, “In 1940, the U.S. army mirrored attitudes of the American people, as is the case
today and as it was a century ago.”5455 Eisenhower’s caveat, though, was that George Marshall
had ensured that the War Department, at least, would be prepared for large-scale combat.56
Eisenhower would always view Marshall as not only a faithful public servant, but as a man of
high character and without an ego, who insisted on cooperation among those who he
commanded. Marshall valued subordinates who would think and act within their spheres of
responsibility, for he “hated buck passing.”57 Correspondingly, Eisenhower notes that Marshall
also hated the “man who tried to do everything himself.”58 By the time Eisenhower wrote these
descriptions of the man he so admired the two had worked closely together throughout the war
and one senses in Eisenhower’s words the love a student has for a great teacher and the desire to
emulate one whom he viewed as a supreme example of human virtue. Eisenhower, for the
duration of his life, would lionize Marshall in public and in private. In spite of this warmth, the
two were not deep friends in the sense that they viewed each other as equals and took active parts
in each other’s personal lives, though.
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David Eisenhower, Grandson
David Eisenhower was Dwight’s only grandson and the son of John, Dwight’s only
surviving child.59 David was a young child during Dwight’s presidential years, but the two grew
close in the last decade of Dwight’s life. After leaving the White House in early 1961, Dwight
and Mamie began to live a portion of the year at the family farm in Gettysburg, which by then
also housed John’s family.60 David and Dwight’s time together included experiences ranging
from the commonly known experience of an elderly family member who cannot still drive
safely, but drives anyway (after almost crashing a farm truck into a group of tourists that he felt
were too close to the road Dwight angrily informed David, “When you get a license you must
never impede access to a public thoroughfare.”),61 to mundane, but warm discussions about
baseball,62 to the touching. Most representative of this last category is a letter that Dwight sent
to David, now away at college, upon his engagement to Julie Nixon. The often cold and distant
former president wrote, in part: “A love, shared by two young and intelligent people, is one of
heaven’s greatest gifts to humanity…I’m not only proud that you are my grandson, but my friend
as well—to whom I give my deepest affection.”63
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to make Dwight’s relationship with John more special and yet, more tense.
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The best record the public has about the friendship that formed between David, who was
coming of age during in the 1960s, and Dwight, who hoped to spend his final years (there would
turn out to be one more almost exactly eight-year-long bloc in his life) finally focusing on leisure
and family life, is an intimate biography David Eisenhower wrote, entitled, Going Home to
Glory: A Memoir of Life with Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961-1969 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2010).
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Throughout most of his life, and especially since he became famous during WWII, most
who met Eisenhower found him to be cordial, but emotionally detached. Late in life, though, he
seemed to be more disarmed around his grandson than he had been around anyone else, perhaps
even more open than he was with Mamie. Though Eisenhower was surrounded with friends of
all sorts—in this decade, he kept social appointments to go along with his homes in Gettysburg,
Augusta, and California—during his retirement years he remained still a lonely man. As he
prepared to write his memoir, David asked his grandmother “if she felt she had really known
Ike.” She replied: “I’m not sure anyone did.”64 Examples of Dwight trusting David enough to
show real affection, then, help to illustrate not only that the general valued his finally attained
quiet family life, but resonate a deeper point: that his life in public service had denied him
normal family relationships and that he grieved this, even if he accepted it as a duty required
cost.

Lyndon Johnson, In Search of a Friend
Perhaps the least well-known of Eisenhower’s friendships developed late in his life.
After leaving the White House Eisenhower mostly refrained from publicly commenting on
political affairs. When he did choose to re-enter that world he usually remained out of the
national consciousness. (He spoke about the Vietnam protest movement, for example, during a
June 1963 speech he gave at the dedication of a new building for his Gettysburg church, but did
not have his speech published or widely covered.65) Though he did not wish to maintain a large
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public profile he did hope to stay active in politics by advising the current president, as well as
Republican party leaders on a set of issues. Though Kennedy was not usually willing to accept
much assistance from Eisenhower, Johnson kept Eisenhower regularly briefed on the Vietnam
War effort by the end of 1965.66 Initially, Eisenhower believed that Johnson was handling the
war well, but by 1967 he had become critical of Johnson’s leadership when he privately
discussed the matter with friends.67 In spite of this, though, he also found most critics of the war
to be motivated by what he considered to be socially radical ideologies.68 Eisenhower felt that
Johnson, at least, understood how difficult it was to lead a war. From this mutual respect, the
two formed a working relationship that blossomed into a genuine friendship. David Eisenhower
describes it this way:
Johnson phoned Eisenhower often. Though most of their conversations focused on
Johnson’s detractors and trivial matters about political personalities, the link Johnson
sought was spiritual and historical. He wanted the comfort of communicating with
someone who could comprehend the unique pressures of the presidency.69
Each man was lonely, in his own way, and each saw value in the other’s counsel and
company. The phone calls that were ostensibly about strategy are enough to demonstrate this,
but there is deeper evidence of a real friendship between the two. Johnson would often visit the
general when Eisenhower found himself at Walter Reed Medical Center for some type of care.
After one such visit Johnson encountered Edward Elson, then the chaplain of the Senate, and, in
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passing commented: “When I need comfort, this is where I come and this is the man I see.”70
Johnson would come to mean something to Eisenhower, as well. In 1968, as Eisenhower’s
health faded Johnson sent a parade of cards, flowers, briefings about presidential business, and
offers to make the hospital’s living conditions more palatable for Eisenhower and his family.71
Eisenhower routinely replied to these acts of kindness with personal messages of thanks. In this
way, the two men formed a steady correspondence. When Johnson did visit in the last months of
Eisenhower’s life he would come alone and the two men would chat in private, without
attendants or a security detail present. Remembering these warm, almost familial, visits
firsthand David Eisenhower noted the “despair and unspeakable sadness”72 that Johnson visibly
felt when talking with his friend, who he knew was dying, and noted that the president came and
went quietly, in the same manner that would be expected of anyone who was paying what could
have been a final visit to a beloved friend. Late in life, Eisenhower felt empathy for Johnson that
led to something of a true, though short friendship. Each man seemed to find in the other not
only a companion who understood the isolation of the presidency, but one who understood a
deep personal loneliness throughout much of life.

George Patton and Swede Hazlett
With regard to understanding Eisenhower as a political thinker, his two most notable
relationships are those with George Patton and Swede Hazlett. Because the content of each
friendship (and the records we have of them) deals substantively with Eisenhower’s political
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thought they will not be addressed, except in brief, in this chapter. Later chapters will give each
attention, as it relates to the broader trajectory of the project.
Patton, was not only Eisenhower’s most exciting friendship for the casual observer, but
one of the most important for the serious scholar. With Patton Eisenhower developed innovative
tank doctrines and was responsible for disciplining the hot headed general on several occasions
when George treated subordinates harshly, shared classified details with the press, or engaged in
one of his high profile fits of anger. Eisenhower did not always enjoy commanding Patton, but
he never lost a deep affection for his old friend. The way in which Eisenhower dealt with Patton
in the chain of command and the manner in which he spoke of Patton to others demonstrates how
important loyalty was as a governing principle of Eisenhower’s vision of war and politics.
Swede Hazlett was a childhood friend who was Eisenhower’s original inspiration in attending
West Point. Suffering poor health, Hazlett’s Naval career was a short one, but Eisenhower and
Swede kept a consistent correspondence throughout most of Eisenhower’s presidency (and until
Swede’s death in 1958) that ranged from the political to the personal with ease. These collected
letters are as honest and informal of a record of Eisenhower’s thought as we have today.
The fact that Eisenhower imagined himself, or at least presented himself, as having
scores of close friends matters for understanding his political thought, because he conceived of
politics as being fundamentally about grand group endeavors that sought to promote the common
good. It is also important that he did not have especially close friends throughout much of his
life, though. His social isolation is the context in which he both ascends to the presidency and
acts within it.
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Eisenhower as an American Thinker
It is difficult to say exactly when who was the first to observe a distinctive American way
of thinking. In political theory the notion goes back at least to Tocqueville, but it can be
plausibly traced back to the Puritans. The systematic study of a particular American philosophic
stance did not come around until the early twentieth century, however, with the publication of an
essay titled “Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking,” by Progressive
William James. In first arguing that Americans systematically view the world with a philosophic
lens that prizes practical results over intellectual purity, James founded an ongoing study of
Pragmatism that both helped to group seemingly disparate American figures of the past and
inspire influential American thinkers of the future. Eisenhower fits squarely in this tradition. In
1989 philosopher Cornel West published a seminal work titled The American Evasion of
Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. In the introduction to this book he describes his
subject this way:
American pragmatism is a diverse and heterogeneous tradition. But its common
denominator consists of a future-oriented instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought as a
weapon to enable more effective action. Its basic impulse is a plebeian radicalism that
fuels an antipatrician rebelliousness for the moral aim of enriching individuals and
expanding democracy.73
This is the precise mode that Eisenhower used to think about the world. He was thought
of as someone who did not think much because his particular brand of thinking was outcome
oriented, he did not care to display his thoughts in public, and because he had little regard for the
type of politician that seemed more committed to intellectualism than the practical aspects of
statesmanship. Eisenhower was not alone, though. His style was not that of an academic, but he
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shared the same tradition of thought as thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, William James himself,
and Reinhold Niebuhr. As the rest of this project delves into his writings, actions, and private
reflections it will be clear that Eisenhower had in mind “the moral aim of enriching individuals
and expanding democracy.”
To see Eisenhower as a crusader for liberty, in his own mind, is to truly see him. And
yet, West provides a second part to his definition of American pragmatism that is arguably
relevant to Eisenhower, also. West writes:
This rebelliousness, rooted in the anticolonial heritage of the country, is severely
restricted by an ethnocentrism and a patriotism cognizant of the exclusion of peoples of
color, certain immigrants, and women yet fearful of the subversive demands these
excluded peoples might make and enact.74
One of the primary controversies about Eisenhower’s presidency, both when he was in
office and in debates about his legacy concerns his record on civil rights. A future chapter will
address the issue at length, but for now it is worth mentioning that Eisenhower can be plausibly
made into a civil rights hero or villain. Why would the same person who ordered D.C. and
military schools desegregated and who spoke glowingly about the service of African-Americans
under his command in war also seem disinterested in hosting black civil rights leaders from the
south or in intervening in high profile cases, such as the murder of Emmett Till? How could the
same person grumble about the Brown v. Board decision and militarize the national guard to
enforce the decision on an unwilling southern state? The answer to these questions, I believe,
helps to unlock Eisenhower’s holistic thought. He was irrational or incoherent in his thinking,
but rather he was always adhering to a way of thinking that was focused on practical outcomes,
rather than philosophical purity. Furthermore, he had both the desire to expand freedom to new
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parts of the country and the world and a deep suspicion about some movements that threatened
stability or tradition. He was, in this way, a classic American. Though this study does not spend
any more time evaluating Eisenhower’s place in the annals of American pragmatism, it will be
helpful to the reader to keep the connection in mind throughout.

From Eisenhower’s Life to His Political Thought
The previous pages have provided a brief introduction to some of the key forces that
shaped Eisenhower as a soldier and a president. The following chapters will more closely
examine Eisenhower’s political thought and will demonstrate that he was a coherent, forceful,
and unique thinker. Without understanding these formative influences first, though, a search for
the thinking Eisenhower produce results no different from the popular and scholarly consensus
of the past half-century.
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CHAPTER 2
FREEDOM, THE STATE, AND SOCIETY

In order to understand Eisenhower as a thinker it is vital to explore his musings on the
most fundamental parts of government. Specifically, he gave thought and voice to specific
conceptions of freedom, the state, and society that would guide all of his more specific thinking
about topics such as foreign policy, American democracy, the place of religion in public life, and
the menacing character of the Soviet Union. This chapter will explore these three basic
categories of political thought in order to both establish Eisenhower as a political thinker and to
illuminate a bridge between his life experiences and the more specific examples of his thought
which will be addressed in later chapters.

Pre-Presidential Eisenhower on Freedom
While serving as president of Columbia University, Eisenhower delivered the inaugural
Gabriel Silver Lecture. This annual lecture was endowed the year before in order to provide
Columbia with the chance to host a renowned figure to address the topic of peace, broadly
construed. Early in his remarks Eisenhower linked peace to freedom. One without the other, he
argued, constitutes “an inhuman existence.”75 In order for freedom to exist, though, Eisenhower
insisted that justice must be an initial starting point. Justice, Eisenhower told the crowd, requires
three components. The first condition to be met is that people “must be clothed and fed and
sheltered.” Next, since humans are “thinking beings” they need to have the chance to pursue
answers to the most fundamental questions about life. Finally, he contended, the human is a
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“spiritual being in within whom burns longings and aspirations that cannot be extinguished by all
the goods of this world.”76 Even before Eisenhower took office the emphasis on a holistic vision
of justice that would include both bodily and spiritual elements was present in his thought. One
cannot understand his thought on freedom without first understanding what he felt were its
proper pre-conditions. Demonstrating the concrete nature of his thought regarding freedom he
closed the lecture by calling for the university to establish a center dedicated to the study of
world hunger, along with another institute, which would study “war” as “a social
phenomenon.”77

Freedom as Political Action
Eisenhower used the occasion of his first inaugural to announce the combination of
physical and ethereal importance he placed on the concept of freedom. Early in the speech, in
considering the uncertainty of international affairs at that time, he asks “Are we nearing the
light—a day of freedom and peace for all mankind? Or, are the shadows of another night closing
in upon us?”78 He would spend much of the rest of the address answering his rhetorical question
in a way that indicated that the pursuit of his conception of freedom would be his
administration’s top priority. After listing the specific things he planned on doing toward this
end he dramatically argued that the “hope” of freedom was “the supreme aspiration” of a well-

76

Eisenhower, Silver Lecture, 1950.

77

Eisenhower, Silver Lecture, 1950.

78

Dwight Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., Jan. 20, 1953. The American
Presidency Project Archives. Last accessed February 18, 2017. Available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9600.

45

ordered polity and that such hope “must rule the way we live.”79 He cautioned that anything
short of total commitment to the achievement of lasting freedom would be fatal to the American
political system. Speaking in the style of a progressive infused with the language of a Puritan
preacher he confidently declared “history does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak
or the timid.”80 He would use the word “freedom” ten times in this short address and he
mentioned the word “free” twenty-one times more. This opening address of his presidency
makes it clear that for Eisenhower, the only proper political path for the United States was one
that prized the active promotion of his particular concept of freedom. Without understanding
this, one risks misunderstanding Eisenhower’s politics entirely.
For Eisenhower this emphasis was not merely a top-down item that his administration
would pursue, only because he desired it. He consistently argued that all humans had an innate
desire for peace, and that specific conditions made this peace more or less likely. Most basically,
he identified a fundamental tension between military necessity and human flourishing. Speaking
of the Cold War arms race and the security rivalry between the United and the Soviets
Eisenhower, issuing one of the most famous lines of his presidency, lamented: “This is not a way
of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war it is humanity hanging from a
cross of Iron.”81 Alongside this, though, he argued that America could not fail to remain better
equipped and prepared for war than the Soviets, so long as Soviet leadership insisted on an
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aggressive posture. He finds his hope for a different future (and his hope that the present tension
can be resolved) by asserting that no disagreement between the Soviets and the Americans is
intractable. Noting this tension in Eisenhower’s thinking is helpful, as it illuminates his
captiously optimistic realism. He does not believe that humans can prosper under permanently
militarized conditions and, despite seeing no likely short term end to the Cold War, imagines a
different politics for the future.
Though much of Eisenhower’s rhetoric regarding freedom dealt with the AmericanSoviet conflict he frequently and intentionally broadened his vision. During his second inaugural
address, for example, he noted:
From the deserts of North Africa to the islands of the South Pacific one third of all
mankind has entered upon an historic struggle for a new freedom…Across all continents,
nearly a billion people seek, sometimes almost in desperation, for the skills and
knowledge and assistance by which they may satisfy from their own resources, the
material wants common to all mankind.82
People across the world, regardless of race or class, deeply desire political freedom and
economic security. Of equal importance, according to Eisenhower, is that the post World War II
world had become a place where peoples were galvanized to action, in order to pursue a better
and more fulfilling life. Political conditions, systems of government, and economic realities vary
across time and space, but for Eisenhower a basic hope for peace and prosperity was a
fundamental component of being a human.

82

Dwight Eisenhower, Second Inaugural Address, Washington D.C., January 21, 1957. The
American Presidency Project Archives. Last accessed February 18, 2017. Available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10856.

47

The “Basic Purposes of Government”
Most straightforwardly, Eisenhower believed that the state provided a “mediatory role”
that helped to prevent a politics driven by popular whims or special interests.83 Delivering his
1954 State of the Union address Eisenhower noted “three broad purposes” of government,
including defense of “freedom,” promoting economic growth, and addressing the “human
problems of the individual citizen.”84 These three categories are typical of Eisenhower’s
political thought; each one is stated ambiguously and yet, together they demonstrate that he was
thinking about the fundamentals of politics, not just about policy issues of the day. This speech
is the clearest articulation of Eisenhower’s vision of the role of government, as freedom,
economic prosperity, and a desire to secure a combination of material and emotional goods for
the individual would each go on to guide both Eisenhower’s reflections and actions throughout
his political career. The duration of this chapter will explore Eisenhower’s thought related to
freedom, the state, and society.

The State
Eisenhower did not leave lengthy thoughts or deliver a speech that explicitly outlined a
systematic vision of the state, but he did comment on the issue indirectly. Writing to his friend
in 1957 he opined that “laws are rarely effective unless they represent the will of the majority.”85
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Being a true believer in democratic governance, Eisenhower believed that the state should be a
reflection of the people, insofar as a consensus could be reached. Because of this, it should strike
a balance between too much power for the people to control and so little power that it could not
meaningfully impact society.
Closing his 1955 state of the union address he argued that “a government can try, as ours
tries, to sense the deepest aspirations of the people and to express them in political action at
home and abroad.”86 A government could and should attempt to help a people achieve better
lives, but it could not provide ultimate happiness. “No government can” he continued,
“inoculate its people against the fatal materialism that plagues our age.”87 This juxtaposition
demonstrates the two bounds of government Eisenhower hopes always prevail: The state should
not be treated as a savior, but it should be considered an indispensable tool in the effort to
achieve individual and communal prosperity. For Eisenhower, then, any circumstantial question
of policy must always be guided not only by the Constitution, but by the test of whether the state
is adequately expressing popular desires. A purely technocratic approach to ruling was not only
anti-democratic, but was doomed to eventual failure, according to Eisenhower’s thinking.
Specifically, Eisenhower articulated two rules for government involvement in any issue.
First, “the federal government should perform an essential task only when it cannot otherwise be
adequately performed”88 and, second “in performing that task our government must not impair
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the self-respect, freedom, and incentive of the individual.”89 Here the nuance in Eisenhower’s
thought begins to show. The government must always be an engine of the people, but must
never fully prioritize the collective so much that individuals are stifled in economic incentive and
in life choices more generally. The state should not be worshipped or hated. It is something that
can be used for great evil (the Soviets and Nazis his prime examples), and due to its power it is
always a potential threat to personal happiness, domestic freedom, and international peace.
However, the state can be a powerful (and is an indispensable) tool for those who want to
advance and preserve freedom.

Executive Power and the Rule of Law
Though Eisenhower believed that too much government interference in economic policy
was among the greatest possible domestic threats to American prosperity he insisted on the need
for a strong presidency. Up until now this has not been viewed as an important or revealing
characteristic of Eisenhower’s thought. Of course a former general and sitting president would
be in favor of wide-ranging executive power, the implicit argument goes. It is important to note
though, the inherent tension between Eisenhower’s desire to weaken government power in many
areas, while simultaneously expanding the role of executive power. Eisenhower’s reasoning is
specific and fits into his larger conception of politics.
The most illustrative experience of Eisenhower’s presidency regarding how he viewed
executive power is an incident that has been popularly dubbed the Little Rock Crisis. Following
the city school board’s plan for racial integration Little Rock’s Central High School was set to
admit nine African American students in the fall of 1957 as the students prepared to enter the
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school for the first time. Large crowds of white protestors assembled on the premises and
demanded that the black students be denied entrance. Insisting that he was acting in the interest
of public order and to ensure the safety of the students Governor Orval Faubus ordered the
Arkansas National Guard to prevent the students from entering the school. Faubus, himself a
proponent of continued segregation argued that allowing the students to attend the school under
conditions of unrest would not only present short term problems for the city and the school, but
would hamper the process of eventual full integration.
Disturbed that the governor had defied a federal district court’s order to implement the
school board’s integration plan Eisenhower met with Faubus on September 14, 1957. At this
meeting Eisenhower suggested to the governor that it would be wise to give the national guard
new orders to protect the black students as they attended the school. While Eisenhower’s public
statement after the meeting struck a conciliatory tone his diary entry that night provided a more
honest perspective and confrontational posture. He wrote:
I pointed out at that time [Faubus] was due to appear the following Friday, the 20th,
before the Court to determine whether an injunction was to be issued. In any event, I
urged him to take this action promptly whereupon the Justice Department would go to the
Court and ask that the Governor not be brought into Court. I further said that I did not
believe it was beneficial to anybody to have a trial of strength between the President and
a Governor because in any area where the Federal government had assumed jurisdiction
and this was upheld by the Supreme Court, there could be only one outcome-that is, the
State would lose, and I did not want to see any governor humiliated.90
In this entry we see that Eisenhower felt no pain in exercising the presidency’s informal
power by directly threatening to exercise the office’s formal powers. Writing to his childhood
friend in just several months prior to the crisis Eisenhower described his conception of executive
power this way: “We cannot possibly imagine a successful form of government in which every
90
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individual citizen would have the right to interpret the constitution according to his own
convictions…Chaos would develop.” Eisenhower believed that it was a primary duty of the
executive to enforce court orders in any places where such orders were being defied. Without an
executive that was both strong enough and insistent upon using force to ensure that court orders
were obeyed, democracy would devolve into mere “chaos.”91
When it became clear that Faubus would not only not follow Eisenhower’s advice to
change the National Guard’s mission, but would instead continue his policy of using the Guard
to prevent the school’s integration Eisenhower acted quickly and forcefully. Nine days after the
meeting with Faubus the White House released a statement describing the daily Little Rock
protest of integration as “unlawful”, because it was designed to hinder the implementation of a
federal court order and, so was a violation of the Constitution. Therefore, the statement went on
to announce that according to US Code Title 10, Ch. 15, sections 232-234 the president had the
authority to use military force to quell an insurrection or domestic disturbance, in the case that
“normal judicial proceedings” were unable to operate.92
The next day Eisenhower handwrote a note ordering federal troops to Little Rock to
ensure that the black students would be able to enroll. His notes from the crisis reveal that he
wanted to order federal troops to the scene, rather than immediately and only nationalizing the
Arkansas national guard, because he wanted both to ensure that the order would be immediately
obeyed with no possibility of delay or obstruction due to local loyalties, and he wanted the
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governor and protestors to realize how quickly the federal government could respond with a
significant show of force. He flew back to Washington from the naval base in Rhode Island,
where he had been staying at and working from for several weeks. Speaking from the Oval
Office before a national television and radio audience he sought to connect his action to other
moments and figures in American history:
By speaking from the house of Lincoln, of Jackson, and of Wilson my words…convey
both the sadness I feel in the action I was compelled today to take and the firmness with
which I intend to pursue this course until the orders of the federal court at Little Rock can
be executed without unlawful interference.93
The references to Lincoln and Jackson are clear. Lincoln, of course, is the ultimate
symbol of federal power triumphing over state dissent and Jackson famously threatened an
armed response to South Carolina, should John Calhoun and his allies attempt to carry out a
nullification threat. The reason for the inclusion of Wilson, though not as immediately obvious
is intentional. Wilson, being a Democrat with southern roots, began his political career as a
proponent of a robust notion of states rights. This stance did not last, though. Wilson would go
on to write glowingly of a “national spirit” that bound all Americans together.94
He went on to refer to protest leaders as “demagogic extremists” and argue that local
leaders has willfully failed to disperse the “mob.” This decision, then, had been an “inescapable
responsibility” of the presidency, since no one else had the constitutional or actual power to
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enforce the court’s decision.95 Hoping to make clear that his action was driven by a commitment
to a particular view of executive power and not motivated by a substantive stance on civil rights
he noted that his opinion of the decision in question was irrelevant and that Little Rock was not
representative of the whole white south. Indeed, he noted, that “many communities in our
Southern States have instituted…plans for gradual progress in the enrollment…of school
children of all races.”96 This, he argued, “demonstrated to the world that we are a nation in
which laws, not men, are supreme.”97 As for Little Rock, he continued: “I regret to say that this
truth-the cornerstone of our liberties-was not observed in this instance.”98 Since “agitators” had
“frustrated” the court’s ruling he had little choice, if he were to uphold the duties of his office
and the fundamentals of American democracy, but to use military force to ensure that the Little
Rock school was integrated, and that other potentially recalcitrant southerners took note that
resisting integration would not end well.

The Danger of a State Sustained Economy
Shortly after Harry Truman’s election in 1948 leaders of both parties began privately
recruiting Eisenhower for a potential 1952 presidential run. Until this time, Eisenhower had
never been publicly affiliated with either party, and, in fact, had spent significant effort hoping to
ensure that he would not be perceived as a partisan sympathizer.99 Many took this lifelong
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political silence as a signal that Eisenhower cared little and thought little about the domestic
issues of the day. This led partisan operatives to believe that his personal popularity could be
attached to any platform and ensure electoral success for either party. While it is true that
Eisenhower despised being considered a politically involved man, up until this point in his life,
the historical record shows that he did, in fact, have developed beliefs about both the philosophy
of government and about the actual operation of America’s government. Specifically, he was
worried about what he perceived to be a dangerous trend toward state control of the economy. A
caustic diary entry from January of 1949 merits inclusion here:
The trend toward governmental centralization continues, alarmingly. In the name of
“social security” we are placing more and more responsibility upon the central
government, and this means that an ever-growing bureaucracy is taking an ever-greater
power over our daily lives. Already the agents of this bureaucracy cover the land-to
justify their existence and render those reports that that seem to show a “profit” on their
operations they nag, irritate, and hound every businessman in the United States. This
morning’s paper says that the American Museum of Natural History is nearing
bankruptcy…Undoubtedly, the final answer will be “federal aid.” This is indicative of
what is happening to us everywhere. The “tax and tax, spend and spend, cut and cut”
formula is working wonderfully for the shortsighted persons who cannot (or do not desire
to) see beyond the next election date.100
This private reflection differs drastically from the public image Eisenhower was
portraying around the same time. The staunchest public criticism he had offered of the New
Deal by this point was mild and came cloaked in personal praise for Roosevelt. “With some of
Mr. Roosevelt’s political acts I could never possibly agree,” Eisenhower noted, “but I knew him
solely in his capacity as a leader of a nation at war-and in that capacity he seemed to me to fulfill
all that could possibly be expected of him.”101 Taken together these two musings show that
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Eisenhower’s reservations about the Democratic domestic agenda were both long-held and
deeply rooted. That he would criticize Roosevelt at all in his first book is noteworthy, because
doing so departed from the book’s usual diplomatic tone and focus on strategy and Eisenhower’s
personal achievement. The appearance of the critique, though it is tame and short, points toward
deeply held convictions that Roosevelt’s philosophy of government ran counter to Eisenhower’s
vision for the state.
Serving by this point as president of Columbia University, Eisenhower became
acquainted with the Republican leaders in New York. Governor Thomas Dewey paid a personal
and secret visit to the general to convince him that he alone was suited to win the presidency for
the Republicans in 1952. Dewey was so convinced of Eisenhower’s conservative credentials that
he offered to resign his position, so that Eisenhower could win a stepping-stone gubernatorial
race in 1950.102 In November of 1949 Eisenhower was visited by national party leaders, who
hoped to convince him that one more Democratic victory would send America incontrovertibly
toward socialism. Eisenhower records himself as being moved by the argument, but remaining
unconvinced that he was suited to be the Republican candidate. He closed this day’s reflections
by insisting that he would never “willingly go into politics.”103 His economic worries did not
stop, though. Later that month he again noted his worries about excessive economic
centralization.104 In 1954 he delivered a message to Congress for the sake of providing a yearly
economic report. In this message, he described an active role for government involvement in the
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economy, but a role that would center on setting conditions such that the market could work,
rather than on sustaining the economy with government spending. Eisenhower contends:
It is Government’s responsibility in a free society to create an environment in which
individual enterprise can work constructively to serve the ends of economic progress; to
encourage thrift; and to extend and strengthen economic ties with the rest of the world.105
He would go on to argue that a foundational task of the federal government in ensuring
that the market would be conducive to economic success was preventing monopolies from
forming and breaking them up when they were discovered. He viewed this role not as something
opposite of what he felt Roosevelt and Truman had done before him. They had, in Eisenhower’s
mind used the government as an economic monopoly itself. This was, for Eisenhower,
something that was not only unfair and un-American, but unsustainable in the long-term.
In 1956, he wrote about a controversy concerning whether the federal government should
have a role in regulating natural gas prices. He argued that though natural gas is fairly
categorized as a “public utility” and though the Supreme Court had recently granted Congress
the authority to regulate the commodity’s prices, he was so bothered at the suggestion of federal
involvement in that market that he urged Congress to pass legislation that would formalize a
federal unwillingness to intervene. “The producer of any such well,” he argued “should be
enabled to charge whatever he can get by competitive bidding in his particular state.”106Though
he recognized a legitimate public interest in the price of natural gas he did not feel that the
situation was dire enough to justify federal intervention in the economy.
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The fear of a government driven economy would never leave his thoughts. During his
1956 State of the Union speech, for example, he identified “fiscal integrity” as a fundamental
objective and defined it as working toward a balanced budget and reducing taxes, but only in
conjunction with a reduction in expenditures.107 Without a significant spending cut reducing
taxes would not address the fundamental problem of government interference in the economy.
In private, too, Eisenhower continued to fear an economy that was entangled with the state. In a
diary entry from March of 1958 he described his administration’s approach to economic
management:
We are basically conservative. We believe, for example, that frantic efforts now to put
the federal government into a large-scale building program will have the most
unfortunate financial consequences in the years immediately ahead. We believe in a
private enterprise rather than a “government” campaign to provide the main strength of
recovery forces.108
Here is an example of Eisenhower’s theoretical and concrete fears merging in his
thoughts: Not only was he philosophically opposed to a government driven economic program,
but he believed that his administration was faced with the challenge of defeating influential
opponents who wanted his government to be the primary agent in his country’s economic
recovery. This entry is important not only because it connects the philosophical with the
practical, but because it demonstrates the resolve of Eisenhower’s commitment to this principle.
Late in his second term, in private, he still wrote at length (the above quotation is from an
uncharacteristically long entry) about what he thought was the tempting, yet irrefutably foolish
principle that a government could repair or sustain an economy. “Private enterprise” was not
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only an important component of a free society, but was the best hope for ensuring statist
economic planners were not able to dupe the voters into a doomed philosophy of economic
intervention.

The Taft-Hartley Act
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 was a Republican-sponsored bill that passed new
restrictions on several forms of union conduct. For example, once the law took effect, unions
could no longer mandate membership for current employees, were required to bargain with
management in good faith, and were prevented from threatening a strike designed to pressure a
third-party business to pressure a business with which a union had an ongoing conflict.109 Seen
by conservatives as necessary regulation designed to prevent union leadership from taking
advantage of both employees and employers, the act was met with strong opposition by Harry
Truman, who viewed it as an attempt to limit the political tools unions could use to secure
favorable conditions for their members.
The Democratic Party made the repeal of the act a primary part of its 1948 and 1952
platforms and, as such, a live issue. Eisenhower initially appointed union leader Martin Durkin
as Secretary of Labor. Unions and Durkin himself believed that Eisenhower would be open
revising the act in ways that would render it more acceptable to union leadership. To this end,
Durkin suggested nineteen amendments to the act in a message sent to congress. He noted that
Eisenhower was supportive of these proposed changes.110 There seemed to be cause for
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optimism among union activists, because the appointment of Durkin seemed to signal that
Eisenhower was willing to allow business-labor relations to be a point of compromise, in order to
build political capital amongst some democrats. The nomination of Durkin enraged Robert Taft,
longtime senator, stalwart conservative, and Eisenhower’s chief rival for the Republican
nomination. Speaking just after the announcement of Durkin’s appointment Taft complained
“that a man would be appointed who has always been a partisan of Truman Democrats, who
fought Gen. Eisenhower’s election, and advocated the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law.”111
By the time Durkin submitted his nineteen amendments to Congress, though, things had
changed for Eisenhower. Robert Taft had recently died, yet Eisenhower had grown
uncomfortable with the idea of revising legislation that so many in his party strongly supported.
Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks helped to convince Eisenhower to reverse course and to
leave the Taft-Hartley Act as it was in its present form. This reversal humiliated and infuriated
Durkin, who resigned over the incident and criticized Eisenhower for having changed his mind
without notifying Durkin that he no longer supported the previously agreed upon plan.112
The reversal on the Taft-Hartley Act is indicative of Eisenhower’s larger economic
outlook. He feared unchecked capitalism and he felt that business and labor leaders should seek
compromises that would provide each group with some of their objectives. He worried that too
much wealth being concentrated in a few hands would have a corrupting influence on American
society, as it would erode the national creed of equality of opportunity. In spite of these feelings,
though, Eisenhower consistently came down on the side of wanting less economic intervention in
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government, aside from large capital projects like the Highway System. The Taft-Hartley Act
was, according to most conservatives of the day, nothing more than a law that would help ensure
a fair negotiating environment for both sides of a dispute. Not wanting to intervene decisively
on the side of labor in this example is representative of Eisenhower’s overall convictions
regarding how much involvement the government should have in what he considered to be the
regular features of how the economy operates.
When Eisenhower first secured his party’s nomination in 1952 the Taft-Hartley Act was
one of the mot important issues on which he was at odds with both Republican leadership and a
Republican sentiment. In 1948 the party platform makes no mention of the act, while the
Democratic platform calls for the law’s repeal.113 In 1952, the Republican platform triumphantly
calls for keeping the act in place and lists eight benefits it provides to “the working man” and
seven benefits it ensures to unions.114 Meanwhile, the Democrats again called for the act to be
repealed in their platform.115 In 1956, however, the Republicans had shifted their position to
look more like Eisenhower. To start with, the platform awkwardly reads:
Our great president has counseled us further: “In all those things which deal with people,
be liberal, be human. In all those things which deal with people’s money, or their
economy, or their form of government, be conservative.”116

113

1948 Democratic Party Platform, July 12, 1948. Last accessed March 3, 2017. Available at
The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu.
114

1952 Republican Party Platform, July 7, 1952. Last accessed March 3, 2017. Available at the
American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu.
115

1952 Democratic Party Platform, July 21, 1952. Last accessed March 3, 2017. Available at
the American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu.
116

1956 Republican Party Platform. Last accessed March 3, 2017. Available at American
Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

61

While there is no explicit explanation in the platform itself for what, exactly, this
“counsel” from Eisenhower will mean for the party going forward there are a few hints in the
policy positions later expressed in the document. The Taft-Hartley Act is one of these. Four
years after issuing an ode to the Taft-Hartley Act that reads like the political version of Elizabeth
Barrett Browning’s Love Sonnet 43 (the poem which famously begins “How do I love thee? Let
me count the ways”), the Republicans committed themselves to “revise and improve the TaftHartley Act so as to protect more effectively the rights of labor unions, management, the
individual worker, and the public.”117 Rather than being an issue that pitted management on the
side of freedom against unions on the side of socialism, as the party had previously seen the
issues which concern the law, the platform now pitched the dispute as one where individual
liberty was at stake in the welfare of workers to unionize effectively. “The protection of the right
of workers to organize into unions and to bargain collectively is the firm and permanent policy of
the Eisenhower administration.”118 Though this paragraph does go on to blame the
obstructionism of Democrats for the fact that the act had not yet been amended it is important
that the Republican position shifted to desire an amended deal. This is the clear influence of
Eisenhower and it is evidence of his political thought in action within his own party.

Freedom: What is it?
Freedom is, perhaps, the most frequently mentioned topic in Eisenhower’s speeches,
letters, and memoirs. He used the word liberally and usually seemed content to imply that its
meaning was self-evident. Importantly for this project, though, Eisenhower had a specific
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conception in mind when he discussed freedom. He believed that freedom consisted in
balancing individual agency with an inescapable duty to the whole.119 He imagined a political
order that would never be fully controlled by either elites or the masses, nor one that would be
dominated by any partisan agenda for an interminable period of time.120 In order to understand
Eisenhower’s most sweeping notions it is often helpful to pay attention to the details of what
appear to be political, not philosophically oriented speeches. An instructive example can be seen
in his 1957 State of the Union Address, wherein he discussed labor-business relations:
Freedom has been defined as the opportunity for self-discipline. This definition has a
special application to the areas of wage and price policy in a free economy. Should we
persistently fail to discipline ourselves, eventually there will be increasing pressure on
government to redress the failure. By that process freedom will step by step disappear.
No subject on the domestic scene should more attract the concern of the friends of
American working men and women and of free business enterprise than the forces that
threaten a steady depreciation of the value of our money.121
Here, Eisenhower seamlessly relates a current practical dispute to a lasting principle.
Though his passive language here leaves his prose less clear than would be ideal for scholarly
purposes, he communicates his perspective straightforwardly. Freedom is living in a selfdisciplined manner which will enable one to achieve prosperity. In order to achieve the selfdiscipline that freedom requires, a citizen (in this case a member of the working class or a
business executive) must demonstrate a disinterested public mindedness, for the sake of both the
community and one’s own long-term interests. Earlier in this same speech Eisenhower cited an
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“enlightened self-interest” as one of America’s enduring hallmarks. Freedom, for Eisenhower,
must include more than pursuing one’s own needs, yet without an honest pursuit of some degree
of self-interest freedom will be meaningless.
Another example of Eisenhower’s conception of freedom come in chapter 11 of
Eisenhower’s second term memoir, Waging Peace, which is titled “Principally Politics” and
begins with the following quote, attributed to Daniel Webster: “Liberty exists in proportion to
wholesome restraint.”122 For Eisenhower this restraint applied not only to individual lives, but to
the government apparatus as well. Specifically, he tied a congressional penchant for continually
increasing spending to a decline in the moral character and quality of life of the whole of the
American people. Blaming the Democrats for the particulars, but complaining about the general
attitude of Congress he wrote: “I was getting alarmed by the sprit of recklessness that sought
constant increases in spending, and by the apparent inability of [the Republicans] to stem it.”123
He would go on to cite economist Arthur Burns who argued that the “creeping inflation” the
United States had experienced since 1933 was a fundamental threat to the sustainability of a free
market and to any chance for continued prosperity in the long-term. Eisenhower was especially
convinced by Burns’ chief arguments that inflation was worth fighting, because if it was
occurring at all there existed no failsafe way to ensure that it did not occur too suddenly and
because even a small amount of inflation badly damaged the poor and middle classes.124
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Freedom through responsibility is a theme to which Eisenhower often returned. In
closing his farewell address he connected freedom and responsibility with a broad understanding
of human well-being. In a characteristically soaring manner he confidently announced his
highest hopes for the world.
We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs
satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who
yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom
will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs
of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease, and ignorance will be
made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come
to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.125
Freedom itself did not ensure this long list of human goods in Eisenhower’s thinking, but
rather without robust political, economic, and social freedom the fundamental and universal
goods of health, peace, and happiness would not be attainable. Freedom, then, not only has a
specific content, but a particular purpose for Eisenhower. It is a powerful instrument of human
flourishing, not an abstract concept that is to be celebrated for its own essence. When properly
understood the pursuit of freedom would be natural for a people and would naturally lead to their
collective and individual good

The Economics of Society
Important to Eisenhower’s understanding of both freedom and the state is an
understanding of how the two connect to provide a conception of a good society. The best
succinct statement on this topic comes from scholar Robert Griffith, who writes that Eisenhower
hoped “to resolve what he saw as the contradictions of modern capitalism and to create a
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harmonious corporate society without class conflict, unbridled acquisitiveness, and contentious
party politics.”126 For Eisenhower, a space in which a common public life could be pursued was
not only a necessary part of democratic governance, but an essential ingredient in human
happiness. It is in considering society, as distinct from but related to the state that Eisenhower
expressed one of his chief political fears: unchecked business interests. Modern capitalism had
the potential to increase human welfare, but also carried with it the possibility of causing great
suffering. Griffith quotes Eisenhower as lamenting the “concentrated wealth” that had served as
“a menace to the self-respect, opportunities and livelihood of…ordinary citizens.”127 This ill, in
Eisenhower’s words, “compelled drastic action for the preservation of the laborer’s dignity-for
the welfare of himself and his family.”128 Here, we can see roots of thought that would later
manifest in Eisenhower’s partial, but substantial support for the baseline of the New Deal. This
is noteworthy, because Eisenhower has often been categorized (and, at times categorized
himself) as a president on a mission to destroy the economic legacy of the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations. Understanding Eisenhower’s hopes for the society helps to understand why his
later New Deal stance was nuanced.

Political Society
Eisenhower not only imagined a particular type of society; he had specific ideas about
how that society would be threatened. His musings on these obstacles to common flourishing
and how to best confront them constitute his most basic ideas about what makes for a good
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political society. The greatest possible systematic internal threat to a common good, in
Eisenhower’s mind, was interest group driven politics.129 Demonstrating bold political thought
Eisenhower proposed a solution to the rancor of democracy that directly contradicts James
Madison, one of America’s most original and prodigious democratic thinkers. In Federalist
Paper 51 Madison argues that the best way to ensure that no interest group dominates politics, to
the detriment of the whole, is to construct a system where “ambition checks ambition.”130
Explaining his position that no one person or group can be trusted with definitive power Madison
famously wrote “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”131 Like
Madison, Eisenhower believed that political competition could not be avoided in a democracy,
but unlike Madison Eisenhower located the solution in “the leadership of public-spirited and
professionally skilled managers…who could exercise the disinterested judgment necessary to
avoid calamities.”132 Eisenhower felt that society must find a leader whom it could trust to wield
significant power, rather than trusting in an institutional framework which would not enable any
leader to have too much power. What Madison imagined as a fundamental threat Eisenhower
felt a necessity of good governance.
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Eisenhower has often been perceived as a self-reliant politician rather than a philosopher
president. His military experience, his folksy style, and his carefully guarded public statements
combined to give citizens and scholars alike the impression that confidence and a vague
conservatism marked his political life and that any serious thought was left to other realms.
Even the oft cited and well-known Eisenhower scholar Robert Griffith argued that “Eisenhower
was not, of course, a profound or original thinker.”133 This conclusion, though popularly and
understandably reached, is incorrect. Eisenhower’s thoughts regarding how to best deal with
democratic conflict are important, because they illustrate that his confidence in himself and his
conclusions work with, rather than stand in for, serious political thought. Eisenhower’s political
vision called for leaders who could manage crises, exercise a non-partisan public mindedness,
and build a consensus among disparate factions. Between September of 1949 and January of
1950 Eisenhower recorded a series of reflections in his diary responding to Republican leaders
urging him to run in 1952.134 In each of these entries Eisenhower notes that he does not feel a
duty to run for office. His civic contributions will be more valuable elsewhere and he has a
disdain for the thought of being affiliated with a particular party.
A diary entry from November of 1959 reveals that he was first approached about seeking
a future Republican nomination in 1943.135 Though he recalls dismissing this suggestion he was
again approached about the matter in 1945. The primary reason Eisenhower gives here (years
later and in private) for not running relate more to the experience of the war than to a sense of
duty. Successfully defeating the Germans in less than a year from the time of D-Day until the
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final surrender was, in Eisenhower’s words, “the climax of my own personal career.”136
“Anything that could happen to me thereafter,” he continued, “would, in my opinion, be
anticlimactic.”137 Quickly, though, Eisenhower turns from recalling his suspected boredom at
the thought of occupying the White House to remembering his short time as the governor of
American occupied Germany. This was a task to which he was naturally well-suited, but one
which caused him great discomfort, in his memory, because the job was being done by a soldier.
He remembered his position this way: “I kept pounding away on this matter because of my
feeling that after wars are over…the executive head of all organizations governing civilians
should be, under the Western tradition, a civilian.”138 Even in his memories he could not fully
separate his feeling that the political world was mundane and not a good match for his talents
with his self-image as one uniquely disposed and positioned to provide the type of political
leadership he believed post-war America was lacking at the highest level.
By the time Eisenhower launched his campaign in 1952, though, he had come to view
himself as the exact type of leader he felt America needed. On February 11th of 1952
Eisenhower declared: “Our times are tumultuous-people are returning to instinct, emotion, and
sentiment. Responsibility is becoming again something real.”139 Shortly before his inauguration
he privately noted his distaste for what he viewed as usual and toxic partisan politics.
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The real fact is that no one should be appointed to political office if he is a seeker after it.
We can afford to have only those people in high political offices who cannot afford to
take them. Patronage is almost a wicked word-by itself it could well-nigh defeat
democracy.140
Here Eisenhower expresses a characteristic fear both of a system that is dominated by
party competition and a fear that too much power in the hands of public sentiment (in this case,
in the form of a recently victorious president appointing only partisan allies to important posts)
could ruin “democracy” itself.141 Eisenhower posits himself and his stature as a virtuous and
disinterested leader as the antidote that American democracy needs. It is, certainly, fair to
question both his motivations and his self-awareness. It is difficult to read his diary entries and
the letters he wrote to friends during the late 40s and early 50s and find his years long refusal to
consider a presidential run as sincere. It is also a notable stroke of egoism to imagine one’s self
as the only citizen who has both the credentials and temperament to lead a nation out of a moral
and political crisis.142 More importantly, though, it is possible to trace consistent and distinctive
political thought on Eisenhower’s part. Understanding Eisenhower’s thought on the state,
freedom, and society helps to provide a basis from which to understand his political decisions
regarding specific issues and his guiding motivations as president.
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Eisenhower Situated in the Politics of his Time
The next chapter will explore Eisenhower’s particular brand of conservatism in a more
thorough manner, but it is important here to establish some of the political landscape of the
1950s, in order to see where Eisenhower fit within it. Though he had been a university president
himself, Eisenhower opposed the growing trends within the academy which prized pure
academic freedom for faculty members to express unpopular political opinions freely, along with
the conception of a system that would not inculcate values within the student populations, but
would instead allow individuals students to make up their own minds on even the most
fundamental of questions. William Buckley notes in his famous book God and Man at Yale that
in an address at Cornell, noted historian Edward Kirkland attacked Eisenhower for insisting, in
Eisenhower’s inaugural speech at Columbia, that universities should instill “The American Way
of Life” in their students. Kirkland was also upset that Eisenhower had recently announced his
support for loyalty oaths being required at some public universities, which were designed to
prevent communist sympathizers from being in roles that could influence young Americans.143
Historian and Republican strategist Geoffrey Kabaservice notes that Eisenhower’s
moderate Republicanism can only be fully understood as an outgrowth of the earlier progressive
Republicans.144 Eisenhower’s moderation was not pure Progressivism, though. Instead, he
picked up their willingness to accept technological and social changes of the time, their
internationalist bent, and their enthusiasm for the idea that good government meant good
management. Distinguishing himself, though, he was not eager to launch reforms and his
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internationalism lacked “Wilsonian Moralism.”145 This last point is confusing on its surface,
because Eisenhower did not hesitate to use moral language and he frequently pitched the Cold
War in the terms of good and evil. Unlike Wilson, though, Eisenhower felt that American power
should be used to influence foreign domestic governments for the sake of democracy. He had no
vision of a world governed by moral and self-determining peoples. In fact, he had little problem
installing decidedly un-democratic leaders in foreign countries, for the sake of American
interests. In contrast to Wilson’s vision Eisenhower hoped that American power would help to
contain threats in the world to democracy, which in turn would make the world a better place,
even for those who did not live in democratic regimes.
Though Eisenhower won two presidential elections and enjoyed wide public popularity,
he would never achieve complete acceptance from the more conservative wing of his party. His
refusal to attempt a dismantling of the New Deal, his comfort with large scale government
action, and the fact that he was not committed fully to conservative ideology over a pragmatic
consideration of politics infuriated thought leaders of true conservatism. William Buckley, for
instance, writing during the 1956 presidential election argued that Eisenhower was not a true
Republican, but was merely a “measured socialist” who could not be trusted with the
fundamental task of fighting the growing state apparatus that Roosevelt’s Democrats had built. 146
Another critique from the ideological right was that Eisenhower was merely a liberal who was
friendlier to big business than his predecessors had been. Still, this argument went, Eisenhower
did not care for traditionalism and had no use for those who offered a counter liberal philosophy
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of politics.147 Noted historian of conservatism George Nash contrasts the wide dissatisfaction
with Eisenhower on the right with the former general’s popularity nation wide. This, argues
Nash, is evidence that Eisenhower was considered by everyone to be a centrist in his time.
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CHAPTER 3
THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM
Communism is one of the most important themes for understanding Eisenhower’s overall
political thinking. It was a topic he addressed frequently throughout his presidency, both in
public and private. It was, he felt, the most important issue in the history of the world. He
conceived of communism as a five part threat. The rest of this chapter examines each of these
five dimensions, beginning with the most fundamental and philosophical, then moving to the
practical consequences of his thinking on the topic.

Existential
Most fundamentally Eisenhower believed that the threat of communism was a total one.
The long-term fate of democracy was at stake, as was the potential for human flourishing around
the world. In short, if communism was not stopped from expanding until the Soviet leadership
was content, the entire world would be doomed to interminable misery of every kind, in
Eisenhower’s view. In thinking about the conflict holistically Eisenhower felt that the Soviet
threat was, at its core, an existential one. In early 1956 Eisenhower asked a group of current and
retired high ranking military officers to study a possible nuclear conflict with the Soviets and to
attempt to project American losses. A diary entry from January 23rd of that year, merits
quotation at length:
The report was in two parts, each based on a particular assumption as to a condition
under which war might develop. The first anticipated no warning until our DEW148 line
was reached. The second anticipated a month of strategic warning…Under the first case
the United States experienced practically total economic collapse, which could not be
148
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restored to any kind of operative conditions under six months to a year. Members of the
federal government were wiped out and a new government had to be improvised by the
states. Casualties were enormous. It was calculated that something on the order of 65
percent of the population would require some kind of medical care and, in most instances,
no opportunity whatsoever to get it… While these things were going on, the damage
inflicted by us against the Soviets was roughly three times greater. The picture of total
destruction of the areas of lethal fallout, of serious fallout, and of at least some damage
from fallout was appalling…For ourselves, it would be clear that there would be no
shipping in and out of our country except some small or improvised vessels for many
months. It would literally be a business of digging ourselves out of ashes, starting
again.”149
This reflection demonstrates that for all of his talk about America holding moral,
political, and military advantages over the Soviets Eisenhower also understood the Cold War as
something unique in the history of political rivalry. He had a sobriety about the inevitable
physical and social destruction the world would experience should the conflict ever escalate to a
nuclear war. Under these conditions, winning a war, in any traditional sense, would not be
possible. The Soviets would likely suffer more damage than the United States, but both would
be reduced to an economy, a government, and a society that no longer functioned.
Eisenhower’s greatest fear, then, was not that the Soviets would “win” an armed conflict,
but that one would take place at all. This would seem to run counter to the type of language
Eisenhower deployed when writing about America’s pre-war stance in the late 1930s. In his war
memoir he criticized both the American government and population for refusing to accept the
need for eventual American intervention in Europe. His calculus of America’s enemy had not
changed, as he viewed both the Germans and the Soviets as much more formidable and much
more evil than a usual foe, but his assessment for what a war would bring was much different in
the 50s than it was in the 30s. It was appealing to imagine simply militarily defeating the Soviet
Union, but it was not possible to seriously contemplate such an outcome, even in a best-case
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scenario, without accepting that any war would mean the gravest military and civilian losses in
American history.
A crisis would test this attitude just a few months after the Soviet launch of Sputnik
jarred American citizens and policymakers alike Eisenhower delivered his sixth State of the
Union address. Shortly after the perfunctory introductory remarks Eisenhower shifted his tone
and starkly asserted that there were but two topics that merited the nation’s current attention.
The first was “to ensure our safety through strength”150 and the second was to create peace. In
bridging these two points he bluntly argued that:
We could make no more tragic mistake than merely to concentrate on military strength.
For if we did only this, the future would hold nothing for the world but an Age of Terror.
And so our second task is to do the constructive work of building a genuine peace. We
must never become so preoccupied with out desire for military strength that we neglect
those areas of economic development, trade, diplomacy, education, ideas, and principles
where the foundations of real peace must be laid.151
Once again, Eisenhower found it his duty to remind the American people that the greatest
threat of communism was not military destruction, but of an internal and holistic degradation of
the American way of life to the point that such a thing would no longer meaningfully exist. It is
especially noteworthy to find such commentary in this speech, because the mood of the country
at the time was one of trepidation regarding the military situation. The Soviet satellite had
inaugurated a new era of the conflict and, it was widely thought, of military technology more
generally. And yet, though Eisenhower addressed questions of physical security in his address

150

Dwight Eisenhower, State of the Union Address, Jan. 9, 1958. The American Presidency
Project Archives. Last accessed February 18, 2017. Available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11162.
151

Eisenhower, State of the Union Address, Jan. 9, 1958.

76

he could not make it onto the second page of an eleven-page text without warning of the
possibility of a permanent “Age of Terror” if Americans gave in to the temptation to put a desire
for physical security above all else.
Famously, in his Farewell Address of January 1961, Eisenhower described communism
as a “hostile ideology global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in
method.”152 In the same speech he went on to note that “until the latest of our world conflicts,
the United States had no armaments industry. But now…we have been compelled to create a
permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.”153 At this juncture it may have seemed to
his listeners that he had finally reconciled himself to an indefinitely large, expensive, and
mobilized military. In one sense, he had. He no longer explicitly discussed slashing the
military’s budget and he could no longer imagine a near-term future without a corporate arms
industry in the United States. Importantly, though, he had not been converted from the
skepticism of the start of his presidency about the American handling of the Cold War. He went
on to lament the current conditions:
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new
in the American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even spiritual-is felt
in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize
the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave
implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure
of our society.154

152

Eisenhower, Farewell Address, Jan. 17, 1961.

153

Eisenhower, Farewell Address, Jan. 17, 1961.

154

Eisenhower, Farewell Address, Jan. 17, 1961.

77

Eisenhower accepts the “imperative need” for the size of the current military and the
close relationship between the government and arms companies, but only for a limited time.
This is a set of conditions, he hopes, will be temporary and will not return to American life once
the imminent threat of global war passes. Examining the full context of Eisenhower’s thought
makes it clear that he believed that America would win the Cold War, in the sense that it would
outlast the Soviets as a world power. In cautioning Americans against becoming too comfortable
with a large arms industry and a permanently large standing military, then, Eisenhower is
counseling his country to worry about its future, even while it protects itself in the present. The
connection comes most deeply from the toll the “total influence” of the new arrangement takes
on American society. The cost, for Eisenhower, is a temporary, yet holistic degradation of the
character of American life. The elevation of security had damaged America’s “economic,
political, even spiritual” quality of life. This adverse impact of necessary defense efforts
impacted citizens at every level of government and society. Eisenhower hoped that a sober
awareness about the side effects of America’s military administered medicine would provide the
people with the urgency that would be required to combat cultural weakening they faced.
Specifically, realizing that the current military situation was both historically unAmerican and philosophically opposed to the core tenets of the American project—for
Eisenhower these fundamental distinctions included individual freedom, a balance between
material success and non-material happiness, and the chance for individuals to live in harmony
with each other and with God—would allow the American people to shift back to a less militant
posture as quickly as possible and would help citizens to be on the lookout for ways that the
military industrial complex may be negatively impacting their lives in ways that were not
immediately obvious.
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Taken together, Eisenhower’s thought on communism is both coherent and careful. He
has a specific paradigm through which he views not only communism, but the Soviet state and
the Cold War itself. That Eisenhower does not ever specifically and fully outline the exact
parameters of his thought on the subject is a consequence of his pragmatic style and penchant for
focusing intently on a particular matter before him. A careful analysis of his thought, though,
reveals that he viewed both individual crises and the general context of the entire Cod War
through a lens that held communism to be an insidious, aggressive, and formidable challenge to
America in every facet of existence. To meet this challenge, he thought, American citizens and
policy makers needed to understand their enemy and needed to approach specific incidents with
the mind of a technician, not merely the passion of a crusader.
Though Truman is usually described as the first notable anti-communist president,
Eisenhower was, himself, an avid opponent of global communism. For Eisenhower this was not
merely a political rivalry with the Soviet Union, but rather his opposition to communism was
grounded in his ideological commitments. In fact, that many observers now view his own
perception of his presidency as merely an exercise in defeating global communism. Though
much of this dissertation is dedicated to disputing the notion that Eisenhower was little but a cold
warrior while he occupied the White House this chapter will examine his views on communism.
To understand his thought in this realm it is important to note that that Eisenhower’s thought
flowed from experience and not from a liberal education or an intentional desire to engage in
philosophy. For Eisenhower, the Soviet state, its leadership, and its geopolitical maneuvers were
inseparable from broad or theoretical communism. Because of this he often conflates
communism and the Soviet state. The duration of this chapter will examine five dimensions of

79

communism that Eisenhower perceived as a threat to America and to human freedom. These
overlapping, but importantly distinct dimensions of threat are: spiritual, ideological, economic,
political, and existential.

Spiritual
Eisenhower often mused on the spiritual dynamic of a conflict. He excoriated the
Germans in World War II for representing a system that attacked humankind not only with arms
and propaganda, but also with a unique malaise of the soul. The Soviets, for Eisenhower, were
even worse than the Nazis had been in terms of the scope of a spiritual risk to freedom and free
peoples. After an initial tour of European capitals as NATO’s chief Eisenhower traveled back to
America to give informal reports both to Congress and to the American public. As he prepared
his remarks he hoped to emphasize not only the material strength of Allied armies, but also “the
spiritual vigor of the European peoples, who for years had labored…to repair the devastation of
war, and having fought the creeping paralysis of Communism now found in the North Atlantic
Treat y new hope.”155 This was important for Eisenhower because in his thinking spiritual
strength tangibly contributed to military might. The Europeans, being freedom loving and rightminded peoples, possessed an unending resolve to defeat the Soviets, not merely because the
Soviets were a geopolitical foe, but because global communism embodied an evil that could not
be allowed to long persist if human prosperity were to survive.
One can argue that Eisenhower never adequately demonstrates a link between spiritual
strength and material power, and it is beyond dispute that Eisenhower’s rhetoric about the
spiritual dimensions of the Cold War are often tinged with an idealism that can be surprising
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coming from a former general. Importantly, though, seeking to understand Eisenhower’s
assessment of the communist threat without understanding his conception of the Cold War as, in
part, a spiritual conflict will prevent a scholar from fully appreciating his thinking on the central
foreign policy issue of his presidency. The spiritual component of the conflict, for Eisenhower,
was concerned with individual and collective attitudes about the relationship between the human
and the divine, but it did not stop there. Eisenhower did not conceive of existence as having
separate spheres for spiritual and practical matters, but rather he imagined a world where the
spiritual was intimately entwined with all other categories of the human experience and, as such,
could not be neglected in analyzing a political problem.
For Eisenhower, the spiritual threat of Communism required not only a willingness to
fight for the western creeds of liberal democracy in the case of an actual war and a faith in an
objective divine goodness but also necessitated a self-awareness about the costs of the Cold War.
Historian Walter McDougall notes that “Eisenhower said over and over that the only way the
United States could lose the Cold War was by militarizing its society, bankrupting its treasury,
and exhausting Americans’ will to resist.”156At a news conference in 1953 Eisenhower
elaborated his thoughts about the matter:
We must not destroy what we are attempting to defend. So, just as earnestly as I believe
we must fight communism to the utmost, I believe that we must also fight any truly
unjust, un-American way of uprooting them, because in the long run I think we will
destroy ourselves if we use that kind of defense…That, I say, must be the true path for
every real American: to oppose these ideologies, these doctrines that we believe will
destroy our form of government, and at the same time, do it under methods where we
don’t destroy it. I can’t define it any better than that.157
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To Eisenhower, the Cold War presented the real threat that the democratic west could
fear so much for its physical security that it would be willing to do anything to counter Soviet
power. It was conceivable, in Eisenhower’s thinking, to win the Cold War by defeating the
Soviets economically and politically so as to avoid a nuclear conflict. If this victory was not
achieved in a certain way, though, it would matter little for the nation’s long-term prosperity. A
drive for victory at all costs, even if it came in the cause of justified self-defense against an evil
enemy could not be tolerated, if the good things about American democracy were to persist. And
if America lost what was uniquely good about its character and political system, it would have
lost the only thing it was defending. The Cold War, then, was about defending a way of life, not
just defending literal life.

Ideological
Speaking at Dartmouth’s graduation ceremony in June of 1953, just five months after
taking office Eisenhower indirectly launched an attack on Joseph McCarthy, the noted
communist hunter. After learning that the senator was encouraging the burning on non-approved
books in Voice of America office libraries around the world Eisenhower quipped to the crowd of
graduates: “Don’t join the book burners…Don’t be afraid to go in your library and read every
book…How will we defeat communism unless we know what it is?”158 Eisenhower often
worried that a disdain for communism could too easily become a hatred that was blinded and
therefore self-destructive. It was not only permissible, but indispensable for Americans to
understand the nature of Communism’s assessment of the human, politics, and the future.
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Ignoring the claims of Soviet propagandists and communist sympathizers would leave American
wholly unequipped to wage the ideological portion of the Cold War. Without addressing this
dimension, Eisenhower believed, the long-term defeat of the Soviets would not be possible.
Treating communism as nothing more than a military or economic threat did not merely
underestimate the enemy, but misunderstood the fundamental nature of the conflict. Rather than
worrying about exposing citizens to the ideas of communism, Eisenhower believed that political
leaders should be sure to educate Americans about communism, so that its weaknesses would
become evident.
Writing in the final chapter of Waging Peace, the memoir of his second term Eisenhower
argued that the Soviet system could be understood in the following way: “Communism, no
matter how it may be described or disguised, requires dictatorship as a condition its
existence…This eliminates freedom of choice between their own and other ideologies.”159 He
conceived of the Cold War, in its most fundamental guise, as being a proxy for “the conflict
between liberty and slavery,” which he noted was “as old as history as new as the latest tick of
the clock.” This struggle between liberal democracy and Communism, between the Americans
and the Soviets, was a signal of “the instinctive rebellion of men, descended from tribes that
knew no law, except survival of the fittest.”160 The Soviets were an ideological threat, because
their system was a concretized version of man’s original sin. What the communist system
provided, in Eisenhower’s mind, was a seductive temptation that asked unwitting peoples to
remake the world according to their own desires. Communism, then, was a threat that needed to
be met not only by force, but also by a superior articulation of better ideas.
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After describing the political threat of communism in his 1959 State of the Union
Address, Eisenhower went on to argue that one of the greatest weapons in the Soviet’s
ideological arsenal was an abuse of language. He argued:
We live, moreover, in a sea of semantic disorder…Police states are called people’s
democracies. Armed conquest of free people is called ‘liberation.’ Such slippery slogans
make more difficult the problem of communicating true faith, facts, and beliefs.161
In Eisenhower’s thinking the official Soviet use of distorted language was the sign of an
evil and formidable ideological opponent. It would not do to merely shrug off Soviet use of
language as incorrect, or manifestly and hilariously false. Instead, this dimension of the Cold
War required an intentional and large-scale response. This response had two important
components. “We must use language to enlighten the mind, not as the instrument of the studied
innuendo and distorter of truth,” Eisenhower argued. “And we must live by what we say,” he
continued.162 It was not enough to fight the Soviets materially and economically, nor was it
enough to point out the hypocrisy in the Soviet creed and in official statements and namings.
Rather, the task America and its allies needed to undertake, according to Eisenhower’s
recommendation, was one of both propagating a language that exalted democratic freedoms and
denounced the ills of communism, while also living up to these stated ideals of justice and
individual freedom. Either approach, if pursued alone, would be incomplete and would be
susceptible to defeat by communist lies. In thinking this way, Eisenhower shows himself to
imagine the ideological as a concrete part of politics, not merely a rhetorical or philosophical
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dimension that policymakers need not worry about. Understanding the particular ideological
challenge of global communism, in Eisenhower’s mind, was a necessary precursor to defeating
the total Soviet threat.

Economic
The economic arena was the most obvious practical dimension of the Cold War for
Eisenhower. This position was based on an observation of the political realities of the time. A
military conflict may never come and, if it should, both sides would have likely already lost, as
Eisenhower saw it. The war of ideas among non-aligned peoples was important as well, but that
realm lacked the daily urgency that economic competition provided to both American and Soviet
policy makers. For Eisenhower’s part, he argued that increased developmental aid to foreign
countries should be an American priority, because such aid would create larger and freer
markets, would add to the world’s population of consumers engaging in trade with America and
American allies, and would build goodwill toward America. To this end, Eisenhower proposed
the “Eisenhower Doctrine,”163 which allowed countries under threat of Communist harassment to
ask for direct aid from the United States. The aid provided would be a combination of military
and economic assistance, depending on the nature of the threat. Critics of the economic
assistance portion of the plan worried that, in the long-term, the plan may help to launch
currently underdeveloped states into competitor status with the United States. Eisenhower
conceded that this could be a long-term result, but countered that fear by arguing that such aid
“has as its principal purpose the strengthening of freedom and the gradual exhaustion of

163

U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, “The Eisenhower Doctrine: 1957.” Last accessed
March 7, 2016. Available at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-doctrine.

85

Communism in the world.”164 Put another way, Eisenhower believed that one of the chief ways
to build goodwill and trust toward the American led Cold War alliance was to outbid formal and
informal offers of Soviet aid to non-aligned states. The threat of a future economic rival should
not deter Americans from meeting the more immediate threat of expanding Soviet influence.
In his first State of the Union address Eisenhower emphasized the need to integrate
military planning with economic considerations. He argued for “the inescapable need for
economic health and strength if we are to maintain adequate military power and exert influential
leadership for peace in the world.”165 The trick, for Eisenhower, was that he abhorred notions of
centralized economic planning. How, then, could the American government unite its military
and economic plans, while retaining full control of the one and little control of the other?
Eisenhower hoped to solve this puzzle with the six following objectives: a balanced budget,
reducing military spending, ensuring payment on government debt, fighting inflation, reducing
taxes, and encouraging an increase in private enterprise.166
Though the last point is so vague as to be of little help for the scholar’s purposes, the first
five present the beginnings of a concrete and comprehensive fiscal policy. Here, we are
provided with a glimpse of Eisenhower’s greatest hope for American economic life. He
envisions a state that spends as little as is reasonable (though, not, as little as is possible), an
economy that does not become reliant on government spending for economic growth, and a
society that is driven by individual freedom which results, in part, in economic improvement.
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Though he does not mention communism in this section he does help us to understand what he
most fears in the Cold War. When he notes, at other times, that the greatest threat the Soviets
pose is the temptation for America to destroy itself by ruining its own character in pursuit of
endless security he is expressing a fear that the five substantive economic points he lists in early
1953 will disappear from American life and with them, American freedom, peace, and
contentedness will disappear as well.

Political
Most scholars have not analyzed Eisenhower’s thinking about communism more deeply
than only considering his version of the political threat. It is important to end here, rather than to
begin here, because it is only by understanding Eisenhower’s deeper thinking on the issue that
his take on the political situation comes truly into focus. For Eisenhower the political threat
included, but was not limited to the military threat the Soviets presented. Eisenhower viewed the
Soviets as a looming political threat as early as the months just before America entered World
War II.
In his final memoir, he recalled that “from 1941 onward, I had, because of personal
experience, become increasingly sure that the Soviets would not look upon the United States as
anything other than a potential enemy.”167 During the war, Eisenhower worked with other highranking officers to caution the Roosevelt administration against trusting the Soviets to act in
good faith. “We did not openly refer to the Soviets as a potential enemy in those days,”
Eisenhower noted, because our political leaders were trying to develop working political
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agreements with them. But there was no doubt what we meant when we kept warning.”168 What
was meant, specifically, was that the United States would not be able to avoid a political conflict
with the Soviets, regardless of the perception of goodwill being built during the common war
effort in Europe. Shortly after the war, some advisors in the Truman administration began
counseling the president to escalate America’s military posture in order to counter Soviet
ambitions in Europe and to prepare for what they viewed as an inevitable war. Conversely,
Eisenhower cautioned that not only was a Soviet war not yet inevitable, but also that conflict
could not be treated primarily as a potential military matter. Instead, a balance of both military
and economic strength, along with a calmness that allowed for the real possibility that war would
not be necessary was the best way forward in Eisenhower’s mind.169
Between the World War II’s immediate aftermath and the start of his presidency
Eisenhower was asked to lead NATO. After serving as Columbia University’s from 1948 until
1951. Soon after accepting NATO command and arriving in Europe Eisenhower surveyed the
military situation facing the Atlantic alliance and concluded that the “outlook was bleak for those
of us who only five years before had fought a war to eradicate tyranny from the earth.”170 He
continued: “It now seemed that, at any moment, the arrogance of Communist power might be
converted into offensive action against the West.”171 In response, Eisenhower believed that his
first job, upon assuming NATO’s leadership, was to travel to the capitals of other alliance
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member states in order to personally convince their leaders of the urgent need for total
commitment to a joint military strategy which had the sole purpose of defending against Soviet
aggression and comprehensively defeating Soviet aims across the world. The strategy
Eisenhower imagined, then, included an irreplaceable role for the military, but it was not a
merely military approach. Put differently, Eisenhower believed that tending to physical defense
and preparing for a possible full blown conflict was necessary, but he hoped to instill a bigger
vision in his colleagues. He encouraged a strategy that imagined the military as but one tool in a
large array of political dimensions of the conflict.
Later, when Eisenhower was sworn into the presidency he was immediately faced with a
question about how he would broadly pursue foreign policy. Specifically, he had to make the
concrete decision as to whether to retain NSC 68’s172 analysis of the Cold War that Truman had
relied upon in formulating his foreign policy. This paradigm held that the Soviets were bent on
total world domination and that stopping this pernicious plot would require a full military and
economic mobilization by the United States. In spite of this large-scale mobilization
containment, not direct confrontation was be the mode of combatting the Soviet Truman chose.
Eisenhower quickly judged this analysis to be fundamentally flawed. In comparison,
Eisenhower wanted a leaner and more agile military joined with better diplomacy. He aimed for
a combination of striking secret deals with the Soviets at times, while opting for direct and public
confrontation at other times. Though the Soviets were a substantial threat, he argued, the threat
presented by the Cold War was not one of pure and unstoppable escalation. If American leaders
embarked on Truman’s plan for full mobilization in the short-term not only would the American
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people misunderstand the state of the conflict, but defense spending would balloon to a level that
would damage the overall health of the economy. Even more troubling, for Eisenhower, was that
this “permanent state of mobilization” would threaten the fundamentals of American political
life.173 Where Truman and his advisors saw in the Cold War a geopolitical threat which verged
on overwhelming American capabilities for self-defense, Eisenhower saw a different kind of
challenge: The possibility that the American people could, in an outbreak of hysteria, destroy
themselves without any bullets being fired.
Rejecting NSC 68 was an important first step in Eisenhower’s foreign policy, but more
was required. It was now up to Eisenhower and his administration to imagine a new suitable
framework from which to view the Cold War. The new approach would come to be called the
“New Look” and would include a significant reduction in military spending (The president’s
request for military funding dropped by $5 billion dollars from 1954 to 1955, when the New
Look was adopted.), a reapportionment of funds (The army and navy would receive lower
percentages of the total military budget, while the air force would receive a larger share.), and a
new deterrence strategy to combat Soviet power. Rather than building up an overwhelming
conventional force, Eisenhower hoped that a nuclear arsenal that would be sufficient for
retaliatory purposes would be enough to dissuade the Soviets from starting a war.174
The most important foreign policy issue during the early days of Eisenhower’s
presidency was the state of the Korean War. Though worried about the spread of communism in
Asia, Eisenhower felt that Truman had carelessly led the country into an imprudent war.
Eisenhower used this position to campaign as a sort of anti-war president, whose judgment he
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hoped would appeal to doves and hawks alike. Speaking in Detroit late in the campaign
Eisenhower argued that the Korean conflict “was never inevitable, it was never inescapable.”
The way things had unfolded had proven to be “a damning measure” of Truman’s abilities as a
world leader.175 Eisenhower then shifted his focus in the address from the ill-advised nature of
American involvement in the war to an indictment that the ultimate cause of the war was that
Truman failed “to turn back Communist ambition before it savagely attacked us. The Korean
war—more than perhaps any other war in our history—simply and swiftly followed the collapse
of our political defenses.”176 In Eisenhower’s thinking fighting communism meant taking a
holistic approach, which used military force as but one tool in a vast arsenal that would be
required in order for lasting peace to be achieved.
Truman’s failure, in Eisenhower’s argument, was not that he did not sufficiently want to
oppose communism, but that he did not understand the depth of the commitment that would be
required to defeat it. The suggestion Eisenhower hoped voters would pick up is that he could be
trusted to bring the necessary intellectual and moral resources to the Cold War that provided the
west’s only hope for eventual safety from expansionary communism. The Korean War
transitioned the Cold War into a real war and Eisenhower worried that if this became the normal
condition of the American-Soviet rivalry, his long-term hope of ending communism through non
military means would be doomed. Additionally, Eisenhower saw Korea as a preview of needless
destruction that would come from conventional wars fought between democratic and communist
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powers. While most policy makers at the time were primarily concerned about the possibility of
a nuclear conflict, Eisenhower seemed to be equally worried about the prospect of an endless
series of small and conventional wars fought as proxy conflicts, in place of a full blown nuclear
war. Ending the Korean War was important for Eisenhower not only because he felt that the
United States could not gain much from its continuation, but also because he hoped to turn the
Cold War cold again.
Another illustrative set of examples of the New Look Policy is the two Taiwan Straits
Crises. After the Korean War ended in 1953, Eisenhower ordered an end to the naval blockade
that had been in place between China and Taiwan. He hoped that this would decrease tensions
between Mao’s China and Nationalist Taiwan. Both parties, though, became more aggressive in
their military posturing once the American naval presence was removed. This led to a calculated
response from Eisenhower, which sought to both avoid full scale armed conflict in the shortterm, without leaving America’s commitment to fight communism in the long-term in doubt.
Specifically, in early 1955 Congress passed a resolution which Eisenhower signed that promised
that the United States would defend Taiwan from an invasion from the mainland. Conversely,
the United States would not assist Taiwan in a conflict in which it was the party that began the
fighting.177 This effectively ended the First Taiwan Crisis, as both sides backed off bellicose
rhetoric and Mao stopped bombing islands occupied by Taiwan and claimed by China.
In 1958 the crisis began after Kai Shek reinforced the islands of Matsu and Quemoy. In
response, Mao ordered the shelling of these islands and many in the region, including important
members of Taiwan’s political class, as well as American military officers, believed that a full
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invasion of Taiwan’s home island would soon follow. Kai Shek sought permission from
Eisenhower to retaliate against mainland China, while an American general in the region, along
with the Joint Chiefs, counseled Eisenhower to be prepared to deploy tactical nuclear
weapons178, should China become more aggressive. Eisenhower, ever worried about the cost of
an all-out war with another nuclear power, flatly refused to allow for any Taiwanese response to
the bombardment. Instead, he began secret negotiations with Mao’s officials in Warsaw, hoping
for a diplomatic solution. Eisenhower hoped that the crisis would be settled by an agreement
that would require Taiwan to demilitarize the particular islands that had been originally
reinforced in exchange for a cessation of Chinese bombing and a promise that no invasion of
Formosa would take place. Eisenhower biographer Jim Newton eloquently describes what
happened:
Negotiations began in Warsaw on September 15, and after early posturing, China
suspended its bombing on October 6. Taiwan reluctantly agreed-as if it had much
choice-to scale back its military presence on the islands, though not to abandon them.
China responded with a move that captured the lunatic order of the period. It resumed
shelling on October 25, but only on odd-numbered days. Terror devolved into farce; the
threat of devastation was transformed, Ike noted, into a “Gilbert and Sullivan war.” The
prospect of World War receded.179
Looking back on this crisis now it is easy to imagine Eisenhower’s moves as nothing
more than the obvious choices of a reasonable leader. At the time, though, it was not at all clear
that the New Look would produce better results than the more aggressive containment of
Truman’s presidency. During September of 1958 and at the height of the crisis Khrushchev sent
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a menacing telegraph to the White House and, by ignoring it, many in the American military
establishment felt that the president was capitulating to the communist bullying. Navy Chief
Arleigh Burke argued that the position that no political aim was worth risking a third world war
was one of misguided naiveté and that such an attitude was the primary reason that the Soviets,
as he saw it, had been winning the Cold War since its inception.180
Diverging from military advisors and from a strong feeling that nuclear war with the
Soviet sphere was inevitable demonstrates Eisenhower’s independent thought in real time. He
was not the only American to believe that staving off a nuclear war, even a limited one, was
required at nearly any cost, but he was uniquely positioned to put his conviction into policy. His
crisis management was guided most fundamentally by a conception of how he perceived the
overall arch of the Cold War, which was, for Eisenhower, neither an interminable and abstract
struggle between democracy and communism or a merely particular rivalry between two states
without a deeper moral context. It was, rather, a concrete conflict wherein each side not only
represented, but actually instantiated objective good and objective evil. The latter part of this
formulation meant winning had to be America’s highest foreign policy priority, yet it also meant
that victory achieved at the cost of America’s enduring hallmarks of goodness (as Eisenhower
saw them) would, itself, be a defeat. The correctness of the conflict, though, meant that
prudence was required, even if confronting Communism’s evil would have to be delayed or
reimagined in a way that did not include traditional military conflict.
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Eisenhower’s conception of the Soviet political challenge can be seen outside of crisis
management as well. Two weeks before taking office Eisenhower recorded a lengthy diary entry
that detailed both the excitement and trepidation he experienced as he reflected on the prospect
of working with Winston Churchill in an official capacity again. In this note Eisenhower
worried that Churchill did not understand how formidable of a political foe the Soviets had
become. He put it this way:
Nationalism is on the march and world communism is taking advantage of that spirit of
nationalism to cause dissension in the free world…Actually what is going on is that the
communists are hoping to take advantage of the confusion resulting from destruction of
existing relationships and in the difficulties and uncertainties of disrupted trade, security,
and understandings—to further their aims of world revolution and the Kremlin’s
domination of all people.181
The Soviets were skillfully exploiting the global trend toward national self-determination,
something that Eisenhower praised elsewhere, and if the Americans and British did not find a
way to meet this challenge the Soviets would soon exercise a daunting amount of influence
across the world. So Eisenhower’s thinking went. The problem was not only a general one, but
manifested itself in several specific and critically situated locations. Among the states
Eisenhower worried could fall into the Soviet sphere none may have been more important than
Mexico. Writing to a friend in July of 1954 Eisenhower noted that Mexico had influential
Marxist elements in its domestic political climate. A former president, Lazaro Cardenas, was not
only a communist sympathizer, but was broadly popular. Noting that he would not support
tariffs on Mexican goods for fear that such a move would cause the Mexicans to embrace
communism he wrote:
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As of now we do not take too seriously any direct threat from Mexico. She is a weak
country. But let her once form a partnership with Moscow and it takes no great
imagination at all to see what would happen.182
Eisenhower felt that American policy makers could not afford to think about any issue of
foreign relations, be it trade, defense, or diplomacy, without accounting for the Soviet response.
No sector of the world was unimportant in the political war with communism and no issue could
be presumed to be unrelated to the broad context of the conflict. One particular incident which
demonstrates Eisenhower’s thinking on this front came in 1958, when Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev notified the world that the Soviet Union would soon end its occupation of East
Germany and would recognize the East German state as an independent entity. The primary
implication of this move, for the Cold War, was that this would mean that the western Allies
would no longer have permission to occupy and defend West Berlin. Though Eisenhower
admitted that the legal basis for continuing American presence was tenuous, he refused to
withdraw American troops from the city.
The soundest basis for our remaining in Berlin, I felt, was our solemn obligation
expressed to the two million Germans of West Berlin and to the entire world to stand by a
city that had freely chosen to stay with the West and the cause of freedom. If our word to
them would be broken, then no one in the world could have confidence in any pledge we
made. 183
The impetus for staying, then, was twofold. The first was to protect the physical safety of
West Berliners at a time when their existence as a democratic enclave with a prosperous
economy was threatened. The more strategic reason for Eisenhower’s firm stance in favor of a
direct confrontation over the future of West Berlin is that he did not want to signal weakness to
the Soviets or to American allies. The obvious symbolic importance of West Berlin, along with
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the way that this particular crisis was playing out on the international stage meant that here,
unlike in the Taiwan Straits, Eisenhower would not back down rhetorically or militarily. Though
the standoff did not come to an outright war, Eisenhower was willing to accept such an outcome
if the only alternative was surrendering West Berlin at the whim of the Soviet controlled East
German government. Comparing the Taiwan Straits Crisis with the Soviet demand that the
Americans abandon West Berlin reveals two distinct responses from Eisenhower. Importantly,
this demonstrates that when it came to the military and political dimensions of the Cold War
conflict Eisenhower possessed a pragmatic nature, rather than the orientation of a true hawk or a
true dove.

Eisenhower and Peace
One of the most notable curiosities of the Eisenhower presidency was that he was elected
largely because of the fame he won as one of the most important commanders in the largest war
in the history of the world, yet he spent much more time talking about peace than he did musing
on war. For Eisenhower, peace was not only a far away abstract goal, but something that either
would or would not be achieved, depending on whether particular political objectives were met.
I discuss his “Chance for Peace” speech elsewhere, but it is worth noting again here. This was
the first public speech Eisenhower gave as president and it was broadcast on both television and
radio. After speaking in specific terms about the virtues of America and the moral defects of the
Soviet system he concluded in sweeping language that was representative of how he thought
about peace. American policy under his administration would be aimed at “the lifting, from the
backs and from the hearts of men, of their burden of arms and fears, so that they may find before
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them a golden age of freedom and of peace.”184 This “golden age of freedom and peace” was, for
Eisenhower, a realistic and concrete possibility, but it required that the United States take
specific actions to curb the spread of Soviet influence around the world.
His ruminations on peace were not limited to airy hopes for a better future that lacked
specific content of thought. He often argued that money spent on the military was, though
sometimes necessary, always a “sterile” use of funds, because that money would do more
positive good for society if it were spent on schools, infrastructure, or another project that would
enable both collective and individual prosperity. The military would never make America great
and, in fact, was a threat to the things that were best about the American way of life. That it was
a necessary tool meant that the sacrifices required of maintaining it were important, but the
sacrifices were more than the potential loss of life or a mere economic hit: the greatest threat was
a deeper potential menace that the American people would come to accept a perpetually large,
expensive, and mobilized military as their new way of life. If this was a condition that lasted for
too long, Eisenhower feared, his long-term vision of a peaceful America at the head of a peaceful
and prosperous world would not be realized.
That Eisenhower was so concerned with peace may seem strange, at first glance, but it
was part of a coherent way of thinking about the world for him. As importantly, it was a way of
thinking that matched up with his life experiences. Though he bristled at his mother’s pacifism,
he did grow up in a small religious community that was deeply committed to peace as a way of
life. This influence can be seen in Eisenhower’s thinking and speaking peace, even though he
does not readily acknowledge his religious upbringing as a source of his thought. Furthermore,
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when he talked about war he often talked about it in the context of being legitimate only for the
sake of establishing a peace as quickly and as fully as possible. He carried this line of thinking
with him throughout his public life.
One of the last prominent public speeches he made came at the Republican National
Convention in 1964. Peace, he argued, was a foundational Republican virtue and was a point on
which the two parties substantively differed in their values and track record. Mentioning a recent
poll that indicated that voters more trusted the Democrats to keep the country safe than the
Republicans Eisenhower offered this rebuttal: “World War I, World War II, and the Korean War
were started during Democratic administrations…it is hard to believe that an informed and
impartial public should conclude Republicans are less able to keep peace than the Democrats.”185
It is noteworthy that Eisenhower served two terms as president without entering or escalating a
war. He was able to help effect a ceasefire in Korea and he declined to become involved in
Vietnam. This was, in Eisenhower’s thinking, one of his important and conservative
accomplishments.
The connection between Eisenhower’s emphasis on peace and his thinking about
communism is one of the most important links between any two topics in all of his political
thinking. The reasoning for being obsessive about communism was not only to win a conflict in
the short-term, but to get on with the even more important business of, as he titled his second
book, “Waging Peace.” This is what he viewed as his legacy and this is what he felt all patriotic
and wise leaders should keep at the forefront of their minds always, even as they dealt with the
contingencies of communism’s multi-faceted threat.
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CHAPTER 4
THE UNIQUENESS AND BASIC GOODNESS OF AMERICA
Eisenhower has been thought of by some thinkers186 as a conservative ideologue, by
some in his own party as a moderate who was not a conservative at all, by still more as a
politician without substantive values on controversial political issues of his day. There is
something valuable in each of these assessments, though each misunderstands Eisenhower’s
disposition and shortchanges his thought. Rather than fitting into one of these three categories
Eisenhower was, instead of an ideologue, a pragmatic thinker committed to a particular kind of
conservatism. Specifically, Eisenhower was fully committed to the idea of America’s
fundamental and unchanging goodness. A quick reading of many of his speeches will reveal
language about America’s greatness and goodness that does not seem to differentiate much from
the way in which most presidents speak about America. Fred Greenstein described Eisenhower’s
political attitude about America as an “impatiently intense idealism”187 that often manifested
itself in anger toward American political and business leaders who, in Eisenhower’s view, were
too selfish to think of the common good. Eisenhower could not stand those who he felt did not
both share and contribute to his vision of America as uniquely good and uniquely great. That
America was both good and great was taken as a given in his mind and it is from this starting
point that the fullness of his political thought flowed.
A closer examination of his writings, diaries, letters, and speeches shows that Eisenhower
was politically and intellectually committed to the notion that there existed a fundamental
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essence to America and that this essence was good, essentially unalterable, and important for
contemporary American politics and society. Put another way, Eisenhower’s words and actions
can only be understood if one first understands his conception of America and understands that
this set of ideas was more important to him than any specific policy positions. The duration of
this chapter will explore six dimensions of America according to Eisenhower. These include
America’s religious foundation, America as a land of continual progress toward a more just
society, America as the antidote to fascism and communism, America as a land without social
status, the combination of power and justice, and America as a just leader in international affairs.
Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion about how Eisenhower, in light of how he
viewed America, viewed himself as the ideal public servant for the American people.

America’s Religious Foundation
In Eisenhower’s thinking America had an explicitly religious founding and that fact
mattered, perhaps more than any other, when it came to properly understanding the fabric of
American communal life. Speaking shortly after his election in 1952 Eisenhower succinctly
stated his view of America’s relationship to religion in this way: “Our form of government has
no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.”188 In this
quote both Eisenhower’s blunt style and his peculiar sense of America’s uniqueness are on
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display. He was not the type of culture warrior of the Christian Right that would arise in force in
later decades, but he did believe America’s religious heritage to be inescapably important for
American politics in the present.
It is worth pondering Eisenhower’s words here, both because they are often quoted and
because they seem to make little sense. How could it be the case that someone would find a
country’s particular religious heritage vital to its political success, yet simultaneously conclude
that the specifics of that religion are immaterial to judging its impact on the same country? The
most likely scenario, when Eisenhower’s thought is taken as a coherent whole, is that
Eisenhower actually did care about the specifics of America’s religion. It just so happened that
American public religion at the time of his presidency coincided with Eisenhower’s own view of
what American religion could and should be composed of, if the country were to draw strength
from it.
Eisenhower’s “I don’t care what it is” comment, in context, should be taken to mean that
he is equally happy with any mix of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism making up the
dominant religious consensus. The particular and exclusive theological claims of each needed
not be litigated in such a way as to exclude the others in order for America to function
successfully, in Eisenhower’s mind. Each of the three shared enough of a basic worldview and
anthropological stance to get along with each other for the sake of the common good in the
American system. At that time in America each of the three was composed mostly of
traditionalist elements when it came to moral teachings and each was staunchly opposed to
Soviet communism, for example. These shared fundamentals were the really important things
for Eisenhower.
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Writing to a friend in the summer of 1947 Eisenhower described his feeling about
America’s religious foundation:
I believe fanatically in the American form of democracy-a system that recognizes and
protects the rights of the individual and that ascribes to the individual a dignity accruing
to him because of his creation in the image of a supreme being and which rests upon the
conviction that only through a system of free enterprise can this type of democracy be
preserved.189
This is an example of Eisenhower expressing his view that America’s religious heritage
remained important for current politics, but it is also a representative statement about his
conception of America’s distinctiveness. Democracy is not limited to America, of course, but
the particular American instantiation of it was the best kind, in Eisenhower’s view. Going
further, he believed not only that America happened to be exemplary of the best kind of
democracy, but that there were specific things about the country’s history and common character
that made it the best model. This theme, that America is a model for human prosperity and that
the reasons for this are related to unique national traits is one of the most common in
Eisenhower’s writings, both public and private.
Speaking at his first inauguration he began to publicly describe how America’s religious
foundation should guide American policy. In a characteristically airy tone he argued:
We who are free must proclaim anew our faith. This faith is the abiding creed of our
fathers. It is our faith in the deathless dignity of man, governed by eternal moral and
natural laws. This faith defines our full view of life. It establishes, beyond debate, those
gifts of the Creator that are man’s inalienable rights, and that make all men equal in His
sight…This faith rules our whole way of life.190
It is noteworthy that Eisenhower capitalized references to god in the written text of his
speech. In doing so, he is expressing his belief in a concretized divine being, not merely talking
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about a metaphorical source of human rights. Speaking for the first time as the new president he
explicitly argued that America’s religious origins were so important that they encompassed the
nation’s “full view of life.” He notes that equality, which derives from a divine being, is
“beyond debate” in the most fundamental of American creeds and calls this conception a “faith”
that “rules” the entirety of America’s social structure. Religion is the blood of America’s body
politic in Eisenhower’s view. It is something indispensable to America, not only for
philosophical, but for practical reasons as well. An America that is not in harmony with its own
particular religious origins is, for Eisenhower, an impossible conception.191
The uniqueness of Eisenhower on this front can be better understood by comparing him
to the other presidents who served in his era. Franklin Roosevelt, though a lifelong Anglican
Church member seldom invoked the divine in his public speeches and was not apt to find much
of a political use in religion.192 Like Roosevelt, Truman was a lifelong church member, a Baptist
in his case, yet he frequently resorted to appeals rife with religious language as he made attempts
at public persuasion.193 What is even more striking is what these two had in common and how it
contrasted with Eisenhower: both Roosevelt and Truman attended church services less frequently
as they aged and their public duties increased. Conversely, Eisenhower spent most of his adult
life not attending church, not claiming a specific denomination, and paying religion little
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attention in even his private letters and diary entries. Famously, just before he took office that
changed. He joined a prominent Washington Presbyterian church, which he attended regularly.
He also formed a friendship with that church’s head pastor. Upon retiring to Gettysburg he
joined a local Presbyterian congregation and again attended frequently and befriend the church’s
pastor. The man who had been a Jehovah’s Witness as a child and, as best as we can tell, a
Christian leaning deist for most of his adult life became a committed Presbyterian, spending his
final years much in the same way later president Carter would more famously spend his post
White House years: living in a small town, mostly away from the spotlight, and actively
participating in a small church.
Strikingly, Eisenhower’s use of religious language in public came at almost the exact
time he decided he would attend church while in office. Beginning his first inaugural address
with a prayer was a decision that surprised many at the time, but was representative of how he
would consistently use his platform to invoke divine blessing on America for the duration of his
presidency. A fierce debate among some scholars exists about whether this late faith was
genuine for Eisenhower or whether, instead, it was the result of a calculation he made to achieve
political success. While I have no answer for this question it is worth noting here, because it
points to the level of frequency and intensity with which Eisenhower deployed religious
language as president. He did not merely allow some casual mentions of the word “god” to
appear in his speeches, echoing other presidents of his time, but instead made themes of the
divine a constant refrain in his public appeals. This zeal of a convert style was new to the
presidency when Eisenhower deployed it and it points to specific underpinnings of his political
thought.
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Continual Progress Toward a More Just Society
One of the distinctive features of Eisenhower’s thought regarding America’s uniqueness
is that he saw a consistent progress in the country’s social life being worked out in history. For
example, in corresponding with Billy Graham while in office Eisenhower argued that churches
and clergy members could help to promote increasing racial equality by pressuring federal
courts, via an informal moral authority that could lead to a shift in attitudes on race among
churchgoers. Eisenhower would be often criticized during his presidency by civil rights activists
who believed he did not do enough to promote systematic change. Conversely, conservatives
who opposed a change in the fundamental racial status saw in Eisenhower a racial equality
crusader who had little care for the cultural norms of the time or the autonomy of local entities to
manage racial affairs.
Though the next chapter will more fully explore Eisenhower on civil rights it is important
to note here that the most important reason for this mixed image of his presidency related to
racial issues springs from his mixed record of actions. This record resulted from Eisenhower’s
conviction that progress was being steadily, though slowly, achieved rather than from a confused
sense of a long-term vision. The vision was holistic and coherent in that it included both a
preferred end result and a desired method to help achieve this result. Eisenhower envisioned a
future time when racial equality would permeate American society, but he was not willing to use
his formal or informal powers as president to attempt to move too quickly on issues related to
race. He was convinced that acting too quickly would prove pragmatically disastrous and the
slow pace of change did not bother him, because he believed that positive changes were coming
as quickly as possible.
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One instance of Eisenhower expressing America’s tendency toward social progress
comes in a phrase at the end of his farewell address that reads, at first, like little more than a
fluffy conclusion to a speech he wanted Americans to remember. Looking at it through the lens
of his overall thought reveals that, in fact, he was articulating a clear conviction in America’s
intrinsic capacity for bringing about positive change to the world. Speaking about a post Cold
War future, one in which the American form of government had triumphed peacefully but totally
over the Soviet system he put it this way:
To all peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America’s prayerful and
continuing aspiration: We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have
their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy
it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that
those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are
insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease,
and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time,
all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of
mutual respect and love.194
Though this paragraph sounds like the expression of a general Christian faith, rather than
a description of America the two were often intertwined in Eisenhower’s thinking. This
particular passage came not only at the end of his Farewell Address, a traditional occasion for
presidents to provide a combination of personal reflection and philosophical thought about
America, but he described the paragraph as “America’s prayerful and continuing aspiration.” It
is fitting that he felt no need to make a clear distinction between America’s communal qualities
and a broad Christianity. This type of religious faith, politically embodied, was the fundamental
feature of America, to Eisenhower’s thinking.
If the world could come to more resemble America, Eisenhower is arguing, it could
make tangible progress toward improvements in the economic, political, and social fortunes of
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people everywhere. Eisenhower has no worries that specific people groups or certain civic
traditions will have trouble incorporating American democracy. On the contrary, he believes
that the only lasting hope for global prosperity specific, yet attainable. He seems to also be
hinting here that America’s greatest challenges are how it deals with external threats, not how
well it adheres to the tenets of its own creed. The most important goal for the United States,
under this reading of things, is to be sure to remain both an exemplar and an active force for the
betterment of humanity. There is a messianic component to Eisenhower’s thinking regarding
that is as inescapable as his pragmatic instincts, which have more often been the topic of
scholarly reflection on him.

America as an Antidote to Fascism and Communism
One way that Eisenhower conceived of America’s uniqueness was to imagine it as the
cure for totalitarian systems of government present in his day. Specifically, he saw America as
an antidote to both fascism and communism, the two great enemies of his military and political
career. Eisenhower believed that America was not only contextually in the right in World War II
and the Cold War, but he also held that America’s rightness in these conflicts stemmed from an
underlying national virtue. American democracy, he believed, had specific characteristics that
made it morally superior to and immune from becoming a totalitarian system.
One example of this was related to America’s military history. At the beginning of
World War Two America had never retained a large standing army during peace time. This was
not a continuous, intentional decision by American policy makers over nearly two centuries as
much as it was the result of America’s roots in the traditional citizen-soldier model of the
English-speaking world. Though the English had a standing army for several centuries by the
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time of the Cold War, they went centuries existing as a cohesive political unit without a
permanent force. Still, though, Eisenhower was pleased that the United States did not have a
professional military culture throughout its history. During the Cold War, when military budgets
soared and each branch of the armed forces grew into larger and more routinized bureaucracies
Eisenhower lamented that this was not a state of affairs that could be sustainable if American
democracy was to flourish in the future. The traditional model of a small American military that
would be enlarged in the case of a crisis was, though rare among western powers, superior to a
permanent and permanently large standing army because the latter system put the country in
service to the military instead of the military being a tool for the country.
Though, on the whole, he was pleased with America’s history of having a small army
during peacetime he did have some concerns about how that tradition impacted the United States
strategically in a world where American interests were becoming increasingly global. That the
United States had not kept a fully mobilized military during peacetime was more than a historical
point of interest, in Eisenhower’s mind. He felt so strongly that Americans were not accustomed
to the sacrifice demanded by large-scale war that he took it as a primary mission to create both a
sense of investment and of confidence in American soldiers that the war in Europe could be won
decisively. Reminiscing about the importance of the success of the Tunisian campaign, which
came early during America’s involvement in the war, he wrote that “the morale of the [2nd] corps
had improved markedly since March 1 and it had a right to prove its own effectiveness as well as
the quality of American arms.”195 Before the Tunisian victory Eisenhower noted that American
soldiers seemed particularly bothered by European notions that American fighting forces were
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not to be feared by enemies or relied upon by allies. After Tunisia, in Eisenhower’s mind,
American troops were cured not only of their combat inexperience, but of their cultural
unfamiliarity with large-scale fighting.
Though Eisenhower treated this cultural unfamiliarity with war as both a strategic and
tactical weakness at the outset of the war, he believed that the reason for this naiveté was
America’s unique goodness. Specifically, America had not spent its existence merely
undertaking exercises of political rivalry and colonial conquest, but had, instead, built a society
that had served as a model for what Eisenhower saw as the budding democratic spirit that was
manifested in newly invigorated nationalist movements across the world. The American public
had “an abhorrence of war”196 that was historically ingrained and that, though temporarily
strategically problematic in Eisenhower’s view in the late 1930s, was a manifestation of the
American national desire to live in harmony with the rest of the world.
The American military, then, was an important tool for American policymakers, but it
could never helpfully become a central focus of national energy for a sustained period of time.
Writing once more to his friend Swede Hazlett in 1956 Eisenhower bemoaned what he viewed as
the military bureaucracy’s obsession with ever growing budgets and an endless enlargement of
personnel and weapons. “Let us not forget,” he wrote “that the Armed Services are to defend a
‘way of life,’ not merely land, property, or lives.”197 He would go on in the same letter to speak
about the need for “balance” when thinking about America’s security challenges in the full
context of economic, political, and moral communal life.
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The answers that American political and military leaders produced to questions about this
balance, along with what the public focused its attention toward mattered in Eisenhower’s mind,
not only for the specific policy questions of the day, but the way in which how the balance
between security and moral and economic prosperity, as Eisenhower envisioned it, was worked
out reflected the underlying character of a country. “Possibly nations have some of the
characteristics of the individual,” Eisenhower wrote, “and we know many individuals who stand
poverty with good grace grow insufferable and degenerate in character the moment they
experience good fortune.”198 Eisenhower was clear about this metaphor in the same paragraph
when he noted that “Some people doubt that it is possible for a free government to live too
long…It looks as if we are having a chance to prove or disprove the charge.”199 American
existence into the future was in the balance based on how the country handled its militarycivilian relationship going forward.
In one instance of original thought Eisenhower noted that during the war he had come to
hope for a program that would require each American male, upon reaching a certain age, to serve
in the military in some capacity for 18 months, even during peacetime. Rather than leading to a
culture that embraced a permanent and large standing army this proposal would, Eisenhower
hoped, provide a much greater portion of the public with an intimate knowledge of military life,
while also ensuring that the professional and permanent part of the force could remain small, as
they would always be able to rely on young men who were serving their mandatory obligation
for most tasks a peacetime military would need to accomplish.200
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Though Eisenhower does not say much about this program and though he does not make
a formal proposal to implement such a thing, even this quick reference to his thinking on the
matter demonstrates that he had long been thinking about the enduring relationship of a practical
political system and the enduring character of a polity. Eisenhower wanted a population that was
competent and comfortable with military affairs, but one that did not rely on the military for
financial or psychological security outside of instances of genuine crisis.
In the last chapter I discussed Eisenhower’s sense that the Cold War presented much
more than a physical threat to the United States. Here, it is plain why this matters for
Eisenhower. If America is to thrive long into the future it must act in particular ways in the
present. And that particular right way, according to Eisenhower, could be discovered by
Americans understanding their own heritage and by exercising fidelity to the fundamental
characteristics of the nation. It is fair, on this point, to charge Eisenhower with being so vague in
his thinking that it is difficult to discern much in the way of practical guidance for American
leaders or voters. Important for understanding Eisenhower’s thinking, however, is realizing that
he held a long, steady, and coherent conviction that America possessed fundamentally good and
unique characteristics and that when the American people were faced with a tension about how
to proceed the first and most important counsel Eisenhower would give would be an exhortation
to look to what he viewed as a few basic and undisputed foundational ideals of American
democracy.
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America: A Land without Social Status
When speaking or writing about his childhood Eisenhower was quick to emphasize his
roots as the son of farmers and to note that he was proud to have grown up in a small town. To
hear Eisenhower describe what he viewed as an idyllic childhood in Abilene is to glimpse a
vision of how he viewed America at its most characteristically good. For example, in a letter to
Swede Hazlett, written in the fall of 1947, Eisenhower described a recent visit to his hometown
this way: “I saw no significant physical change in the town-that is one corner of the country that
seems to drift along in the even tenor of its ways, and its people are the happier for it.”201
As Eisenhower penned this note he was officially the secretary of the army, but he was in
a transitional phase of his career. He had already served as the American governor of occupied
Germany, and he had not yet taken on either of his most prominent pre-presidential non army
positions, that of serving as president of Columbia University and NATO’s first full-time
commander. On this visit to Abilene, then, Eisenhower had more time to linger than he had had
during his military career or than he would have later. The especially (for him) reflective tone of
his letter suggests the extra thought he gave his hometown on this visit. Abilene was a place that
both stood in contrast to most of contemporary America, yet was emblematic of the nation, as
well. Eisenhower never displayed any interest in living in Abilene once after he left for West
Point, and his visits were not as frequent as they could have been. Abilene was not a physical
home once he reached adulthood for Eisenhower, yet it always remained a home for his
imagination, and it was this function that helped Eisenhower to conceive of a particular America.
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The Combination of Power and Justice
Writing to a friend in August of 1956 Eisenhower described America’s enduring
hallmarks this way: “American strength is a combination of its economic, moral, and military
force.”202 The full context of this quote was that Eisenhower had become exasperated at arguing
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about military expenditures and “coordination among the
Services.”203 He was angered that the Joint Chiefs could not see past their particular professional
interests to the larger picture of holistic American strength.
One story from Mandate for Change, Eisenhower’s first term memoir is illustrative of
how he viewed the interaction between the American economy and the virtues of the American
citizenry. He described a meeting with a businessman who had apparently asked Eisenhower to
extend a particular tax that, though viewed unfavorably by the business community was judged
by this particular man to be necessary in the short-term. Going on to argue that this incident
represented something good and broad in American businesspeople he mused as follows:
He is a representative of the class that the so-called liberal is always calling ‘thief,’
‘robber,’ ‘economic tory,’ and all of the other names that imply venality and utter
selfishness. Of course, all of us are selfish. The instinct of self-preservation leads us into
short-sightedness…often at the expense of our fellows. But the very least that we should
attempt to do, it seems to me, is to think of our long term good…There is no future
prosperity for any except as the whole shall prosper…END OF TIRADE!
In addition to the amusing capitalized sign-off Eisenhower is exhibiting one of his core
convictions. Specifically, he is arguing that the incident with the businessman, though a
seemingly unimportant one, is representative of a care for the common good that Americans
usually possess. This unified cooperative spirit, on the most important questions, was one of the
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people’s best attributes and was characteristic of them across social, economic, and generational
lines. For Eisenhower, Americans were broadly committed to the success of the American
project, which resulted in a faithfulness to the good things about America’s character.
Economic prosperity, political power, and American democracy were tied together in
Eisenhower’s thinking. Speaking on Labor Day in 1953 he proclaimed that “the workers of
America are witnesses, before the world, of the strength, the pride, and the prosperity that alone
can be won by free labor.” He went on to argue that free American workers “mock the false
insinuation that economic well-being can be purchased only at the cost of political freedom.”
Instead, he noted, “free American labor has won for itself the enjoyment of a standard of living
unmatched in history.” He bragged that Americans had produced not only enough food for
themselves, but enough to send to the “thousands suffering the peculiar torments of the
proletarian paradise of Eastern Germany.”204 A free political system was the foundation of a free
economy and a free economy gave America not only the moral, but the political advantage over
the Soviets and their satellites. America’s success was inextricably tied to America’s national
goodness.

American Justice and Leadership in International Affairs
It is important to note that Eisenhower did not hold the position that the United States
always acted in accord with its underlying high character. He held that human beings would
always be subject to selfishness and mistakes and, because of this, the business of government
would always be fraught with imperfect information, often questionable motives, and acts of
204
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injustice. Even these aberrations, in Eisenhower’s thinking, though, helped to demonstrate that
the overriding character of the nation was good. For example, Eisenhower proudly recalled a
speech he delivered in the first months of his presidency to the Organization of American States
(OAS) wherein he admitted “all peoples, our nations-every one of them, the United States
included-have at times been guilty of selfish and thoughtless actions.”205 He would go on to note
that in spite of this America remained committed to an “understanding and trust”206 throughout
the Americas. While these comments themselves are important, it is more noteworthy that he
included them in larger section of his book that covered America’s leadership in the Cold War.
This was a leadership, he thought, that was both benevolent and befitting of the American
people’s desire for both greatness and peace. The tone of his comments to the Latin American
leaders, while seemingly intended as friendly,207 come across as patronizing. The reason for this
is that Eisenhower took as a given that the United States was usually a good neighbor and most
often acted out of more than mere self-interest. Both World War II and the Cold War served as
concrete evidence that the United States was a powerful agent for good on the world stage. That
the two dominant political conflicts of Eisenhower’s adult life would be so easily translatable
into a clear narrative of good and evil helped to make his starting belief in America’s goodness a
firm and lasting conviction.
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Eisenhower’s enduring view that America had long played the role of international
peacemaker and that it should continue to do so in the future is evidenced strongly by several
incidents that seem too small for most Eisenhower scholars to remember. A chief example is the
Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan, more often referred to as the Johnston Plan. This 1953 plan
sought to permanently set the way that the Jordan River’s resources would be split between
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan in a way that would satisfy all parties enough to prevent
armed conflict over the water supply.208 Importantly, Eisenhower specifically dispatched
diplomat Eric Johnston to help negotiate the plan when it seemed clear that no peaceful solution
would be quickly forthcoming from the Middle Eastern states themselves.
After an initial round of negotiating in person with both Arab and Israeli leaders
Johnston returned to the White House to give Eisenhower a personal briefing on the progress of
the talks. According to newspaper reporting at the time Johnston noted that though the plan was
designed, on its face, to fairly divide water rights, the proposal’s deeper goal was to bring lasting
peace in the region between Arabs and their newly arrived Jewish neighbors. Specifically,
Johnston and Eisenhower believed that if water rights were agreed upon new areas of Jordanian
land would be fit for settlement and this, they hoped, would provide a home for many of the
Palestinian refugees and prevent ongoing conflict between the Israeli state and the Palestinians
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living in and around Israel.209 Eisenhower’s vision for Johnston’s mission, then, was to use
American leadership to create permanent peace in a region that had already become violent in
the half-decade since Israel’s 1948 founding.
This incident is noteworthy, because it is one of the first times that an American president
sought to use American power and prestige as a way of mediating peace in a distant region of the
world. The commonly accepted beginning of formal American enduring dominance on the
international stage is the founding of the United Nations, but this incident is of a different kind.
The U.N. is an institutional body that was set up to be a long-term and regular actor in world
politics. What Eisenhower did, in deploying Johnston, was to send a special envoy for a specific
mission at a particular time.
That this mission was to the Middle East was also important. Unlike in Southeast Asia,
Latin America, or Iran the Levant was not full of governments whose loyalty could conceivably
be won or bought by either the Americans or the Soviets. Israel was a new liberal democracy,
while Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon all had large populations of religiously serious Muslims and
the latter two states also contained significant numbers of Christians. An alliance with the
Soviets would have been unlikely or impossible on ideological grounds alone. Eisenhower, then,
was acting out of a conception of American power and American goodness that saw the United
States as a moral, as well as a political authority in the world.
In 1956, Eisenhower launched a program that was emblematic of his belief that the
United States would be best served by being an international leader in the promotion of human
rights. Speaking at a conference launching the “People to People Program,” which would allow
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Americans to travel abroad to learn about the culture of another place, while serving as
messengers of America’s democratic ideals to the host country, Eisenhower articulated the
soaring hopes he had for the venture. “The purpose of this meeting,” he announced, “[was] the
most worthwhile purpose there is in the world today: to help build the road to peace, to help
build the road to an enduring peace.”210 American initiative in the realm of cross-national
understanding was important politically, not only culturally, in Eisenhower’s view. He posed
two “problems” in the form of questions that he hoped the new program would address. “How
do we dispel ignorance?,” he asked, followed by wondering “How do we present our own
case?”211 The reason that these issues presented important challenge to be met, he felt, was
because the Soviets were committed to engaging in ideological warfare against the democratic
world.
He noted, “The Communist way, of course, is to subject everything to the control of the
state and to start out with a very great propaganda program all laid out in its details.”212
American efforts at public outreach to the third world were qualitatively “different.”213 The
United Stated relied on “the forces of initiative, independent action, and independent thinking of
168 million people.” This system was available to any nation that would take it up as their own,
Eisenhower believed. And, the more that did adopt the American systems of enterprise and
government, the safer the world would be from the threat of large-scale war. In addition to more
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security, increasing percentages of the world’s population could reasonably expect material
prosperity in their lifetimes. All of this, without exception, was good for America. Yet again
this is a case where Eisenhower is insistent that what is good for America is good for the entire
world and vice versa. Without American leadership, unfortunately, such increased prosperity
and happiness would not be possible. No other western nation had either the ability or
ideological purity to meet the Soviet challenge in this arena. The choice for Americans was
stark: either take an active and missionary role in helping the world to see the universal value of
capitalistic democracy or risk the failure of the system at the hands of Soviet influence which,
unchecked, would lead to inevitable armed conflict that would be too costly for anyone to bear.
This is yet another example of Eisenhower conflating American Christianity with what he
viewed as America’s political mission. For Eisenhower, the lines between pure and civic
religion did not need to be sharply drawn, at least not as related to matters of public policy.
Religion could inform citizens about what large goals were worth pursuing and the practical
working out of those goals, would serve the health of American religion, while it accomplished
tasks for the American political system.

Eisenhower as Eisenhower’s Ideal Public Servant
Perhaps the most basic Eisenhower conviction regarding America’s distinctiveness was
that he believed that the public, in most cases, possessed a wisdom that helped to avoid a
political environment dominated by partisanship. This moderation, as he saw it, meant that
American voters were motivated by a sense of the common good and that they expected their
politicians to be independent minded figures who eschewed partisan interest when it conflicted
with the public good. Additionally, Eisenhower believed that there really could be a specific
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common good that provided for the chance to create policy to benefit a wide segment of society
and that the content of this common good could be known in most cases. Because he wanted to
be seen as the ideal type of public servant he expected the American people to demand that he
publicly describe himself as neither a conservative or a liberal, but rather as someone who took a
position on particular issues based on what would benefit “America as a whole.”214 Selfish
partisans existed on both the left and the right and they both had to be resisted, according to his
public pronouncements. Instead, politics should be conducted through a “middle way,” whereby
political leaders were partisans of America only.215
Rhetoric about serving the full country’s interests and Eisenhower’s claims that he was
essentially free of partisan motivation was not a rare or ill-considered tactic. One noteworthy
examples of Eisenhower’s view of himself is also one of the most instructive. Just before he
began the 1952 campaign a personal friend gifted him a copy of a letter George Washington had
written to an acquaintance just before his own presidency. Eisenhower somberly noted that he
“was struck by the solemn concern expressed by Washington as he proceeded ‘to embark again
on the tempestuous and uncertain ocean of public life.’”216 After quoting Washington’s hopes
and fears at length Eisenhower concluded his reflections on his initial campaign: “It was with
much the same feeling expressed by General Washington, but also with the expectation of new
experiences and new opportunities for service, that my wife and I now turned toward the future
that loomed before us.”217
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Eisenhower would never explicitly admit in public or to himself that he viewed himself
as a Washington figure, but it was no accident that he chose the premier American symbol of
non-partisan public spiritedness as his inspiration at the outset of his presidency. For
Eisenhower, as for many Americans, Washington embodied the highest example of service to the
country and was a figure to be emulated. Even more importantly, though, Eisenhower’s casting
of himself as a successor to Washington in more than the merely presidential sense was directly
related to his view of the American people. The American citizenry, in Eisenhower’s view,
demanded, produced, and was loyal to figures who existed above the partisan fray that engulfed
lesser nations and lesser men. For Eisenhower America was different, it was better, and it
required a unique type of leadership. The best example of a political community in the history of
the world, as Eisenhower saw America, deserved a leader that was up to the moral task, not
merely the pragmatic duties that would come to the president.
In conclusion, Eisenhower conceived of America as a political community that, through a
specific historical experience and through a commitment to both moral goodness and national
greatness by its citizenry had ascended, in his lifetime, to become a benevolent world power.
That America’s moral capabilities to lead the world honorably had existed since its founding in
Eisenhower’s mind was important, but the nation did not reach its full potential until that moral
goodness was joined with a combination of political, economic, and military power large enough
to exert notable influence on the world stage. A new superpower shepherd of peace needed not
only competent leadership, but leaders who also believed passionately in America’s mission of
global stewardship abroad and in its role as a moral exemplar in domestic affairs.
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Eisenhower, in thinking about himself, saw just the figure who could lead the country in
a way that would both harness its material power and lead it further down the road of moral
goodness. Eisenhower saw himself, then, as a figure who had the combination of formal power,
naturally endowed gifts, and a sufficiently strong character to help America achieve new heights
of greatness. Far from being a president who did not think coherently about or often about
politics, Eisenhower was committed to a holistic vision of American history and politics. This
vision would guide his political and ethical sensibilities and would give him fodder for his
presidential agenda. It is fair to note that Eisenhower was not a systematic thinker and it is
reasonable to critique much of his thought related to America as being simple, naive, or too full
of self-praise. Nevertheless, his conception of America, America’s place in the world, and his
place in leading America in the world was the result of years of both experience and thought. In
this way, though not a philosopher, Eisenhower was a persistent political thinker.
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CHAPTER 5
EISENHOWER’S CONSERVATISM AS GRADUALISM

Eisenhower is an important historical figure in both the Republican Party and in postwar
American conservatism. Rarely, though, is he thought of as an important intellectual figure for
these entities. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that Eisenhower was both a thoughtful and
committed conservative, though one of a particular kind. In order to illustrate the argument the
remaining pages will address Eisenhower’s non-partisan posture, his conception of the
“corporate commonwealth,” his record on civil rights, his thoughts on the military industrial
complex, and his positions on a range of economic issues.
Writing during Eisenhower’s presidency British philosopher Michael Oakeshott defined
conservatism not as “a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition.”218 We have not evidence and no
reason to speculate that Eisenhower took note of Oakeshott’s work. This, though, makes the fact
that Eisenhower fits Oakeshott’s description of a conservative so well especially important.
Oakeshott did not have Eisenhower in mind as he wrote and Eisenhower was not attempting to
live an image put forth by an academic. Instead, Eisenhower is an example of Oakeshott’s thesis
of conservatism only because Eisenhower was a conservative. Some of the most important
features of conservatism, according to Oakeshott, are “a propensity to use and to enjoy what is
available rather than to wish for or to look for something else; to delight in in what is present
rather than what was or what may be.”219 In terms of spending government money,
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conceptualizing his vision for America’s highest possible ideal for communal life, and in his
attitude about politics Eisenhower was a conservative according to this definition.

Eisenhower’s Non-Partisan Posture
Prior to accepting the Republican nomination for president in 1952, Eisenhower had been
courted by some Democrats to run as their party’s candidate in 1948.220 Though he declined the
summons, this incident would later serve as a chief reason that citizens and analysts alike
believed that Eisenhower lacked partisan convictions. His relative quiet on political matters did
extend beyond his formal army career and into his time as Columbia’s president, head of NATO,
and informal advisor to the Washington security community. In addition to his lack of political
talk he also envisioned himself as someone who both above partisan battles. Recalling how he
viewed himself shortly before he entered the political realm he wrote in one of his memoirs the
following:
My feeling about such issues had long convinced me that it would be impossible for me
ever to adopt a political philosophy so narrow as to merit the label “liberal,” or
“conservative,” or anything of the sort. I came to believe, as I do to this day, that an
individual can only examine and decide for himself each issue in a framework of
philosophic conviction dedicated to responsible progress—always in the light of what he
believes is good for America as a whole—and let the pundits hang the labels as they
may.221
Eisenhower enjoyed and cultivated the sense in others that he was not a man of partisan
conviction and he embraced that same idea in his own self-reflection. Taking Eisenhower at his
word about whether he was a partisan would always leave one concluding that he was not only
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disinterested in ideologically driven politics, but that he himself had no ideological beliefs to
draw from. A closer examination, though, demonstrates otherwise. If, instead of looking to
Eisenhower’s words about whether he was a partisan we turn to the broader corpus of his
speeches, public writings, and private reflections a different picture emerges. It is true that
Eisenhower was neither a lifelong politician nor a movement conservative. It was on this very
point that some in the party objected to his nomination. This wing supported Senator Robert
Taft, the son of his more famous father who had previously served as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. Robert Taft’s Republican and conservative credentials were unquestionable and
lifelong. In this context, Eisenhower appeared to be an outsider not only to the party, but to the
foundational ideals of conservatism. Once the historical context of Eisenhower’s rise to power is
understood, though, it is possible to see that he spent decades holding and developing a certain
kind of conservative disposition. Specifically, he was committed to conservatism as gradualism.
The best articulation of this that he gave came, ironically, in the above-mentioned quote where
he insists that he is not a partisan. Rather than this insistence the phrase “responsible progress”
is the key to understanding his particular kind of conservatism.
Though I will argue that Eisenhower’s statements denying a true partisan allegiance
should not be taken as credible on their face, there is something to be learned about him in them.
For example, one window into both his basic political orientation and the style with which he
thought about the world came at a 1949 speech delivered to the American Bar Association’s
annual convention. In this talk, Eisenhower outlined what he called “the middle way.”222 He
imagined politics as being a similar exercise to military conflict. In both, he thought, “cowards”
hid behind “slogans” but run away from an active engagement with the task at hand. This
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passage merits quoting at length, because in this paragraph Eisenhower shows that he has little
respect for hyper partisans, yet that he is a conservative himself. This is also an example of how
he often used clichéd military metaphors to express a level of political thought that was deeper
than the tone betrayed. He said:
The frightened, the defeated, the coward, and the knave run to the flanks, straggling out
of the battle under the cover of slogans, false formulas, and appeals to passion—a
welcome sight to an alert enemy. When the center weakens piecemeal, disintegration and
annihilation are only steps away, in a battle of arms or of political philosophies. The
clear-sighted and the courageous, fortunately, keep fighting in the middle of the war.
They are determined that we shall not lose our freedoms, either to the unbearable
selfishness of vested interest, or through the blindness of those who, protesting devotion
to the public welfare, falsely declare that only government can bring us happiness,
security, and opportunity.223
In this speech Eisenhower both posits himself as a non-partisan and asserts the most
fundamental conservative dictum of the day: That the gravest threat to American freedom,
domestically, lay with those who advocated for too much government involvement in society and
in the lives of individuals. This drift toward statism, as Eisenhower and other prominent
conservatives saw it, had to be reversed at both the popular and policy levels if America were to
prosper long-term.
Despite this reserve, though, Eisenhower had long held to a fundamentally conservative
political outlook. Writing in 1949, for example, Eisenhower lamented the negative impact he
felt increased taxes were having on donations to Columbia, where he was then president. He
began his diary reflection on the matter by noting that “the trend toward governmental
centralization continues, alarmingly.”224 By this point, the American government’s bureaucracy
had already grown so pervasive as to “cover the land” and to infringe on matters of small
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business, the flow of the free market, and the autonomy of citizens. The harm done to private
universities that relied on donations for their survival came from the fact that the wealthiest
philanthropists were paying such high sums in taxes that they no longer had the disposable
income to spend on charitable causes, in Eisenhower’s analysis. Worse than the strained
fundraising situation in Eisenhower’s mind was that many academic officials hoped to make up
the shortfall by courting monetary aid from the federal government itself.
Though he conceded that some small and specifically directed aid would be helpful to
private colleges, he feared that large streams of income coming from the government would
centralize the administration of higher education and would prevent universities from being
excellent. To those who were advocating for a large expansion of aid programs Eisenhower had
stinging words: “The proposition is immoral, and its adoption, in this general sense, will lead to
statism and, therefore, slavery.”225 For Eisenhower this was not an isolated issue, nor a passing
concern. Instead, he viewed this debate as emblematic of the larger disagreements in American
society about how prominent of an economic role the government should play in areas that had
previously been left to state and local governments or private individuals or organizations. In the
specific case of universities Eisenhower noted that “the best way to establish dictatorship is to
get control of the educational processes in any country.”226 Eisenhower was further frustrated,
because he felt that he was one of a rare few in the academic world who understood the issue
clearly. He lamented that “there seems to be little awareness of what is happening to us.” The
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majority of Columbia’s leaders, in Eisenhower’s view, were shortsighted and did not worry at all
about the long-term risks of relying too heavily on a financial structure that had the potential to
strip the university of its status as an independent entity.
Though Eisenhower remained the president of Columbia until he took office as president
of the United States he unofficially, but substantially turned away from his duties in that position
to become the supreme commander of NATO in 1950. In this role he was both politically quiet
and focused nearly exclusively on foreign relations. For that reason, it is best to jump to the
beginning of his presidency to continue to analyze his conservatism. One concrete example of
Eisenhower’s conservatism in action was his appointment of Albert Cole to head the Department
of Housing and Home Finance.227 Under Cole’s leadership, the federal government took a more
distant stance toward discrimination in housing compared to the Truman administration.228 A
recent review of Eisenhower’s housing department conducted by political scientists Lamb and
Nye found that Eisenhower did not specifically direct Cole to be less aggressive in looking for
housing discrimination than Truman’s department had been. Instead, Eisenhower kept a handsoff approach to Cole’s work, because he knew that Cole represented his boss’s disposition
against federal intervention in local and state matters.229 Eisenhower’s conservatism was evident
here both because he was not enthusiastic about forcing federal policy on localities in what had
traditionally been a state matter and because he did not have an appetite for a grand program that
sought to revolutionize the way that housing was administered across the country. There is
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another way that Eisenhower’s conservatism was on display in the appointment and management
of Cole. By not giving Cole a specific agenda to carry out, but instead allowing him to manage
his department as he saw fit Eisenhower was taking a hands-off approach of delegation.

Eisenhower’s “Corporate Commonwealth”
Though he was weary of sweeping government involvement in the economy, he was not
an unrestrained capitalist. As Eisenhower scholar Robert Griffith put it, he wanted “to resolve
what he saw as the contradictions of modern capitalism and to create a harmonious corporate
society, without class conflict, unbridled acquisitiveness, and contentious party politics.”230 Part
of government’s job in encouraging this “corporate commonwealth”231 was to “prevent or correct
abuses springing from the unregulated practice of a private economy.”232
The most illustrative example of the corporate commonwealth vision is also
Eisenhower’s most remembered legacy. Eisenhower came into office planning to modernize
America’s infrastructure specifically by creating an interstate highway system through a
cooperative effort between federal, state, and local governments. In order to determine how best
to proceed Eisenhower appointed friend Gen. Lucius Clay to head a study group, in August of
1954. Specifically, the committee was charged with recommending a funding scheme that
would be efficient, would satisfy governors, and would enable a smooth transition to large-scale
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public works, if the ongoing recession worsened.233 Clay did succeed in appointing figures from
a range of backgrounds to his committee, including bankers, teamsters, engineers, and car
company executives. As a result, the committee’s findings, many of which were adopted into the
Interstate Highway Act of 1956, proved valuable at modernizing the country’s transportation
grid. Critics, though, would note that the lack of voices concerned about environmental impact,
existing community disruption, the long-term use of farm lands, or the design of cities would
lead to construction that, in many locales, harmed social and economic systems which were
beneficial to the already present citizens.234
Though the criticisms that have been levied against the Clay Committee regarding a lack
of foresight that went beyond the economics of the matter are largely fair, the important thing to
note regarding this chapter was that Eisenhower believed that a transformational project was
possible in America, but only if there was willful cooperation between various levels of
government, and between private citizens and their elected officials. Here, Eisenhower’s
optimism about America’s capability to effectively join resources in a great time of need, and his
expectation that the country’s citizens and leaders will be able to find a substantive common
ground when the national interest is at stake is on display. He believes that a great task can be
accomplished and that it will make a noticeable difference in the lives of all Americans, in this
case it will be a catalyst for economic prosperity that will reach across class, geographic region,
and partisan affiliation. Eisenhower is not a progressive, though, as he does not believe that the
arms of government should be used alone to improve conditions, even when the proposed
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solution is large and costly. Rather, Eisenhower envisions a venture project of this nature being,
at heart, an intentional action of the people’s collective will. The federal government is one
engine which they must use in order to accomplish such a large task, but many other entities
must be involved if the project is to be viable.

Civil Rights: Champion or Enemy?
When commentators analyze Eisenhower’s civil rights record they often look only at a
few of the highest profile cases on the issue of his presidency. While this chapter will explore
some of the most important of these cases later, it is first important to establish that Eisenhower’s
thought and action on the matter began long before he took office. For example, he issued an
order in March of 1944 demanding the equal treatment of soldiers, regardless of race, by all
officers under his command, he helped to persuade George Marshall that black troops should be
allowed in combat roles, and in 1946 he suggested to his brother, Milton (the new president of
Kansas State University), that he should require all students to take a citizenship class which
would have the “elimination of racial intolerance” as one of its chief goals.235 Shortly after
taking office he acted to integrate schools on military bases and created a committee designed to
end racial discrimination by federal contractors.236 It is also noteworthy that of his five Supreme
Court appointees, none were southerners and that he was reportedly angry with southern
congressional members who added late amendments to the 1957 Civil Rights Act, which were
thought to weaken some of the law’s new protections.237
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The first landmark civil rights issue of Eisenhower’s presidency was the Brown v. Board
decision, which required the eventual racial integration of public schools. In the lead up to the
case’s arguments interest groups and political leaders on each side of the separate but equal
question lobbied the president to officially weigh in on the case on their behalf. Before making
the final decision to allow Attorney General Herbert Brownell to, following his own conviction,
file an amicus brief arguing that the decades old system of legal segregation be struck down,
Eisenhower heard arguments from both sides and made known his own preference to avoid
giving the appearance of executive meddling in the Supreme Court’s affairs.
For example, in an exchange with South Carolina governor James Byrnes, Eisenhower
refrained from taking a clear position on the case before the court, but noted that he believed that
“separate but equal” was likely doomed in the long term, because it was a confusing legal
standard with no clear government body having the authority to regularly determine what did and
did not meet the equal part of the doctrine.238 Though Eisenhower’s biographers are at odds
about whether he privately supported the court’s 1954 decision, examining his actual actions
surrounding the case present a more complicated picture than someone who merely was excited
or disappointed by the particulars of the decision. For example, in March of 1953 (just two
months into his presidency) Eisenhower ordered all schools on military bases to be racially
integrated by the following academic year.239 He sent simple replies to the governors of Texas
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and Louisiana, assuring them that he would forward their letters to Brownell for consideration,
after each had written to him requesting his assistance in defending the status quo. Writing to
Swede in the fall of 1953 Eisenhower again refrained from making his wishes for the Court
decision known, but did predict that could would “be very moderate and accord a maximum of
initiative to local courts.”240
Though Eisenhower portrayed himself as ambivalent about the Court’s decision in 1954
he would later become more resolute in his views. The most famous policy decision he made
related to Brown was, of course, using the military in the Little Rock Crisis of 1957. Around the
same time, however, he privately vented that the Court’s decision was imprudent and was based
on a faulty understanding of human nature. Again writing to Swede in May of 1957 (just a few
months before the Little Rock Crisis took place) Eisenhower argued that expecting full scale
integration so quickly was foolish. “Law are rarely effective unless they represent the will of the
majority,” he began. “When emotions are deeply stirred logic and reason must operate
gradually,” he continued. Because Plessy v. Ferguson had been decided almost sixty years
before Brown, Eisenhower emphasized that most southern whites believed segregation to be not
only moral, but unassailably legal. Given that reality, he felt, only a gradual process of
integration had a chance to succeed and to proceed without substantial unrest.241 Here is a core
example of Eisenhower’s conservative gradualism. He is neither the arch traditionalist that
refuses to accept change on moral, legal, or traditional grounds nor the progressive who is
actively seeking ways to bring about societal improvement quickly and on a grand scale. Rather,
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he hopes for the eventual improvement of social conditions, but believes that pursuing a goal so
large requires time, patience, and an acceptance that the ideal is rarely practical in matters of
cultural overhaul.
A second important civil rights episode that illustrated Eisenhower’s core approach to the
issue was the murder of Emmett Till in Mississippi in 1955. Till was from Chicago and was
visiting relatives in the south when he was abducted, tortured, and killed for having been thought
to have been flirting with a white female resident of the town. This lynching galvanized the civil
rights movement, since it happened to such a young boy and because Till’s mother, Mamie
decided to hold an open-casket funeral so that the extent of the violence done to Emmett would
be publicly visible. A few days after Till’s death the editor of the Chicago Defender, a nationally
known African-American newspaper telegrammed the White House to ask if any formal action
would be taken related to the murder.242 The next day J. William Barba, an assistant to the
president, replied that Eisenhower had delegated the matter of federal response to the Justice
Department and that, so far, they had not found “any facts which provide a basis for Federal
jurisdiction or action.”243
It is important to note the administration’s first response to a call for presidential action,
because it reveals Eisenhower’s basic disposition on high profile incidents involving civil rights.
Specifically, he sought to avoid federal involvement in the enforcement of laws, unless there
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were extraordinary circumstances that would prevent state or local authorities from properly
handling the matter themselves. On the same day Barba wrote back to the Defender Mamie Till,
Emmett’s mother, sent a message to Eisenhower “pleading that [Eisenhower] personally see that
justice is meted out to all persons involved in the beastly lynching of [Emmett}.”244 She closed
the letter by noting that she would wait for a personal reply from the president. Eisenhower held
firm that, as far as he could tell, there remained not legal justification or practical usefulness to
potential federal involvement in any aspect of the case.
The public controversy over the case, though, did not subside quickly. 10,000 mourners
attended Till’s funeral in Chicago. Later, when the all white jury in Mississippi acquitted the
two suspects there were protests of 20,000 in Chicago and 10,000 in Harlem.245 Later in the fall
Frederic Morrow (a special assistant to Eisenhower and the first African-American to hold an
executive position in White House history) began receiving messages from members of the black
community urging him to urge the president to act. One message in particular stood out.
William Beverly, publisher of the Pittsburgh Courier and future ambassador to Liberia under
both Nixon and Carter, wrote to Morrow to advise him that even if Eisenhower did not wish to
act formally, an official statement condemning Till’s murder would go a long way in quelling
some of the anger at inaction within the black community. In November Morrow wrote a
classified memo to Eisenhower and argued for some type of official action. After noting that his
experience as a former NAACP field director made him especially able to spot racial tension he
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reported that in his official travels throughout the country black citizens everywhere were angry
and saddened that the administration had not yet taken even a small action in the case. He
warned that if the president did not act he risked allowing racial tension to explode into needless
violence. He put it this way: “The warning signs in the South are all too clear: the harassed
Negro is sullen, bitter, and talking strongly of retaliation whenever future situations dictate.”246
He described a frightful social situation in Mississippi that teetered on the edge of a full-blown
race war. The white citizens councils were engaging in “economic terrorism” and had created a
climate of “fear and terrorism that holds the entire area in a vise.”247
Meanwhile, he argued that black Mississippians were themselves beginning to organize
in ways that were designed to meet violence with violence. Inaction on this case meant allowing
a large portion of the country to succumb to fruitless bloodshed, Morrow argued. Additionally,
Morrow aimed at Eisenhower’s particular conservatism by noting that though it seemed prudent
to refrain from acting in this case, it was actually the more dangerous course. The world, not
only black Americans, were watching and Morrow feared that Eisenhower’s caution was
creating a multi-pronged crisis. One example of international attention the case received came a
month before Morrow’s memo. A group called the Norwegian Students Association sent a
telegram addressed to Mamie Till expressing condolences after the American embassy would not
aid the delivery of the message.248
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A couple of months after Morrow’s recommendation cabinet secretary Maxwell Rabb
asked White House Staff Secretary Andrew Goodpaster to advise Eisenhower that, at the least, a
form letter should be composed and sent to each of the over 3,000 citizens who had written
directly to the White House asking for federal action. To not respond at all, Rabb worried,
would be to “miss the boat” regarding public opinion.249 This is an important illustration of
Eisenhower’s starting place on Civil Rights, because this is the rare case where we have a record
of public pressure combining with the counsel of some of his most trusted advisors to advise a
course of action that Eisenhower was not comfortable taking.
That Eisenhower was firm in his conviction that the Till murder gave the federal
government no cause for intervention and that he was sure that gradual progress on civil rights
was real and enough can be seen in the State of the Union Address he delivered in 1956, a few
months after the murder. In this speech he did not mention Till, did not allude to the case itself,
and refrained from mentioning tension in Mississippi or the broader south. Instead, he argued,
“Unprecedented advances in civil rights have been made” and, he announced, “we are proud of
the progress our people have made in the field of civil rights.”250 He would go on to note that
America’s international stature had increased because of recent extensions in domestic civil
rights. For Eisenhower, it was more important that broad progress was being made, as he saw it,
in access to housing, jobs, and the integration of schools on military bases. To dwell (or even
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publicly mention) Emmett Till’s murder, Eisenhower feared, would be to risk an improper
influence over a state matter and would involve the presidency in a controversy that would
benefit neither the office nor the people.
The other high profile civil rights incident of the Eisenhower presidency was the Little
Rock Crisis of 1957. Since I have already explored that episode in a previous chapter relating to
Eisenhower’s view of executive power I will not rehash it here. It is important to note, though,
that Eisenhower did act decisively in a way that pleased many black citizens and civil rights
advocates and angered many southern whites. In addition to deploying military forces to Central
High School, Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 into law just days after the
Arkansas crisis had subsided. This bill was the first piece of federal legislation on Civil Rights
since reconstruction and provided for the protection of voting rights, dedicated a portion of the
Justice Department’s resources exclusively to civil rights, and made it a federal crime to violate
another citizen’s civil rights.251
In addition to the high profile case of the Till murder and the Little Rock Crisis
Eisenhower was consistent in his gradualist perspective on civil rights in small exchanges. For
instance, Jackie Robinson wrote to Eisenhower in May of 1958 requesting that the president stop
asking African-Americans to be patient in hoping for civil rights progress. After applauding the
president for the action he took in Little Rock he asks for a bolder public statement about the
need for faster civil rights progress. He wrote:
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As the chief executive of our nation, I respectfully suggest that you unwittingly crush the
sprit of freedom in Negros by constantly urging forbearance and give hope to those prosegregation leaders like Gov. Faubus who would take from us even those freedoms which
we now enjoy. Your own experience with Gov. Faubus is proof enough that forbearance
and not eventual integration is the goal the pro-segregation leaders seek.252
By this point, Robinson’s major league debut was over a decade behind him and he was a
nationally known and respected civil rights figure, in addition to being an athletic hero to many.
The ambivalence toward Eisenhower’s civil rights record that he displays in this letter is an
attitude that was common among civil rights champions of the time. Characteristic of how he
handled high level correspondence while in office, Eisenhower replied with a short and cordial,
yet ultimately dismissive letter. He contended that he urged patience as a means to progress,
rather than a substitute for it. He also commended Robinson for being one of the most important
leaders in guiding America toward eventual full social and political equality. He insisted that
progress had been made and that Americans, especially African-Americans, ought to be proud of
the achievements in civil rights over the past few years. Unfortunately for Robinson,
Eisenhower’s letter did not explicitly denounce the morality of segregation, but rather treated it
as a policy problem to be carefully and slowly dealt with over a period of years.
Important to understanding Eisenhower’s political thought is understanding that he
should not be classified as either a hero or opponent of civil rights. He did not support racial
discrimination culturally or legally, but he was never prepared to launch a moral or total crusade
against it. In Eisenhower’s thinking there were even greater evils than segregation and the
chance of political instability at home while facing communism abroad was chief on the list.

252

Jackie Robinson, Letter to Dwight Eisenhower, May 26, 1958. Eisenhower Presidential
Library Archives. Last accessed February 18, 2017. Available at
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/jackie-robinson/letter-1958.html.

140

The Threat of the Military Industrial Complex
Though Eisenhower cherished his military career and appeared to always remain prouder
of his role in WWII than of any accomplishment he achieved while president, he viewed the
military as a necessary evil, not something to be intrinsically celebrated. He put it this way:
“The one thing that disturbs me is the readiness of people to discuss war as a means of advancing
peace.”253 During his first campaign he noted in a speech that military forces were
“nonproductive, sterile organizations whose purposes are, at the best, largely negative.”254 He
was convinced of the unalterable need for a strong military for America, and he never waivered
that serving in the military was an honorable and selfless thing. He was careful to not lose sight,
though, of the notion that, ultimately, the military’s actions resulted in a loss of wealth, life, and
happiness.
Perhaps Eisenhower’s most memorable phrase came in his Farewell Address. Just a few
days before he would leave the office, Eisenhower used his final chance to address the American
people as president by cautioning against the trajectory of civil-military relations. Using blunter
language that he previously had on the subject when making public remarks he argued: “In the
councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex.”255 For Eisenhower, the
problem of an increasing reliance on military might alone was a fundamental threat to the
traditional American system of freedom. Eisenhower showed the nuance of his position and
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incrementally prepared his audience for his conclusion about the dangers of the military
industrial complex by first praising America’s commitment to building a world class set of
armed forces.
After noting the necessity of a strong military, though, he quickly pivoted to the
substance of his present concern. He reminded Americans that a permanent “arms industry” had
never existed in America until after WWII. Furthermore, he was disturbed that the United States
government had come to have a higher annual arms budget “than the net income of all United
States corporations.”256 He went on to define the impact of this new and colossal arms industry
as multi-faceted. The consequences were “economic, political, even spiritual” and extended far
beyond the bureaucratic corridors of Washington. This problem was absolute, it impacted the
lives of regular Americans, and its threat to become all-encompassing for American society was
grave in Eisenhower’s thinking. Though he viewed America as intrinsically good and the
American people as collectively virtuous he did think that such things were an absolute
protection against the threat of the military industrial complex. “The potential for the disastrous
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist,”257 he noted. Eisenhower cautioned that
Americans of the present and future would do well to vigilantly look for instances where the
combination of industry, arms, government funding, and a social prioritizing of defense over all
else would become pernicious.
This is one of the strangest facets of Eisenhower’s thought. He was committed, not only
in word, but through policy to the notion that America would posses the most powerful
conventional army and nuclear arsenal in the world. Simultaneously, he consistently viewed a
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large, permanent standing army as a threat to America’s basic way of life. Existing perpetually
with a huge army, prioritizing new military technology over all else, and looking to win all
conflicts primarily through physical force were all better suited to Soviet ideology than to
American sensibilities. The United States and conservatism, in Eisenhower’s thinking were
fundamentally about both domestic and international peace. An entrenched relationship between
big business and a large military could not, over time, avoid being a threat to this commitment to
peace.
Speaking directly about the most basic danger of this confluence he sharply commanded
“we must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic
processes.”258 In terms of traditional American liberty, Eisenhower instructed that “we should
take nothing for granted.”259 The only hope for “security and liberty” to “prosper together” was
for “an alert and knowledgeable citizenry” to “compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial
and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals.”260 He did not fear a
corruption of the collective American character that would result in the American public being
motivated by conquest or selfish goals. Rather, he feared that the citizens of his country would
drift, unknowingly, to adopt a permanent policy of perpetually increasing armament, and, that
this, in turn, would result in a national community whose deepest priorities had been abandoned
and whose citizens suffered for it.
Though the Farewell Address is Eisenhower’s most famous exploration of the military
industrial complex his root ideas on the subject had been developing for years by the time he
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spoke in 1961. For example, writing to a friend in September of 1950 Eisenhower contended
that “We, in America, have never liked to face up to the problem arising out of the conflicting
considerations of national security on the one hand and economic and financial solvency on the
other.”261 In order to address the problem, from a policy perspective, Eisenhower suggested that
the American military be relatively small in peacetime, but that it develop a “striking force” that
would be both reasonably inexpensive to maintain and would provide American leaders with the
ability to command a quick response to a military crisis. If the crisis were large enough, the
thinking went, larger forces could be mobilized and, if needed, drafted to join the fight.
This option, in Eisenhower’s thinking, captured the possibility of allowing Americans
both to be prepared in the new, Cold War dominated international landscape, while permitting
them to continue to spend most of their energy and resources on peaceful pursuits which were
likely to bring in more money and more happiness. Speaking about the issue in philosophical
terms Eisenhower argued that “It has always been obvious that a democracy, even one as rich as
ours, could not maintain in peace the force in being that could promptly and successfully meet
any trouble that might arise in any portion of the globe.”262 He continued to note the possibility
of several crises happening at the same time and in different parts of the world.
The deeper issue, though, was that Eisenhower did not believe it would be possible for
American democracy to maintain the things that made it unique and good if the citizens and
government became too focused on security alone. That the solution had to come from a
determined effort by the citizenry to remain free of the military-industrial complex was clear in
his thinking. No bureaucratic solution, nor a reliance on the prudence of the leaders of the armed
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forces would be successful in staving off the threat in the long-term. In 1949 he put it this way:
“Since a democracy must always retain a waiting, strategically defensive, attitude it is mandatory
that some middle line be determined between desirable strength and unbearable cost.”263 Now
that the branches of the military had been enlarged and professionalized each one would have an
unending appetite for appropriations, Eisenhower feared. Perhaps most troubling was that it
would be easy not only for the military to make loud demands for more resources, but that such
demands would likely appear reasonable to a citizen who was not balancing the usefulness of a
new weapon or program with the holistic impact it would have on American life. The
democratic citizen’s job, then, was to serve as both a supporter of a needed military apparatus
and a watchdog against the military establishment’s desire for economic and political control
over the society.
Eisenhower’s views about the military industrial complex make up an important part of
his conservatism, because they help to illustrate the type of society he envisioned for America.
Eisenhower believed in America’s basic goodness and felt that the country had a knack for
working out domestic problems that threatened individual liberty and communal prosperity. If
only Americans would realize the fundamental good in their system and in their political
community they would not be quick to make drastic changes to the type of life they had lived
together unless those changes were required for continued economic success. It is on this last
point where Eisenhower’s conservatism coherently distinguishes between a large and new
government undertaking, such as the interstate highway system, and a different large and costly
government program, in this case the military industrial complex. The former, for Eisenhower,
helped Americans to better live out their happy and healthy lives together, while the latter was a
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financial, philosophical, and political burden to lasting American success. The basis of
difference in Eisenhower’s conservatism, then, was not the size of the project a government was
undertaking, but the goal and side effects a particular program would have on holistic American
life. The military industrial complex, to put it simplistically, threatened America more than it
helped America. This, in turn, meant that it was a dangerous revolution in the way that
American society operated, rather than a necessary means of self-preservation, as many other
Americans at the time argued.

Leveling the Playing Field: Public Housing Assistance and Healthcare for the Sick and
Elderly
Years before he entered the political world the New Deal’s expansion of government
services, authority, and costs alarmed Eisenhower. As noted earlier, he would cite stopping the
trend of increasing government involvement in the economy as the chief reason that he decided
to seek the presidency. While he was a critic of the scope that of the federal government’s recent
spending he did not seek to entirely roll-back the baseline of the New Deal. He made it a point
to ensure that safety net programs, such as social security and payments to the poor and sick
would continue. Because of this, many have characterized Eisenhower as a soft New Deal
president. William F. Buckley famously described Eisenhower’s animating political principle as
“measured socialism.”264
The full story of Eisenhower’s thought on this front goes further than being a mere non
enthusiastic, but still essential New Deal disciple. A representative example comes in his 1954
State of the Union Address, in which he discussed his vision for the future of medicine in
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America by proclaiming: “I am flatly opposed to the socialization of medicine.”265 That he did
not stop there likely angered conservatives of a purer ideology, but what followed, taken together
with such a stark opening statement illustrated Eisenhower’s own conservatism. He continued:
the great need for hospital and medical services can best be met by the Iinitiative of
private plans. But it is unfortunately a fact that medical costs are rising and already
impose severe hardships on many families. The Federal Government can do many
helpful thing and still carefully avoid the socialization of medicine.266
In a manner that was typical to his public speaking he set out what he believed to be two
dangerous extremes. Though he does not seem to have read Aristotle, he often deployed a style
of someone trying to convince the world of the Aristotelian premise that virtue can be found in
the space between two vices. In this instance the two ills were the reality of rising medical costs
that American families could not afford in the first place and the specter of a health care system
fully controlled by the government in the future. The choice was not between these two, he
insisted, but instead a third option that consisted of a few government interventions designed to
help the market better provide for the needs of citizens was not only possible but necessary.
Matching his concern for health care was his infrequently discussed, but important role in
changes to the federal government’s role in the housing market. Here again is an issue where
Eisenhower is a conservative, but not an ideological one. Upon signing the bill for the Housing
Act of 1954 he issued a short statement that described the advantages he felt the new law would
provide for individual citizens and the society, alike. He began with the wide view: It would
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improve living conditions for millions of citizens, make neighborhoods that had fallen into
disrepair more attractive and safe, and help the market be better suited to do these things itself in
the future.
He then moved on to discussing the specifics. He tied the law’s provision to “insure
larger home mortgage loans, carrying smaller down payments and longer terms”267 to what was
becoming seen as the idealized “American Dream.” “Millions of our families will be able, for
the first time, to buy new or used homes. Families will be helped to enlarge or modernize their
present homes.”268 Keeping in mind the poorest Americans, he noted that the law would provide
the opportunity for those dislocated from their homes because of needed “slum clearance” the
chance to move into better living conditions. Then, he concluded his analysis by noting that the
law would also allow private credit lenders to receive government assistance that would allow
them to increase their business in the short-term, but that would allow them to become
disassociated with federal funding later. This package was quintessential Eisenhower. He
advocated for a high level of federal intervention, but only in a way that he felt would be limited,
mostly temporary, and would achieve a good for individual citizens that would not come to pass
without such an intervention. The difference between this type of philosophy and those
conservatives who viewed the powerful state as the ultimate envenom of freedom is clear. It is
also important to distinguish Eisenhower from the Democrats who were committed to the New

267

Dwight Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Housing Act of 1954,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 2, 1954. The American Presidency Project Archives. Last accessed
February 18, 2017. Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9962.
268

Eisenhower, Housing Act, Aug. 2, 1954.

148

Deal. Eisenhower retains his disdain not only for particular programs he finds to be examples of
government overreach, but especially for the philosophy which says that the government ought
to permanently be in the business of finding new problems to solve in a proactive fashion.

Business-Labor Relations
One of the less discussed yet important categories of thought and action for
understanding Eisenhower’s conservatism is his role in business and labor relations. In 1947, the
Taft-Hartley Act, which was designed to limit the legal maneuvering of labor unions in cases
where a strike could be deemed a threat to national security, was passed by the newly elected
Republican congress, was vetoed by Truman, and finally became law following a congressional
override. This act had angered labor advocates since the time of its passing and during the
campaign Eisenhower had promised a concession to labor in the way of slight adjustments to the
act. In his first year in office, just as he was seeking to put together a reform bill to send to
Congress, Sen. Robert Taft, conservative stalwart and cosponsor of the original bill died.
Consequently, the conservative wing of congressional republicans repudiated Eisenhower’s
attempt at even small modifications to the act in the early days of his administration.269
Importantly, Eisenhower did abandon the larger question of business-labor relations after
this initial defeat. In fact, he turned away from his attempt at a concession to unions and quickly
moved toward working to ensure a government approach that clearly favored business over labor
when it came to setting ground rules for disputes. The most important action he took on this
front was to appoint members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) who were, in the
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words of political economist Stephen Weatherford, “ardent conservatives.”270 This strategy,
Weatherford argues, was “assertively partisan.”271 Eisenhower’s conservatism, though initially
questionable to some longstanding business and party leaders on this issue, would prove to be
genuine and durable in its distrust of the federal government as an explicit protector of a growing
array of workers rights.
Though he did not wish to use the government as a vehicle to ensure positive protections
for workers as a group he did seek to use the government as an agent of shifting economic focus.
Raymond Saulnier, the chairperson of Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisors put it this
way:
The intention of these initiatives was to shift the relationship between public and private
efforts in a way that would strengthen the underpinnings of the market-based and marketdirected entrepreneurial economy, as well as enhance personal freedom.272
As was typical of Eisenhower, he felt that the government did have a role to play, but that
role was to explicitly create paths for private individuals to do the important work of society. He
was not a Jeffersonian when it came to government’s involvement in the economy. He felt that
without some federal involvement for the purposes of providing a minimal social safety net,
setting regulations designed to encourage growth, and fighting inflation the economy would not
be likely to succeed in the long-term in the contemporary and complex environment. During his
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tenure in office he fought against price controls, attempted to curb opportunities for government
to compete with private business, and encouraged private investment in new energy
technologies, most notably in the hydroelectric and nuclear sectors.273

Spending and Inflation
One of Eisenhower’s most traditional conservative positions was that he viewed inflation
as the ultimate economic ill. In 1960, for example, his economic advisors suggested a stimulus
package both for the sake of the economy itself and for Republican election fortunes later that
year. In spite of this pressure, Eisenhower refused to consider such a move, because he feared
that whatever good a stimulus would do in the short-term that it would lead to inflation in the
long run.274 Looked at more broadly, Eisenhower’s economic policy preferences for most of his
presidency “reflected consistent, but flexible fiscal conservatism.”275
In order to understand the nuance of his position on federal spending it is helpful to refer
to a press conference he gave shortly after his first inauguration. Here he argued that “the
objective of a tax reduction is an absolutely essential one” if the American system of economics,
which he held to be based on “private incentive and initiative and the production that comes from
it” were to survive lower taxes, over the long-term were non-negotiable.276 In the immediate,

273

Griffith, “Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” 100.

274

Ann Mari May, “President Eisenhower, Economic Policy, and the 1960 Presidential
Election,” Journal of Economic History, (June 1990) 50, no 2: 417-427.
275

May, “President Eisenhower,” 424.

276

Dwight Eisenhower, Press Conference, Washington D.C., Feb. 17, 1953. The American
Presidency Project Archives. Last accessed February 18, 2017. Available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9623.

151

though, Eisenhower concluded that cutting taxes not only could not be a priority, but that he
could not counsel it at all. The problem was that the federal budget was out of balance and more
tax cuts would only exacerbate the issue. Eisenhower feared that this would trigger a neverending cycle of destruction. He reasoned that tax cuts before the budget was balanced would
lead to perpetual inflation. He expressed it this way: “Therefore, there is no end to the inflation;
there is finally no end to taxation; and the eventual result would, of course, be catastrophe.”277 In
these remarks Eisenhower makes clear that his ultimate aim is to limit and then reduce inflation,
not to ensure that the immediate tax burden on individuals is lessened.
Looking back at Eisenhower on this front, one may judge that he was a strange
Republican president, in that he was willing to openly insist that tax cuts would be harmful in the
short-term. It is worth remembering, however, that it was not until decades later when tax cuts
as ideology became a principle of Republican orthodoxy. In insisting on the balancing of the
budget and the attack on inflation Eisenhower was as much of a traditional conservative of his
day as could be imagined. During the question and answer portion of the press conference
Eisenhower went even further, saying “I shall never agree to the elimination of any tax where
reduction in revenue goes along with it. In other words, it would have to be a substitute of some
kind in that same area.”278 Eisenhower viewed those who wanted quick tax cuts with the same
disregard he held for those who wanted new federal spending. Each position would exacerbate
the current problem of an out of balance budget and inevitably lead to long-term economic
damage, in his thinking. Therefore, the “conservative” thing to do was to pay off the
government’s current commitments while seeking to reduce them in the future.
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Though Eisenhower held the traditional conservative viewpoint on spending and inflation
the way that he thought about it in context of his overall take on American domestic policy fits
well into his theme of conservatism as gradualism. The refusal to support quick tax cuts in the
service of a longer-term policy goal points to Eisenhower’s thinking that conservatism can only
be meaningful as a patient commitment to the nation’s long-term health. The desire for quick
fixes in the policy realm was something he had accused the Democrats of during the campaign
and, though he was deploying traditional campaign tactics, he also seems to have actually
believed that American liberalism was intrinsically a philosophy that was committed to the ill of
intellectual hubris, which sought complicated and government driven solutions to many
problems in the short-term. Eisenhower’s conservatism, as he saw it, counteracted this tendency
not only by offering differing policy solutions, but by providing a temperament that was more
eager to think about politics as a long-term affair.
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CHAPTER 6
PUBLIC AND PATRIOTIC THEOLOGY
Eisenhower’s religion, both its personal and political importance is a subject of much
debate among scholars. The usual battle is over whether Eisenhower himself was a true believer
or merely a religious instrumentalist. I argue that it is impossible to finally discern Eisenhower’s
conviction, but that we need not do so in order to understand the political significance of
Eisenhower’s use of religion. I find that he used religious appeals tailored to be received equally
well by Christians and Jews as a fundamental part of his rhetorical strategy. More deeply,
understanding how Eisenhower thought about American religion sheds light into how he thought
about politics.

Religion in Eisenhower’s America: The Legal Background
The 1940s saw a spate of turning points in the legal status of religious liberty, through a
series of landmark Supreme Court decisions. Between 1940 and Eisenhower’s election in 1952
nine important decisions would be handed down on issues of free exercise, the tax status of
religious activities, and the place of religion in public schools. Quickly surveying these cases
provides an important glimpse into the country’s legal trends regarding religion at the time
Eisenhower was ascending from mid ranking officer to president.

Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)
Here, door-to-door Jehovah’s Witness evangelists were arrested for causing a breach of
the peace and for violating the state’s licensing rules by soliciting donations for religious
pamphlets in a Catholic neighborhood in New Haven. The high court ruled in favor of the

154

Jehovah’s Witlessness, by denying that the state had constitutional authority to require a prior
license for the conduct of religious activity. To do so, they argued, would amount to an informal
but substantial prior restraint on free exercise.

Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)
In another case involving Jehovah Witnesses, two high school students were expelled
from their local public school after refusing to salute the American flag during a required daily
pledge ceremony. The students contended that saluting the flag violated their free exercise by
compelling them to ignore their religious duty not to worship an entity other than god. The court
ruled for the school, arguing that the state had a legitimate interest in inculcating national unity
and furthermore concluded that such a decision was out of the court’s proper purview. The lone
dissenter was Harlan Stone, who would soon become chief justice and begin to see votes go his
way in religious liberty cases.

Jones v. Opelika (1942)
This case involved a conglomeration of several instances where states had punished
Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing to pay licensing fees before selling religious books. Grouping
the ordinances together, the court upheld their constitutionality by finding that in instances where
religious materials are being sold “using ordinary commercial methods” sellers could be required
to obtain the same licenses that other sellers needed to secure before conducting business.

155

Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943)
Just a year later the court reversed the Opelika decision and argued that “in substance”
ordinances requiring a licensing fee for the sell of religious books was a tax on religion. They
rejected the previous standard of “ordinary commercial methods” and found that just because a
religious person was using a commercial avenue to evangelize did not mean that they were
engaged in a mere business venture. They retained the right to attempt to persuade others of the
rightness of their religious beliefs and, should they be subjected to licensing fees to do so, the
religious liberty of rich denominations or individuals would be safe, but the right to free exercise
would be endangered for those who depended on the sale of their materials for the livelihood.

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
In a manner similar to the Murdock decision the court reversed a previous stance in this
case. Here, the state had expelled some Jehovah’s Witness children for refusing to take part in a
required flag salute. In addition to this expulsion the school district reported that the students
were unlawfully truant and the state threatened to prosecute their parents for not sending the kids
to school. This time, siding with the protesting Jehovah’s Witnesses, the court ruled that the
state did not have the authority to mandate a flag salute because doing so was mandating a belief
and specific support of the current political situation. By this point, it had become clear that the
court had shifted to be disposed to accept the claims of religious minorities who felt that their
free exercise was being violated.
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Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947)
Ewing, a New Jersey town just outside of Trenton, had a program where families that
sent their children to private schools could receive grants to cover the cost of transportation to
and from school each day. The town’s reasoning was that there was a public interest in ensuring
all students would be able to attend the school of their family’s choice. A non-religious resident
felt that this use of tax money was material support to religion, as the private schools in the area
were almost entirely Catholic institutions. The court ruled that the program could continue
because it did not amount to government support for a specific religious organization. Instead,
the town had decided merely to extend a general benefit from only public school students to all
students. Because the town had not made any provisions for which private school students
would qualify for the grant it was ruled to be a religiously blind program. The court noted that
this decision did not mean that other localities were bound to offer similar grants to students
attending private schools, but that there was no ground for a federal court to overturn a local
decision of this sort.

Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County (1948)
A school board in Illinois instituted a program where religious education would be
provided Jews, Catholics, and Protestants who wished to participate. Parents signed their
children up for one of the three classes and, for one hour a week, a local clergy member would
use dedicated classroom space to provide religious instruction. The school argued that the
program was voluntary, did not use taxpayer dollars, and did not disadvantage non-participating
students because they simply went to a study hall during the hour. The court ruled the program
to be unconstitutional, because it entailed the “close cooperation” between the school and
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religious authorities. It also, in effect, provided tax supported encouragement to religion by
using school classrooms for religious education. Most fundamentally, the court ruled that the
program was a violation of the establishment clause, because the school’s active participation
facilitated the spread of a particular faith. In a nearly unanimous decision the court struck the
program down.

Zorach v. Clauson (1952)
The last religious liberty case before Eisenhower’s presidency was a school release
program for religious instruction that mirrored the Illinois program in its intent. Like the case in
Champaign County a public school in New York wanted to provide its students with the option
of using one hour a week during school time to attend religious education. The school felt that
this program was sufficiently different from the Illinois example, because instruction was not
held on school property. Instead, students would leave the school to go to a neighborhood
religious organization’s building where they would be taught. The school checked with the
instruction entities to be sure that a student was not using the program as an excuse to leave
school early. Teachers were not allowed to speak with students about their participation in the
program and school administrators were only allowed to verify attendance. The court ruled that
these differences were sufficient to protect the program’s constitutionality. Because no public
facilities or money were being used and because the rules of the program made it clear that there
was no reward or penalty for participation in the program it could be allowed.
Together, these cases help to illustrate the religious environment Eisenhower would see
as he stepped into his presidency. It was a time where public sentiment often differed from legal
opinion, in that the latter allowed for more expression of religious minorities whose members or
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tenets were considered by many citizens to be obnoxious, yet it was also a period where the
courts and the public agreed that a Judeo-Christian baseline for America’s sense of itself was
both present and welcomed.

Religion in Eisenhower’s America: The Sociological Background
Eisenhower took office at a time when America was experiencing one of the strangest
religious transformation of the 20th century. Specifically, the country’s population was
becoming simultaneously more religious and more secular. While noting that the trends of
increased religiosity were significant and durable prominent sociologist Will Herberg argued that
a specific kind of secularism was becoming more prominent in American life during the 1950s.
He wrote:
The secularism that pervades the American consciousness is essentially of this kind: it is
thinking and living in terms of a framework of reality and value remote from the religious
beliefs simultaneously possessed.279
Put another way, Eisenhower would become president during a time of increasing, yet
increasingly casual religion in America. Understanding this environment is important for putting
Eisenhower’s own thought on religion in its peculiar context. Herberg argues that a close
examination of America’s religious history makes it clear how the situation in the 1950s came to
be and came to be seen as normal to most Americans. He notes that new immigrant waves were
expected to adopt most features of American culture, yet were allowed (and even expected) to
retain their particular religions.280 New “immigrant” churches helped to establish the identities
of American Jews, Italian-Americans, German-Americans, and others. Without nationalized
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centers of worship new immigrants would have had trouble retaining any vestige of their home
culture and so, throughout successive generations these immigrant communities kept their faith
communities at the center of their common life.
Along the way, though, the children and grandchildren of each nationality’s original
American immigrants began to develop what Herberg dubbed “the American Way of Life.”281
This “spiritual structure of ideas and ideals…synthesizes all that commends itself to the
American as the right, the good.”282 The relationship between the religion of Americans and the
American Way of Life has been mutually influential, according to Herberg. They way that the
two have informed each other has encouraged religious pluralism and, at times, a spreading of
religious fervor. Herberg argues that, for example, Americans have always known and valued a
diversity of religious expressions and so a society with believers of multiple faiths is considered
the admirable status quo. Inherent in this structure, though, he argues, is an increasing
secularism fueled by a weak deism. The foundation of the American creed, in Herberg’s
analysis is a “faith in faith,”283 something first observed about Americans by Tocqueville in the
1830s. That is to say that exclusive theological claims are not as important to the average
American as a commitment to the idea of faith itself. In fact, specific theological claims could
threaten the American Way of Life’s emphasis on religious plurality.
And so, “religion in America has tended toward a marked disparagement of forms,
whether theological or liturgical,”284 Herberg argues. And indeed, he found that “the anti-
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theological, anti-liturgical bias is still pervasive.”285 By the time Eisenhower took office Herberg
observed that America was full of religious people, (he notes that 95% of those surveyed
considered themselves religiously Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish)286 yet these were believers
who often refused to place serious importance on the distinctive theological claims made by their
respective faiths.
Instead, the country’s sacred grounding was the bond of Americanism. The dominant
feature of American religion was activism, not theology.287 During Eisenhower’s administration
this activism was easily channeled into a staunch anti-communism. The worries about the Soviet
threat (both political and spiritual) joined with a belief that “ethical behavior and a good life,
rather than adherence to a specific creed, will earn a share in the heavenly kingdom.”288
Eisenhower’s America was a place where, in the minds of most Americans, fellow citizens’
patriotism could be judged by whether they accepted one of the monotheistic faiths, and the
quality of their faith could be judged by whether it accommodated the American Way of Life.
Though Herberg popularized the phrase “Protestant-Catholic-Jew” to describe the American
religious consensus, he was describing a phenomenon, rather than inventing a concept.
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Eisenhower’s Thought on Religion in America
In 1956 Eisenhower began his State of the Union Address with a sweeping gesture
toward the divine. He proclaimed:
The opening of this new year must arouse in us all grateful thanks to a kind Providence
whose protection has been ever present and whose bounty has been manifold and
abundant. The State of the Union today demonstrates what can be accomplished under
God by a free people; by their vision, their understanding of national problems, their
initiative, their self-reliance, their capacity for work—and by their willingness to sacrifice
whenever sacrifice is needed.289
Here, Eisenhower blends the notion that America has divine blessing to thank for its
national well-being with the idea that America’s prosperity is largely due to the hard work of its
citizens. This notion was not new to Eisenhower, but was rather an example of him channeling
one of the oldest modes of American thinking about the intersection between national goodness
and national success. In his 1952 work The Irony of American History, theologian Reinhold
Niebuhr noted American political theology originally had two camps, which he calls the
“Jeffersonian” and “Puritan” perspectives. For the Jeffersonians, “the favorable economic
circumstances of the New Continent were the explicit purpose of providential decree.”
Meanwhile, the Puritans shifted from their early conviction that material blessings were not a
sign of a people’s goodness or wickedness to a subtle, yet real belief that the overwhelming
prosperity of America was due, in large part, to the godliness of its citizens. 290 Like the Puritans,
Eisenhower was not apt to insist on the explicit result of prosperity flowing from the actions of a
godly people. Instead, just as the Later Puritans did, according to Niebuhr, he was eager to
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caution Americans that they had a high calling and to remind them that living up to this godly
mission was of ultimate importance, on both an individual and societal level.
The duration of this chapter explores Eisenhower’s thought as it relates to religion in
America’s public sphere by analyzing Eisenhower’s sense of the country’s founding religious
principle, his understanding of both the individual and social importance of belief in a good and
powerful deity, and his conviction that America’s fundamental character is shaped by intentional
divine influence. Taken together, it is best to conceive of Eisenhower’s understanding of
religion in America as communal and in service to the both the individual and the society. This
understanding is best described as being a belief in and hope for public and patriotic theology.

Eisenhower’s Early Religion
Eisenhower was raised by Jehovah’s Witness parents who used the family’s house to
hold weekly worship meetings for the local chapter of the sect.291 The religious fervor of his
parents, particularly his mother who had become a certified preacher in the denomination, meant
that the family’s social life revolved around the Jehovah’s Witness community. Over time,
though, Eisenhower’s father, David became disillusioned with the Jehovah’s Witness teachings
and withdrew to become a Christian whose general commitment to the faith and dedication to
reading the Bible remained, but who no longer claimed a serious denominational affiliation.292
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Eisenhower’s Religion in the White House
In order to understand Eisenhower’s views on the role of religion in American politics, it
is important to first note some key features of his background. As noted in the introduction,
Eisenhower grew up in a home with devout Jehovah’s Witness parents. Though he never seems
to have rejected the faith of his parents in an explicit way, he never joined their ardent
commitment to making the faith of a particular denomination the center of his life. In fact, he
spent most of his adult life having no regular denominational affiliation or routine for church
attendance. Shortly before taking office, though, he was encouraged by influential religious
leaders, including his new confidant Billy Graham, to choose a Washington church to join and
attend regularly.
He chose National Presbyterian Church, which had claimed several past presidents as
members and was also the spiritual home of current senators and supreme court justices. Shortly
after his first inauguration, Eisenhower was baptized by the church’s pastor, Edward Elson.293
Though Eisenhower’s life as a consistent and public worshipper was new, his view that America
was fundamentally a Christian nation was not. His presidency provided him the chance to
communicate his long-held views in a more powerful way, but it did not seem to alter the
essential nature of his religious convictions. These remained solid, though vague and he seems
to have relied on them for personal strength more than for doctrinal or explicit political guidance.
He was private on this front throughout much of his most of his adult life. It is nearly impossible
to find discussions of specific theological content in his personal letters or diaries.
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Christian Deism as America’s Founding Principle
In a recorded message for the America Legion’s “Back-to-God” campaign Eisenhower
boldly argued, “without God, there could be no American form of government, nor an American
way of life. Thus the Founding Fathers saw it, and thus, with God’s help, it will continue to
be.”294 Characteristically, Eisenhower argues that a monotheist understanding of the divine is
vital to the health of America’s polity, but does not venture into the specifics of what this
particular faith should look like when it comes to concrete theological premises.
This choice was one of conviction and strategy. That he rarely proclaimed the
goodness of Christianity’s specific tenets was no accident. Though he described himself in 1952
as a “convinced, nearly fanatic Protestant,”295 he also proclaimed to the Freedoms Foundation in
the same year that “our form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt
religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.”296 He would only have had Judeo-Christian
monotheism in mind, but at the time 95% of Americans self-identified as religiously Jewish or
Christian.297 In their landmark book Civil Religion and the Presidency Richard Pierard and
Robert Linder argue that Eisenhower’s thought on civil religion coalesced around four pillars.
These were, first, viewing god as a source of both individual and national strength, second
thinking of American government as resting on a spiritual foundation, seeing faith as a public
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virtue, and remembering that religion is an important tool in the fight against Soviet style
communism. “We are not merely religious,” he said to the Second Assembly of the World
Council of Churches in 1954. Rather, “we are inclined, more today than ever to see the value of
religion as a practical force in our affairs.”298
Religion was not merely a spiritual good, nor was its value intrinsic. Rather, its benefit
was best seen in light of what it could help the nation accomplish. Institutionalized religion and
individual faith were two of the most power tools in an American leader’s arsenal against
enemies like the Nazis and the Soviets. The reason is that in these struggles, Eisenhower was
confident that America was representing a position of universal good. That is to say that he
believed it to be self-evident that both Hitler and Stalin and his successors were in conflict with
humanity itself and, as such, with god. Standing up to this type of enemy meant standing up for
god’s design for a globe filled with happy individuals and communities which were free to exist
in peace with one another.
Eisenhower’s vision of American public religion, then, was not a particular form of
sectarian Protestantism. Rather, he believed that the country was founded on and guided by a
less specific notion of the divine. Specifically, at the communal level, he hoped for the nurturing
of an already existing Christian deism. This can best be understood as a belief in god, along
generally Christian and Jewish lines that emphasized a commonality between Americans of
different sects and of differing levels of devoutness.
The particular substance of this commonality, for Eisenhower, was a commitment to a
unified public good. Specifically, he emphasized that the divine was the primary source of
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individual and national strength, that American government relied on a spiritual foundation, that
faith was a public virtue, and that religion was useful in the ideological struggle against
America’s internal enemies.299 An example of support for this Christian deism came at the first
national prayer breakfast (at the time known as the presidential prayer breakfast), held in 1953
where Eisenhower spoke and noted the importance of the event. He put it this way: “Today I
think prayer is just simply necessity, because by prayer I believe we mean an effort to get in
touch with the Infinite”.300 Being in touch with the infinite would keep Americans grounded and
focused on pursuit of the common good. Importantly, the administration was not friendly with all
faith groups. Specifically, Eisenhower shared a mutual disdain with the leadership of the
American Council of Christian Churches, a leading fundamentalist Protestant group.301 The
reason for this helps to illuminate his general outlook on America’s Christian deist roots.
Fundamentalists insist on specific, sectarian, and non-negotiable theological content.
Eisenhower’s religion was too general to be holy to the Council, and their beliefs were too
specific and alienating to be useful in the service of America’s common religious bond to
Eisenhower.
This example of tension notwithstanding, when speaking about religion Eisenhower was
speaking for a large number of Americans in the 1950s. Speaking about this “rough consensus”
Sarah Barringer Gordon writes that it:
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did not entail a fully fledged commitment to respect for religious difference. Instead, it
represented the conviction that respect for the three great religious traditions of American
history and contemporary life – which included Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—was
essential to successfully resisting and combating totalitarian incursions. Provided that no
one religion was signaled out for special approval, went the argument, the deployment of
religion by government (and the dependence of government on religion for validity) was
fully consistent with democratic freedoms.302
Barringer Gordon’s analysis in helpful here in that it contextualizes Eisenhower’s
statements and actions on religion. He was not simply a president who relied on religious tropes
in his language by default, but rather an active member of a society where a growing sense of the
interconnectedness between church and state was fashionable. Going further, I argue that
Eisenhower was not merely representative of the American culture of this era, but was at the
vanguard of this sentiment. Without a president such as Eisenhower, who was eager to infuse
public discourse with explicit religious language that included light versions of basic Protestant,
Jewish, and Catholic theology, American society may not have so readily embraced a
strengthening connection between church and state. Eisenhower as a political thinker here, then,
helped to shape the country’s default political attitudes of the 1950s. Later, when dissenters
from this arrangement would go on to win court rulings that would limit the political efficacy of
the consensus (the prohibition of official school prayer decreed in Engel v. Vitale in 1962, for
instance), the baseline would change over time, yet for a time Eisenhower’s basic outlook was
America’s basic social and legal outlook.
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The Social Importance of a Shared Belief in the Divine
The role of religion in promoting the common good was not only conceptual for
Eisenhower, it was of concrete relevance to the important issues of his time. One arena for this
was in foreign policy. For example, speaking to the National Conference of Christians and Jews
he argued that the country’s “spiritual strength” served as “matchless armor” in a global fight
“against the forces of godless tyranny and oppression.”303 He also titled his WWII memoir,
Crusade in Europe, a decision that he noted was intentional, because he viewed that conflict as a
holy war. It is worth noting that, as a child raised in a Jehovah’s Witness community, he would
have been taught that war was not justifiable, unless the enemy was an enemy of god.304 The
common good that derived from a religious citizenry was not limited to World War II the Cold
War, though, in Eisenhower’s thinking.
He quipped, for example, “faith is the mightiest force that man has at his command. It
impels human beings to greatness in thought and word and deed.”305 Domestic politics needed
virtuous citizens and religion was the only way for America to achieve that goal, according to
Eisenhower. This last formulation is important, because it belies the way in which Eisenhower
used his faith to speak of America’s communal religion. The phrase “thought, word, and deed”
is an exact copy of a communal confession and absolution refrain from the Anglican Book of
Common Prayer. It appears, in part, as “We have sinned against You in thought, word, and
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deed….” This prayer is often used by other denominations, including Lutherans and
Presbyterians, so it is likely that Eisenhower would have become accustomed to it in the year and
a half between his inauguration and joining National Presbyterian Church and the time at which
he delivered this speech. If humans sinned in “thought, word, and deed” in spite of their
religion, their faith also gave them the inspiration to do good things, indeed to ascend to
“greatness,” in Eisenhower’s mind. He was providing a liturgy to Herberg’s American Way of
Life. Religion was important because it was fundamentally useful for a prosperous citizenry.

America’s Character Shaped by the Divine
In addition to believing that religion served both a personal and public good, Eisenhower
was convinced that America’s most important foundation was religious in nature. In a 1958 at a
commencement speech at the Naval Academy he described America’s common heritage as
follows:
Basic to our democratic civilization are the principles and convictions that have bound us
together as a nation. Among these are personal liberty, human rights, and the dignity of
man. All these have their roots in a deeply held religious faith—in a belief in God.306
That he chose to make this point at a military academy graduation was likely not an
accident. He felt that this was an important articulation of the most basic commonality of all
Americans. For Eisenhower, the military, particularly at a time when the country faced a
formidable enemy, was a vital connection between the citizenry’s godly desires and the power of
the government to carry out the people’s just hopes.
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“Before all else, we seek, upon our common labor as a nation, the blessings of Almighty
God. And the hopes in our hearts fashion the deepest prayers of our whole people.”307 With
these words Eisenhower moved passed introductory acknowledgements to begin the substance of
his second inaugural. He would quickly go on to anthropomorphize the nation as a religious
believer even more specifically. “May we pursue the right-without self-righteousness…May we
grow in strength-without pride in self. May we, in all our dealings with all peoples of the earth,
ever speak truth and serve justice.”308 America, in Eisenhower’s view, was both called and
destined to become a source of political power, justly administered, through the deployment of a
collective spiritual character that aligned the country’s citizens and institutions with a divine
mandate to promote peace globally.
Perhaps the clearest formulation of Eisenhower’s thinking on this point came at his
speech celebrating the building of the Interchurch Center in New York in 1958. He noted that
the building would come to represent “a prime support our faith—‘The Truth’ that sets men
free.”309 Though the building was to house a Christian (specifically, Protestant) enterprise,
Eisenhower spoke in general terms about religious liberty and the mutually supportive
relationship between religious liberty and political liberty. He would go on to argue that “if we
are to live true to the faith that inspired our Founding Fathers, we must think of our self-respect
as a nation, and we must not forget to exercise self-discipline310.”
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Earlier in the day white supremacists had bombed a Synagogue in Atlanta, providing
Eisenhower a disturbing counterexample of the opposite of the American civic creed’s virtue of
toleration, as he saw it. “If we are believers in the tradition by which we have lived, that
freedom of worship is inherent in human liberty, then we will not countenance the desecration of
any edifice that symbolizes one of the great faiths.”311 Of course, any decent person would be
outraged by the bombing of a Synagogue, but Eisenhower was arguing that the bombing itself
was more than a particularly grisly crime. It was, rather, an attack on the fabric of the American
system itself. Anyone who would bomb a Synagogue not only hated Jews, but was a direct
enemy of America and America’s most important heritage. If the connection was not obvious
enough, Eisenhower he resorted to invoking the ultimate American: George Washington. He
rhetorically asked those gathered: “Can you imagine the outrage that would have been expressed
by our first President today, had he read in the news dispatches of the bombing of a Synagogue?”
He went on to note, again, that freedom of religion was not only a historic feature of America’s
make-up, but one of its most politically valuable, as well.
Our first President spoke gratefully of religious liberty, but he spoke also of the moral
requirements which religion places on the shoulders of each citizen, singly and together.
Washington believed that national morality could not be maintained without a firm
foundation of religious principle.312
Near the conclusion of his remarks he argued that the most important words of the
presidential oath are “so help me God,313 because the highest office of a religious democracy
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could not be satisfactorily carried out except by divine aid. This is especially noteworthy, since
these are the only words of the oath he took, and that presidents have chosen to take, that is not
required by the Constitution.
“Clearly,” he argued, “civil and religious liberties are mutually reinforcing.”314 He
ended his speech by arguing that religious congregations have always been the best source of
justice and constitutional security in American society. When speaking about the threat the
Soviets presented to freedom around the world he often argued that without America free
religion could not be expected to survive in the long-term. Here, he turned that maxim around
and argued that without churches and other religious bodies, America would not long thrive and
could not exist in the way he felt it had been designed to function.
Even though there had been problems, the plan to defeat global communism, largely
through spiritual strength was working in Eisenhower’s view. Speaking in 1956 to the
International Council for Christian Leadership, he explained at length his vision of America’s
relationship to its common religion and how this related to foreign affairs. Noting that he was
especially happy that the group was holding a week of events headlined by the prayer breakfast
at which he spoke he delivered these impromptu words:
This is terrifically important today. There has been too much of the world that believes
the United States to be completely materialistic, boastful, proud, and arrogant…It is such
meetings as this, continued, repeated, and brought home to them, that help to dispel this
very great and dangerous delusion. It is still a nation that is founded on the religious
faith, with great concern for the sentiments of compassion and mercy…That is what we
want others to think about when they think of the United States. People have talked
about the spirit of Geneva. The thing that the spirit of Geneva did accomplish and at least
so far has not been destroyed—one part of it that is valuable—is that people there, in
watching that conference, gained a belief that the United State was truly trying to follow
in the footsteps of the Prince of Peace, and to establish a just peace for the world…I had
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no intention of making a speech. As a matter of fact, I was promised I didn’t have to—
and I don’t know how I got started. But thank you very much.315
For Eisenhower, America was so clearly acting out of a god-centered devotion to the
world’s common good that others could see it, if they only paid attention. These public prayer
meetings that were hosted as joint efforts across sectarian lines were not only evidence of
America’s divine goodness, according to Eisenhower, but were some of the most important
supports of it.

Eisenhower’s Own Faith: True Believer or Instrumentalist Christian?
The status of Eisenhower’s own faith has been a topic often debated by researchers. For
example, in an interview with National Public Radio’s “God in America” series Randall Balmer
argued that Eisenhower was likely not a personally religious man. “I’m not sure Eisenhower
really believed it…I think there’s nothing really in Eisenhower’s life that suggests a deep faith or
piety.”316 Gary Smith, meanwhile, argues that Eisenhower is “considered one of the most
religious presidents in American history.”317To support this claim Smith notes that some of the
president’s closest friends and advisors during and after his presidential years were Billy
Graham, Pastor Edward Elson, and Kansas Senator Frank Carlson, all of whom were well-known
devoutly Christian figures.318
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Historian Sarah Barringer Gordon argues that Eisenhower was both genuinely religious
and that the trajectory of his official worship reflected America in the 1950s. Eisenhower was
genuine in his faith, she argues, but it became important for him to choose a church with which
to officially affiliate as he took office not only because he was the president, but because in the
1950s institutions of all kinds were growing in importance in American life. This meant that
denominational affiliation was becoming an important part of many Americans’ public and selfidentity. In other words, Eisenhower was not merely joining a church because he thought it
would be politically useful, but because he himself would have been likely more open than ever
to the advice of Billy Graham and others that he should have a specific denominational
membership because that is the way that Americans were increasingly defining their religious
lives.
Eisenhower also become interested in attending religious services for the social, as well
as the spiritual content of the sermons. For example, in 1954 he heard a sermon in support of
adding the words “under God” to the pledge at New York Avenue Presbyterian Church and
thereafter become that cause’s most important advocate.319 While his personal faith may well
have always existed, it was coming to take on a more specific and more politically relevant status
in his life, as he was entering the White House.
Though we cannot know for certain how devout Eisenhower was in beliefs, or even what
the beliefs he did hold might have been, we can see that the way he thought about religion
shaped the way he thought about politics. For Eisenhower, theology was personal in the sense
that he kept much of his own views of the divine to himself, yet it was also political in that he
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used the way he viewed the proper role of religion in public life as an anchor for envisioning
American politics, both domestically and abroad. The dispute about whether he was a sincere
Christian or an instrumentalist is an intriguing one, but it misses the point when it comes to
understanding Eisenhower’s political thought or the religious climate of the 1950s.

Eisenhower’s Self-Image as Spiritual Leader of the Body Politic
One of the most striking features of Eisenhower Presidential Library’s chapel is a banner
stitched with the words “The President’s Prayer.” Below this inscription is a prayer that
Eisenhower wrote himself and delivered at his first inaugural. He both had the idea to deliver a
prayer and he wrote the specific prayer himself. In part, the prayer read as follows:
May cooperation be permitted and the mutual aim of those who, under the concepts of
our Constitution, hold to differing political faiths; so that all may work for the good of
our beloved country and Thy glory. Amen.320
It is consistent with Eisenhower’s typical conception of the role of America’s religion in
America’s politics that he would join the nation’s good with a divine will. This moment added
something else, though. Specifically, Eisenhower was embracing the role as a spiritual leader of
the people. Taking this job seriously was not a one-time event. He would also join
Washington’s National Presbyterian Church at the encouragement of one of his most important
spiritual advisors, Billy Graham. Though Eisenhower had always claimed to be a religious
person he had never joined or regularly attended a church during his adult life until he moved
into the White House. Within two weeks of being sworn in he had joined the church and had
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become the first sitting president to be baptized. The choice of National Presbyterian Church
was no accident, either. The congregation had long been home to highly visible government
officials, including Supreme Court justices and notable members of Congress.
Pierard and Linder argue that Eisenhower’s sense of his own role in American public
religion had three important cornerstones. These were: a conception of the individual as a
fundamentally spiritual being, an assumption that American democracy rests on a spiritual
foundation, and a crusading activism on behalf of promoting spiritual good within the polity.321
An example of Eisenhower acting in the role of spiritual leader of a spiritual people
engaged in a spiritual struggle comes from an address he gave to the World Christian Endeavor
Convention in July of 1954. “Only a great moral crusade,” he proclaimed, which was made of
citizens who hoped “to express in some faint and feeble way their conceptions of what the
Almighty would have us do—that is the force that will win through to victory.”322 The awkward
syntax here aside, Eisenhower is articulating his view that the Cold War is an essentially spiritual
struggle and, as such, one of the chief jobs of the president is to rally the people to muster both
the resolve and humility before the divine will to successfully defeat their enemy. Though his
public speeches provide an important window into his self-image as a spiritual leader, he did not
limit himself to speech alone. He had a sense that ritual in the exercise of public religion
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mattered. This sense was best exemplified in the fact that he and his closest advisors, at
Eisenhower’s own insistence, took communion before the beginning of a new session of
congress.323
Eisenhower was not the only one who viewed himself as a spiritual leader. Pierard and
Linder argue that he “occupied a central position in the flowering of public religiosity in the
1950s.”324 In 1955, for example, the RNC released a statement calling Eisenhower “not only the
political leader, but the spiritual leader of our times.”325 In part, this messaging seemed designed
for the sake of future elections, both Eisenhower’s own re-election bid and for the sake of
Republican congressional races. The RNC wanted voters to view Eisenhower as their spiritual
leader, because a religious people in the midst of a possible nuclear conflict and just a decade
removed from World War II would not likely vote their spiritual leader out of office. In part
though, this imaging of Eisenhower was genuine on the part of the president himself and his
political admirers. The chaplain of the senate and a Methodist clergy member, Frederick Brown
Harris said of Eisenhower’s self-written and delivered first inaugural prayer: “his supplication
turned the inaugural platform into a high and holy altar.”326 For many Americans in the early
1950s, the closer America was to Eisenhower’s “Supreme Being” the better off things would be
both internationally and at home.
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Eisenhower’s approach to the intersection of religion and American politics did not go
without criticism, however. Many skeptics argued that his moral certainty damaged his ability to
fruitfully negotiate with Soviet leadership,327 while famed public intellectual William Lee Miller
dedicated a volume of essays titled “Piety along the Potomac: Notes on Politics and Morals in
the ‘50s” largely to criticizing Eisenhower’s intellectual and political marriage of church and
state. Niebuhr, as well, feared that Eisenhower’s style of blending religion and politics would
lead Americans to a moral arrogance that would prevent them from seeing injustices within their
own society and committed by their government abroad. The title of the book The Irony of
American History, refers to Niebuhr’s argument that the best moral resource of the American
public was its refusal to believe its story of goodness to an ultimate degree. The sort of
emboldening of the will based on the assurance of rightness of cause that Eisenhower hoped
religion would play for Americans was precisely the sort of religious influence Niebuhr worried
would gild fallible state policy with the infallible tint of perceived divine sanction.

Eisenhower as Emblematic of American Religion in the 1950s
Earlier in this chapter I have argued that it is impossible for the scholar to know how
serious Eisenhower’s faith was to him, and it is even more difficult to ascertain exactly what
theological tenets would have been included in his faith. Part of the reason for this was that
Eisenhower was a difficult person to know. As discussed in an earlier chapter, he had few
trusted friends, his closest family members found him to be a larger than life figure and
complicated personality, and even his wife expressed an uncertainty about how well she had
understood him during his life. Though Eisenhower became much more eager to talk about
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religion during his presidential years, he nonetheless retained the enigmatic qualities about the
subject that he did about most issues in his life. His newfound religious enthusiasm was a public
symbol in that he wanted Americans to know that he would be a regular church attendee during
his presidency, but the content of his own reflections were private, hidden even from his closest
associates.
In this way, Eisenhower was the embodiment of the 1950s American religious scene. He
lived up to and stood as a powerful symbol of the situation described by Herberg, in that he
insisted on the civic necessity of holding to a faith, he was enthusiastic about efforts at JewishChristian cooperation, and he despised religious entities that he saw as putting their specific
theology ahead of the project for a united America. It is not only fitting that it is difficult to
discern his own personal theological beliefs, but it is important to understanding why
Eisenhower is a key to understanding the religious moment of his time.
Eisenhower’s Presbyterianism was not the faith of the Scottish Reformers or of the
Puritans. The reason for this is not that he rejected Calvinism (though we have no evidence that
he accepted it, either), but that he expressed his own faith in such a way as to reveal that its
primary function was to serve the American people by inspiring Eisenhower to serve and by
providing him with a moral vision of good and evil in the world. And yet, traces of a typical
Presbyterian outlook are present in Eisenhower. Though there is no record of him musing on
“The Elect” he discussed the geopolitical situation as if Americans were an earthly Elect who
bore a responsibility to the rest of the world to both shine as an example of what freedom could
mean for a people and to work on behalf of those who were themselves unable to experience
political freedom. This combination of a sense that some are endowed with an overwhelming
gift of god’s grace, while others must toil without it combined with the earthly focused activism
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Herberg cited as being fundamental to the American creed. The result, in Eisenhower’s case,
was a president who had a high level of self-assurance about his moral convictions and who
insisted that his country had a specific calling to fight political ills across the world. To shy
away from this, in Eisenhower’s thinking, would not be an expression of humility, but rather of a
hubris that refused to accept the task of sacrificing on behalf of humanity.
Thinking of Eisenhower in this way reveals an insight into how he viewed the political
world. He believed that the politics of the 20th century was a struggle between good and evil.
German fascism was followed by Soviet communism as existential threats to the possibility of a
free and peaceful world. Thus, America was not only justified in opposing these regimes, but
was acting a divine protector for the rest of the world. Even the Soviet people themselves,
Eisenhower thought, depended on the goodwill of the American people to fight the Soviet
government. The enemy, he argued, was the Soviet state and its ideological grounding. The
people under its control were captives to be set free by political success and humanitarian
concern. The specifics of how all of this would play out were less important to Eisenhower’s
immediate political reflections than the conceptual frame of being committed to the struggle on
the grounds that it was a special mission for America given by a divine plan for the world’s
eventual peace.
Understanding Eisenhower’s thought on religion is important not only because it
provides a window into how Eisenhower thought about politics, but it helps to illumine the way
that religion and politics interacted in America in the early post war years. Eisenhower was a
product of his time in the way he thought of religion, but he was also a powerful shaper of
religious and political thought as well. Had he not been so determined to infuse American
politics with the language and symbolism of a light Christian monotheism it is not clear that such
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a consensus as Herberg wrote about would have had a nationally public face. In later years,
when social protests would sweep America to combat what was seen as a consensus that was too
traditional, it was Eisenhower’s vision for American religion that was being responded to and
assailed. Whether one finds his particular vision appealing or not, understanding its
development and the influence it had on the country provides an irreplaceable insight into
American politics of the era.
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CONCLUSION

Though Eisenhower was president during a decade that is remembered by some as the
idyllic height of American life, he was not a traditionalist. Indeed, he sometimes advocated
vigorously on behalf of civil rights, was an innovator in how he organized the presidential
bureaucracy, and had little personal concern that America’s racial and social situation was
dramatically changing. In addition to these things, though, he was a consistent advocate of a
fiscal policy that prioritized the fight against inflation, he sought to decrease government
involvement in labor-business relations, and he was worried that the New Deal’s ongoing
expansion would end American freedom. Gradualism, then, is the best word for Eisenhower’s
conservatism. He held to basic conservative principles and believed that they could be
implemented into public policy, but thought that the only way to do so was through careful and
gradual progress.

Eisenhower in 1964
In the Introduction, I discussed Eisenhower’s 1964 speech to the Republican National
Convention. This speech is worth revisiting now, as it provides a window into understanding the
culmination of Eisenhower’s thought regarding the Republican Party and his own conservatism.
He began his description of Republican mythos by invoking Lincoln. “Our party, let us never
forget,” he noted, “was born out of protest against a supreme indignity to mankind—slavery.”328
This commitment to human dignity had remained at the forefront of Republican efforts in the
ensuing century, Eisenhower argued. He described the beginnings of the party to its present this
way:
328
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This Republican Party, then, was conceived to battle injustice; it was born committed
against degradation of people. So it is more than mere coincidence that we Republicans
have as an article of political faith, faith in the individual. Nor is it coincidence that our
party so born has never ceased to champion the rights and privileges of every citizen,
regardless of race or station.329
On one level, Eisenhower seems to be giving a tacit endorsement of soon to be nominee
Barry Goldwater, in noting that the Party’s emphasis on personal liberty was motivated by a
concern for the well being of all citizens equally. More broadly, though, he is making the case
that there is a coherent core of American conservatism and that choosing to elect Republicans
will be better for the country, because it is Republicans who better understand the way human
beings work and what they need for a good life. Doubling down on the race issue he noted that
the Party had always been the friend of black Americans.
From the time that Lincoln signed the land grant act in 1862 to recent weeks when
Republicans in Congress, to their great credit, voted far more overwhelmingly than did
our opponents to pass the Civil Rights Bill. During that period of more than a century
our party’s programs have reflected concern for the individual, whoever he may be,
wherever he may be whatever he may be.330
The presentation of Republican commitments as motivated only by a concern for the well
being of individual citizens was classic Eisenhower. As he would go on in the speech to criticize
the “centralizing process”331 that he argued the Democrats had been engaged in during their
years in power (since the White House years of Franklin Roosevelt) he collapsed his own views
and the story of the Republican Party’s history into one. He likely saw this speech as a second
farewell address, this time to his own party and he seems to have tried to use the opportunity to
cement what he hoped would be his ideological legacy on the party.
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Eisenhower and Goldwater
Much has been made of how committed Eisenhower was to Nixon’s election in 1960 and
Nixon himself was hurt by what he saw as a lacking effort on Eisenhower’s party to
enthusiastically endorse him. While the dynamic between the two, particularly as the 1960
campaign went on, was strange and, often, strained Eisenhower felt that Nixon would be a decent
president, whose basic governing philosophy was sound. The more complicated and interesting
case regarding Eisenhower’s judgment of potential successors came in 1964.
Put most simply, Eisenhower was no admirer of Barry Goldwater. In the aforementioned
1964 convention speech, though Eisenhower made did not criticize Goldwater, he did laud those
Republicans who had just voted for the Civil Rights Act. Goldwater, famously, voted against the
act and was accused by many of being an outright racist. Furthermore, Eisenhower did give
Goldwater even a small endorsement from the podium. He simply spoke about broad
conceptions of Republican philosophy and was content to push Goldwater’s campaign aside in a
moment Eisenhower likely realized would be remembered as one of his most important postpresidential speeches.
This may have been strange behavior for a former president who has been invited and
agreed to speak at his party’s convention, however by the time of the Convention Eisenhower
had already undertaken behind the scenes activities, hoping to prevent Goldwater from becoming
the nominee. In 1963 Eisenhower informally oversaw the formation of the Republican Critical
Issues Council (CIC), which consisted of moderate Republicans and other Eisenhower
associates. The council was chaired by Eisenhower’s brother, Milton, who was serving as the
president of Johns Hopkins University at the time. Remembering the activities of the CIC,
former speechwriter for Milton Eisenhower, Ron Wolk, noted that the council published papers
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criticizing Goldwater’s record on civil rights and called on the convention to pass a resolution
denouncing the Ku Klux Klan and the conservative conspiracy theory based John Birch
Society.332 None of the CIC proposals were accepted and Milton Eisenhower failed in a
convention effort to nominate a moderate Republican, William Scranton, to be the party’s
presidential nominee.
Later in the campaign season, Eisenhower came to a tentative peace about Goldwater’s
candidacy: he did not grow fonder of Goldwater, but he reluctantly agreed to help him, to a
limited degree, during the campaign. The most visible and most fascinating of these efforts was
a commercial that Eisenhower allowed to be shot by Goldwater’s campaign at the Eisenhower
farm in Gettysburg. The short ad includes an awkward exchange between Goldwater and
Eisenhower, sitting at a picnic table across from each other. Goldwater begins:
We keep getting back to the subject of war and peace, and in this campaign that
Congressman Bill Miller and I are engaged in—for the Presidency and the Vice
Presidency—because we constantly stress the need for a strong America, our opponents
are referring to us as warmongers, and I’d like to know what your opinion of that would
be. You’ve known me a long time and you’ve known Congressman Miller a long
time.333
Neither of the two men appears comfortable in the other’s presence. Goldwater seems
nervous and Eisenhower seems annoyed and, possibly, pained to be participating in the
endeavor. Nevertheless, Eisenhower responds to Goldwater’s rhetorical question:
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Well, Barry, in my mind, this is actual tommyrot. Now, you’ve known about war; you’ve
been through one. I’m older than you; I’ve been in more. But I’ll tell you, no man that
knows anything about war is going to be reckless about this.334
The commercial then concludes with the narrator signing off with the often-lampooned
Goldwater slogan, “Vote for Barry Goldwater. In your heart you know he’s right.”335 Even
Eisenhower’s formal cooperation with Goldwater’s campaign amounted to as grand of an
example of “damning with faint praise” as could be imagined in politics. Eisenhower can bring
himself to say that “anyone” who has war experience will not be “reckless” regarding “these
things,” presumably referring to the likelihood that Goldwater would start an ill-advised conflict
with the Soviets. Even in delivering this think compliment, though, Eisenhower cannot help
himself but to throw in a reminder that Goldwater is not his equal in judgment. The line about
being “older than you” and having been in more wars than Goldwater comes across as
Eisenhower reminding viewers that he does not have full faith in a potential president
Goldwater’s decision making capabilities.
The tension between Eisenhower and Goldwater should not be seen as a merely personal
one, though the two had distinctly opposed styles and Eisenhower did not have much regard for
Goldwater as a potential statesman. Instead, Eisenhower’s deepest concerns about Goldwater
were directly related to Eisenhower’s political thought. Eisenhower did not believe that
Goldwater’s libertarian vision of government was in line with traditional conservatism, or with
what he saw as the historic commitments to the Republican Party. This tension, between an
ascendant and acerbic libertarian wing and a more reserved and moderate portion of the
Republican Party would continue for decades.
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Eisenhower and Reagan
As much as Eisenhower disliked Goldwater, he held an admiration for Regan beginning
with Reagan’s emergence as a rising Republican star during Goldwater’s campaign. As Reagan
prepared to run in 1968 he and Eisenhower developed a mentor-protégé relationship through
correspondence and over the course of four in person meetings, at Eisenhower’s residences in
Gettysburg and California.336 In 1965, through a mutual friend, Reagan solicited Eisenhower’s
advice on how he would suggest launching a national campaign. Eisenhower composed a letter,
counseling Reagan to market himself as a true Republican, to remind primary voters of his
loyalty in the Goldwater-Johnson race, and to attempt to win the support as many nonRepublicans as he could muster. In short, Eisenhower suggested a strategy that was similar to
the one he had used during his initial campaign.
Though this relationship seems to have been deeper and more important politically than
most historians have previously thought (there is a recent book on the topic: Gene Kopelson’s
Reagan’s 1968 Dress Rehearsal: Ike, RFK, and Reagan’s Emergence as a World Statesman,
published in 2016), Reagan’s eventual presidency provides both points of continuity and
divergence from Eisenhower that would remain important, even after Reagan left the White
House.
Specifically, both Eisenhower and Reagan crafted a public image that was meant to
appeal to a wider audience than their own party’s core constituency, both sought to cut taxes, yet
were not afraid of costly federal programs that they deemed necessary, and both talked often
about peace, though they served during the Cold War. Their differences are important, too.
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Reagan specific tax cut plan, his exuberant embrace of unparalleled free trade, his seemingly
high level of comfort with the large conventional military buildup that the United States had
come to by the time he took office all separated him from Eisenhower.
Perhaps most importantly, though, is the difference in their respective legacies within the
Republican Party and conservative movement. Eisenhower thought of as not much more than a
calm vessel for safe mediocrity during in the early years after he left office has had a rebound in
interest and admiration from scholars and politicians, alike. This increase in esteem has been
palpable, but it has not risen to deification that Republicans have frequently bestowed upon
Reagan, since he left office.
The first Republican primary debate of the 2016 cycle was held at the Reagan library, in
front of a full-sized replica of Air Force One. Failed candidates from Rubio (whose campaign
ran an ad proclaiming that “the Children of the Reagan Revolution are ready to assume the
mantle of leadership”)337 to a verbal sparring match between Ted Cruz and John McCain in
January 2016 about which one of them had been an earlier and bigger Reagan supporter.338
Candidates with little experience often liken themselves to Reagan’s original outsider status,
while candidates with political experience claim to be qualified to inherit the America that eight
years of a Reagan presidency began to form. During the strange days of the 2016 election cycle
the Clinton campaign even ran an ad arguing that Reagan would have supported a qualified
Democrat, like Clinton over Trump.
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The systematic way in which Republicans have obsessed over Reagan and his legacy
while contesting who among them is heir to his throne is demonstrable, through a catalog of a
series of mostly small, unrelated, and mundane events. In some cases, though, the reverence for
Reagan among Republicans can be observed in its most powerful emotional form.
As a high school student in Texas, I attended the 2004 state Republican Convention in
San Antonio as a volunteer page, having been appointed by my local state senator. At the
convention I spent the first two days watching county level caucus meetings, watching Rick
Perry, John Cornyn, and other party figures give standard and standardly boring convention
speeches. And then, on the final day of the convention, just a few moments before the final, all
delegate session, someone announced that everyone should be seated for an important
announcement. The crowd then learned that Reagan had passed away in the few minutes before
people had come back into the main hall. This hall, which comfortably held the 10,000 delegates
(a larger convention, the organizers often noted, than the upcoming national convention in New
York would be) quickly transformed into the type of scene that unfolds when a family member
has just been pronounced dead in an emergency room. There was crying, shrieking, praying,
hugging, and a clear sense of disconsolation. It was touching and it was frightening; it was the
first visceral encounter I had with politics. It played an important role in my fascination with
politics, which eventually led me to graduate studies in the field.
Reagan is, for many Republicans, a demi-god. He is a demi-god often shaped in the
image of the particular person attempting to claim his legacy at a given moment, but his shadow
has never faded in Republican politics. Conversely, Eisenhower, even after coming back into
fashion as a sort of sweet but quiet uncle, has never had the depth of impact on his party that
Reagan accomplished. Because of this, some of the most original and most important
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contributions of Eisenhower to Republican thought have become neglected: An active concern
about the military becoming too large, an obsessive dedication to world peace, a refusal to
intervene militarily in far away places for vague reasons, and a conviction that limited
government does not have to be crippled government are all unpopular positions within the party
today. Eisenhower may yet experience a rebound of his policy ideas within his party, but that
day has not arrived.

Eisenhower and Trump
The primary reason is that Eisenhower, not Reagan, Goldwater, or some other; even more
obscure figure is the best corollary to Trump’s rise to the White House. Both Eisenhower and
Trump were nationally famous party outsiders, who regular party members regarded as
untrustworthy renegades throughout the nomination process. Once nominated both faced more
politically experienced Democrats who ran campaigns based largely on ridicule.
In both cases, those who work in politics professionally consistently underestimated
them: campaign operatives, party leadership, and the media. Both rode popular waves to clear
electoral victories, yet those who had not voted for them met both with deep suspicion. Open
questions about the qualifications of each to be president, to form a cabinet, and to handle crises
abounded in the early days of the administration. Both were willing to make some bargains with
their party’s base, yet not afraid to bring some non-conservative and non-traditionalist elements
into their party’s leadership. Both seemed to despise what they saw as a Democratic Party that
had become corrupt and unaccountable and both marked their campaigns, with appeals of
personality.

191

Of course, the differences are large and significant. I have no doubt that Eisenhower
would be disgusted with being compared to Trump, but he may well have been even more
disgusted with Trump’s political enemies. It is not clear yet, what Trump’s presidential or
political legacies will be, but looking back to Eisenhower’s early days in office is a good place to
start, if one is searching for relevant historical comparisons.
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